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The contributions to this second volume of essays derived 
from events organized by the Centre for Research in Modern 
European Philosophy (CRMEP) have their source in the confer-
ence ‘Thinking Art’, held at the Institute for Contemporary Arts 
(ICA) London on 29 February 2020, immediately prior to the 
Covid-19 lockdown.1 As previously, the idea was to assemble an 
eclectic range of national and international speakers to present 
parts of their ongoing research, in order to provide a snapshot 
of current work on topics in which philosophical and general-
theoretical issues are at stake within and across a range of 
related disciplines. Here this includes digital humanities, poetics, 
fine art, art history, gender studies, philosophy itself, visual 
culture and postcolonial studies. In its broader sense, philosophy 
is conceived here as a transdisciplinary medium through which 
connections may be made between, and critical reflection 
provoked about, the general-theoretical aspects of concrete 
investigations. The fourfold thematic constellation of material-
isms, art and labour, instabilities of form, and social ecologies 
and intimations of catastrophe – plucked from the ether of the 
1. Klara Kemp-Welch and Christian Nyampeta were unable to attend the conference, 
but have generously made their work available here.
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present – functioned both to connect and to hold apart the 
various presentations.
The unifying conceit, on this occasion, lay in repeating 
a trope from the ICA’s past – ‘Thinking Art’2 – not in order 
to return to that time, but rather to take the measure of the 
present’s distance from it, registered in current preoccupations 
and concerns. Back then, at the outset of the 1990s, interrogation 
of the relationship between philosophy and art was still largely 
driven by the critical and political legacies of conceptual art, and 
the various anti-aesthetic agendas they bequeathed to academic 
study of art. The theoretical resources deployed, in the UK, were 
largely those of German critical theory, French philosophies of 
difference (including Lacanian psychoanalysis) and feminist art 
history. The polemical context was the attempt to maintain the 
momentum of the critical movements of the 1960s and 1970s 
beyond a traditional aesthetics which was being revived at that 
time, mainly in phenomenological forms, on the back of the so-
called ‘return to painting’ of the 1980s, spearheaded by German 
neo-expressionism.3 The lines of engagement were clearly drawn.
In the decade that followed, however, those lines quickly 
became blurred, as post-phenomenological French philosophies 
of ‘affect’ moved into the conceptual space vacated by ‘aesthetic’, 
in a manner that combined claims to philosophical radicalism 
with an artistic conservatism and covert political romanticism.4 
2. See Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne, eds, Thinking Art: Beyond Traditional 
Aesthetics, London: Institute of Contemporary Arts (ICA), 1991 – the inaugural 
publication of the ICA’s Philosophical Forum, set up the previous year by its then 
Director of Talks, Linda Brandon.
3. In the UK, the emblematic exhibition was A New Spirit in Painting at the Royal 
Academy of Arts in 1981. Work by artists from that show have been reassembled this 
year, at the Whitechapel Gallery, in The Return of the Spirit in Painting, alongside a 
companion exhibition, Radical Figures: Painting in the New Millennium. Whether this pair 
of shows reveals the enduring ‘radicalism’ of painting (qua painting) or merely reaffirms 
the deepening conservative political function of its cyclical ‘returns’ is a moot point.
4. The rhythm of this movement was overdetermined by the somewhat haphazard 
temporality of translation. Lyotard’s 1974 Libidinal Economy first appeared in English 
in 1993; Deleuze’s 1981 Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation (the most influential of 
these texts) in 2003. Meanwhile, Lyotard’s more philosophically significant work of 1971, 
Discourse, Figure, was not translated into English until 2019.
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At the same time, new forms of cultural management appropri-
ated, academicized and contained the critical tendencies of 
the 1980s within the new cultural-industrial forms imposed 
on universities (including the incorporation of the art schools), 
in a series of ideological waves, the neoliberal force of which 
continues to build.5 With the decline of the supportive political 
cultures from which they had arisen, art practices concerned 
to triangulate relations between concept, politics and critique 
retreated in the face of institutional developments associated 
with the growing primacy of markets, involving not only the 
integration of museums, galleries and other kinds of art spaces 
into the entertainment industries, but the institutions of art edu-
cation themselves. Critical conceptions of the culture industry 
were displaced by affirmative, governmental concepts of ‘creative 
industries’. In the new university art schools, little art-theoretical 
reflection, or even more straightforward forms of art-historical 
knowledge, were judged necessary for the projected vocational 
aspirations of students redesignated as clients. This was the 
point at which right-wing attacks on the ‘elitism’ of the arts and 
humanities provided ‘market democracy’ with its most effective 
political argument – three decades after the left-populist version 
of that critique had begun to transform those disciplines them-
selves, in a process derided by the Right as ‘dumbing down’.
Today, the philosophical debates that set the intellectual tone 
of the anglophone artworld largely concern so-called ‘new’ – 
especially ‘vital’ and ‘speculative’ – materialisms; the changing 
and precarious character of labour; the dematerializing effects 
of social relations and technologies on the destabilization of 
formal categories; and ecological crisis, postcoloniality and the 
Anthropo cene. The four sections of this book take up variants 
5. The Hochschule der Künste Berlin became a university in 2001, for example; 
University of the Arts London was formed in 2003–4 out of the bulk of the London arts’ 
colleges.
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of these themes, respectively, in variously critical ways. What 
unifies the essays is not any particular theoretical stance, but a 
concern to maintain a thinking of art and its related discourses 
that is sceptical of all attempts to use the new eco-naturalisms 
and vitalisms as an alibi for stopping thinking about art socially. 
In an art context, the flight from thinking socially cannot avoid 
becoming a neo-aestheticism – whatever its theoretical modali-
ties and purported political intent. 
The question that opened the Introduction to the previous 
collection of essays with the same title as this one, thirty years 
ago – ‘In what way, if any, does art need philosophy, or phil-
osophy art?’ – unanswered then, remains as open and contested 
today as it ever was; and equally, if not more likely to provoke 
anxiety, on both sides. All the more reason, one might think, for 




I would like to thank Richard Birkett for initiating the renewed 
collaboration between the ICA London and CRMEP in 2018, 
which led to the conference from which this book derives; and 
the ICA curators Nydia Swaby and Sara Sassanelli, for taking it 
on and seeing it through to completion with such equanimity.









Take a look around, then cut through. 
Hélène Cixous1 
New media materialism is a mode of digital media studies that 
declares itself closer to the ‘truth’ of things, and that rejects 
other approaches as representational, as interested in the 
image and distortions – and therefore further from this reality 
or truth. This judgement is founded on a presumption that 
matter – in this case, the specific materials of computational 
and digital technologies and what they enable – is at the very 
heart of the matter. Consonant with this research priority are 
explorations of the ‘weird materialities’ of the medium-specific, 
or considerations of the dynamics of information systems that 
are determinedly post-critical. There is nothing underneath to be 
revealed, nothing beyond, and almost nothing before to condi-
tion what has come, or what will come after. 
This vision needs exploding, in the interests of technological 
feminism as a political project that addresses gender injustices, 
experienced in particular ways as they intersect with other 
1. Hélène Cixous, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, 
Signs, vol. 1, no. 4, Summer 1976, pp. 875–93, p. 892. The original, ‘Le Rire de la Meduse’, 
appeared in L’Arc, 1975, pp. 39–54. 
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discriminations, or, to put this more systematically, understood 
as always already entangled with other forms of inequality – 
those of race, class, sexuality, ableism, notably.
This vision also needs exploring, because even if new media 
materialism is problematic it responds to a moment, addressing 
a need – a demand for engagement and encounter with emerging 
forms of technology – that insistently provokes questions not 
only about what we mean by activity or agency (that of human 
users, that of machines, their interactions) but also what we 
mean by animation, liveness, intelligence, intelligent life. 
This essay at once constitutes a specific investigation of new 
materialist media studies and explores an earlier response to 
the broader conjuncture, Furious, a jointly authored monograph/
manual demanding a reconsideration of material studies of 
the digital and insisting that such a reconsideration can be 
critical.2 It recognizes the appeal of new materialism for digital 
media studies, the difficulty of finding a critical perch in the 
contemporary situation of pervasive computation, and problems 
with purely representational analysis. We are also materialists, 
although not ‘new materialism’ materialists – not least because 
we do not recognize the absolute cleavage between material 
analysis and historically materialist analysis that new material-
isms insist upon. 
Furious responds to the claims of new materialism, in part, 
through a defence of embodiment; understanding rationality 
as embodied, passionate, affective, as well as a matter of logical 
ratiocination. Moreover it uses embodiment (the materiality of 
bodies) to think about the materiality of informatics. Doing so, 
of course, it attaches itself to an expert tradition: feminism has 
thought about technology, epistemology and ontology and/in 
relation to the (differently available) possibilities of becoming in 
2. Caroline Bassett, Sarah Kember, Kate O’Riordan, Furious: Technological Feminism and 
Digital Futures, London: Pluto, 2020.
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a particular world order for decades now. Moreover, it has always 
been interested in instantiation as excessive and untidy, as 
incomplete. As Hélène Cixous put it in a 1975 address to women, 
‘At the end of a more or less conscious computation, she finds 
not her sum but her differences.’3
Of lists What are the politics of the relationship between new 
materialism, digital technologies and vitalism? How does this 
relationship matter now? To frame the question this way is 
already to make an assumption, or to prioritize a particular 
mode of investigation. It is to presume that there is a relationship 
to be explored, and that its significance is political. Some might 
prefer to talk of the material, the digital and the vital, and to join 
them only through the ‘gentle knot’ of the comma.4 This might 
produce a connection purged of those irritating ‘extra’ isms 
(feminism, for instance) that are felt by many new materialisms 
to screw things up. 
Whichever way these connections are made (much hangs on 
that) questions concerning materialisms, vitality and the digital 
or computational arise with a particular force in the current con-
juncture.5 Digital developments in general and in AI in particular 
give revived salience to long-standing popular associations 
or even equivalences: between the liveliness of machines and 
considerations of organic or human ‘life’ itself; between human 
and the machinic agency; and between the capacity of the 
medium to constitute itself as the message (McLuhan memorably 
understood the light bulb as a medium technology) and vitalism 
which is often also understood as ‘without content’.6 
3. Cixous, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, p. 893.
4. Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be a Thing, Minneapolis MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2012, p. 38. 
5. ‘“[C]onjunctural analysis” can be broadly defined as the analysis of convergent and 
divergent tendencies shaping the totality of power relations within a given social field 
during a particular period of time.’ Jeremy Gilbert, ‘This Conjuncture: For Stuart Hall’, 
New Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 96, 2019, pp. 5–37. 
6. See, for example, Scott Lash’s discussion of Agamben in ‘Life (Vitalism) 2’, Theory, 
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How these associations are understood and what their signifi-
cance might be preoccupy current digital scholarship, and figure 
largely in public culture – as media art, in debates, in fiction, 
for instance. A feature of this discourse taken as a whole is its 
tendency to fuse the actual with the predicted; imaginaries of 
technological futures with extant possibilities. This tendency is 
also in evidence in more specialist registers where it may produce 
a validatory (short) circuit. The AI algorithms instantiated in 
machine learning systems in social media systems, for instance, 
might be grounds for the identification of a kind of machinic 
vitalism in extant computational systems. Their real existence 
is then taken as evidence of the reliability of predictions of what 
will soon arise, true intelligence, or Singularity, in some cases 
taking the form of awakening artificial life. Let us call this rising 
a form of post-human vitalism. 
Whether such a development would be likely to be for good or 
ill divides opinions among those who most confidently predict its 
coming. Some Singularity adherents are markedly enthusiastic 
about emerging forms of future life; others, fatalistically sure 
of the advent of Singularity, are more pessimistic about the 
prospects for future (human) being it opens up.7 
Of fury A different response to ‘all this’, to the current conjunc-
ture as it looks, as it feels, as it operates and as it orders, is fury. 
And that is where I want to begin. I assert that fury is a justifi-
able response to development priorities and trajectories of the 
tech industries as these operate at various scales across multiple 
fields; a justifiable response to the ways in which these trajecto-
ries are shaped and determined, and to what their imaginaries 
Culture & Society, vol. 23, nos 2–3, 2006, pp. 323–49.
7. ‘Optimistically’, these new people will be ‘us … greatly changed’; pessimistically 
they are humanity’s successors, ‘a new race, the inheritors of the earth … usurpers’. 
Russell Blackford, ‘The Great Transition’, in The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and 
Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, 
London: Wiley, 2013, pp. 421–9, p. 442. 
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promise. It is a fury that is justified because of what is being 
damaged, curtailed, undermined and taken away, now and for 
the future. A key problem is a lack of ambition, a lack of proper 
care for all that which exceeds the value it is given by the market, 
even as it is bound up within its constraining logics. 
Further, I argue, theorizations that bind up invocations of 
vitality with assertions of the prior external determination 
of material digital things (ontological claims for priority) and 
attach both (or, certainly, fail to detach them) to the promise 
of digital advance as progress (more computation, more life), as 
an unexamined good, are in danger of producing a formation 
bound up with, underscoring and ultimately helping to deliver 
these kinds of trajectories. This rather than, for instance, 
opening up possibilities for creating and deploying intelligent 
technologies to rethink the horizons of the possible, and the 
shaping of desire. I am interested in both the ideological heft 
of this kind of anti-ideological formation and in the material 
operations and impacts it produces or endorses, these being 
entangled. 
If fury seems too strong as a response, consider the invocation 
of AI solutionism in relation to environmental crisis; space ex-
ploration as a response to planetary devastation, or the promise 
of renewed life in some cryogenically accessed and medically 
advanced future time. There’s always another space, always 
another time, to be had in these kinds of solutions. Or consider 
the ‘friendship packages’ offered by service robots designed for 
old people. Fungible robotics are here being offered in exchange 
for the specific other, my friend, that person. This an exchange 
underpinned by the appeal of the robot as the almost really alive. 
Can this robot be my friend? It can if your mind is not what 
it was and if you (your NHS) cannot afford ‘human’ care. The 
issue here is not the automation of particular tasks per se, nor 
the expanding agency of machines, but the substitutional fakery 
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entailed in the promise of this kind of (anti-) social contract – 
and its reliance on pricing. 
These are brutal examples. They are invoked here to insist on 
how political these issues are, and to ask how they are political, 
which is not quite the same thing. I hope they gesture toward 
ways in which the promise of life, the full life of Singular AI 
or, in more mundane spheres, the quasi-vitalism ascribed to 
particular forms of computational activity (machine learning, 
emergent agency, robotic personality) can align with, indeed can 
contribute to, the structuring of computational capitalism with 
its obscene inequalities. Artificial friendship is a contradiction in 
terms. Another relationship is possible. 
Compulsory (computational) capitalism? The AI technologies at 
the heart of robotics (or at the head of them) are of course digital 
technologies, and high-end AI projects and imaginaries can be 
understood as an exotic (but just as unreal) moment in the larger 
scene of what Mark Fisher memorably called capitalist realism,8 
now taking on computational form in ways we are familiar 
with. These ways include machine learning, big data, platform 
capitalism, pervasive censorship, further automation in the 
everyday and at work. Ellen Meiksins Wood claimed capitalism 
became ‘compulsory’ when the market could not be escaped; we 
might say the same for computational capitalism as a variant of 
this.9 We cannot simply choose to ‘escape the infosphere’, as some 
suggest, given its global reach and its pervasive scaling – from 
the interior of the body and far below that scale, right up to the 
satellite.10 Anti-computing, a selective rejection of the compu-
tational rather than the social relations it articulates, does not 
8. Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?, Winchester: Zero Books, 
2009.
9. Ellen Meiksins Wood, ed. Larry Patriquin, The Ellen Meiksins Wood Reader, Leiden: 
Brill, 2012. 
10. See, for example, Irmgard Emmelhainz, ‘Can We Share a World Beyond 
Representation?’, E-Flux Journal 106, February 2020. 
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provide the basis for a critical technical politics, because the two 
categories cannot be unbound, or not without damage to each 
side. Responding to the situation of enclosure, however, is not 
impossible, even if it may all too easily appear to be unrealistic. 
Fisher’s point about capitalist realism, after all, was that it 
produces the appearance of inevitability – and projects that into 
the future. 
One reason to be furious right now is that the technological 
future could be different if the horizon of the market could be 
exceeded – so that care, for instance, was recalibrated, or so that 
interactions between intelligent machines and humans could 
be more creatively, fruitfully and less reductively explored, or so 
that space was not viewed as a universal market. This case is the 
harder to make because of ways in which the computational is 
coming to us, is being given to us. 
What I am concerned about in particular here are the ways 
in which claims made about the material specificity of techni-
cal media as that which underpins contemporary forms of life 
(digital being, artificial being, cyborg being) and claims about 
artificial life or agency or vitality come to support each other. 
They thereby function to obfuscate a series of distinctions or 
conjunctions between forms of agency and modes of action, 
and between activity and autonomy. These distinctions, their 
main tenance or dissolution, demand interrogation. In some 
forms their elision contributes to producing a felt material 
‘reality’ (a realism) that may not be contested (in that it is based 
on ontology) but only modified or modulated (and is in this sense 
‘post’-critique). The non-contestable, which derives from the 
ontological, is to be distinguished from the compulsory, as that 
which, to recap, is ordered through social relations, as a techno-
social order, which may be refused. 
It is perhaps salutary here to recognize that connec-
tions between intelligent machines and artificial life or 
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agency, which are being made afresh in this era, are also 
long-standing. The rise of the robotic uncanny in films and 
elsewhere from the early twentieth century points to this. 
Metropolis would be the obvious example. However, these con-
nections are worked through in different ways and take new 
forms – this being necessary perhaps because if, on the one 
hand, the link seems to demand to be made – the liveliness 
of machines points to their agency – on the other it entails 
an uncomfortable joining. Consider that the computational 
is often valued for being dead right, for being impartial, 
neutral, passive, for running the numbers. Criticism when 
the programme conspicuously fails to run as planned often 
focuses on the failure of an automatic process to be automatic 
or artificial enough. Human bias got into the algorithm. The 
concern is with the human corruption of the ‘soul’ of the new 
machine: at one end of this scale, mass media training data-
producing ‘Nazi’ robots’; on the other, academics’ inveterate 
tendency to theorize. 
Or take Singularity discourse, a synecdoche for a more 
general formation, and useful to press home the tensions arising 
here. Singularity science certainly subscribes to the prefer-
ence for the calculable and is focused on this when assessing 
material developments in this field – developments such as 
what a computer may do if it surpasses a particular number of 
calculations a minute, let’s say. On the other hand, it entertains 
a mostly unexamined vitalism operating on a grand scale. The 
paradox of vital life and absolute instrumentalism is thus writ 
large in Singularity debates. It is also found operating in a 
different register in more mundane contexts. I am pointing here 
to the general circulation of a similar discourse of tensioned or 
paradoxical equivalence – the one that says life is coded, and so 
algorithmic code is life. Are we our virtual selves? This question 
is routinely asked. 
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Digital materialism(s) A question asked less often, figuring 
in more theoretical registers, is whether this equivalence 
or conflation is constituted through a mode of reduction or 
abstraction (via a cybernetic account based on systems analysis 
in which machine and human actions are rendered into systemic 
abstraction) or by way of a new or revived form of post-human 
(or anti-human) vitalism. The two approaches in fact tend to 
reverse into each other. A decade ago Scott Lash noted that the 
rise of digital media systems produced the revival of a form of 
vitalism that understood not ‘media in terms of life, but life in 
terms of media’, producing talk of ‘information is alive’.11 This 
is not quite a vital materialism, but digital material(ism) as 
entailing the description of a vital material. Lash suggested that 
this revival (the rise of what he terms a neo-vitalism – which we 
might term a digital vitalism) occurred ‘because content itself 
and indeed life itself is swept up in the global flows of finance, 
information and media’. He thus argues that this form of vital-
ism has its roots in a media or information heuristic. This might 
be the more persuasive if we accept – pace McLuhan – that the 
dominant content of new media is the medium itself. Remedia-
tion theory, with its obsession with the forms of old media, and 
which accepts as fixed a hard content/medium division that is 
contingent, and that also exhibits a problematic sense of medium 
seriality, is overplayed. 
From media to material How do different understandings of the 
material of digital media give rise to different characterizations 
of the relationship between the vital and the digital? Specifically, 
how do various forms of medium theory adopting strong new 
materialist approaches respond to the message from the Silicon 
Valley, articulated in its products and evident in its discourse: the 
11. Lash, ‘Life (Vitalism) 2’. 
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message about progress, about more – more technology, more 
activity, more agency, more control, more life? This is a message 
that is at odds with computational instantiations that often work 
to produce the opposite of all of that for the many (differentially 
for all of us) living within its compulsory grounds. My answer is 
that in so far as these accounts accept rather than question the 
priority of a particular sense of material advance, and therefore 
also precondition a response to vitalism (which is permed out 
from a media heuristic that is not curious about itself) they do 
not offer an adequate response. Thinking through, or working 
from, a feminist perspective that is not aligned to new material-
ism but rather questions its assumptions is one way to explore 
why not. 
But this is not my answer entirely. And I am not the only one 
who is furious. 
Kate O’Riordan, Sarah Kember and I published Furious as 
a six-handed, machine-assisted, techno-feminist production, 
arguing for other ways to think about digital materialism and/
in its relationship to questions of the real, the imaginary, the 
symbolic, the vital, the human and the machine. Furious seeks 
to generate a form of digital materialism that breaks with new 
materialism(s) in general, even while it is sympathetic to, and 
values the restorative work of, some of its exponents. It argues 
that a feminism that continues to value critique can point to 
why new approaches are needed to grapple with computational 
developments that blur still further divisions between meaning-
ful forms of agency and who or what may hold agency, or be an 
agent, and that feminist epistemologies can suggest way to gen-
erate them. Contra Rosi Braidotti and a feminism of affirmation 
we assert the continuing possibility of this mode of feminism, 
although we also recognize the necessity of rethinking how and 
where it might be undertaken, what its possible situation might 
be, and how it might be composed or assembled. 
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To the extent that it follows the arguments of Furious, this 
essay is not mine at all. It is ours, a six-hander at least – and all 
of those hands are augmented. 
So where are the others? The digital media artist Hito Steyerl 
once gave a performance lecture at the ICA in London centred 
on a bullet that wasn’t there, although it was constantly invoked 
through gesture.12 A space in the talk was reserved for the bullet. 
Its spectral presence was felt – although it couldn’t fire. Writing 
this essay, an elaboration of a talk also given at the ICA, in part 
a retrospective, I too am aware of a structuring absence: I am 
missing the virtuous armature of my co-writers. If I now invoke 
them, this is not only with the aim of shoring up my position 
or amplifying my firepower; nor is it done only in the interest 
of citational ethics. It is because Furious set out to respond to 
questions about feminism and digital materialism(s) through a 
writing process, as well as by producing an output – this was one 
of the ways it was itself at some distance from the representa-
tional mode of inquiry.13 
Furious explored what a digital writing body can be by produc-
ing a body of writing: a redoubled embodiment, then, and one 
that located itself within an increasingly pervasive (compulsory) 
media system but did not see itself as entirely defined by its 
place there. Pace Joanna Drucker, who declares the end of the 
individual voice, its dispersal into networks, and the confusion of 
writing and code,14 we claimed a body, an augmented body, that 
was ours. Our technical extensions were continuous with us, but 
they did not claim us. Perhaps the simplest way to put this – and 
one that I will come back to since it relates to questions of 
12. Hito Steyerl, Is the Museum a Battlefield?, talk delivered to the ICA, London, March 
2014. 
13. Cixous: ‘To write, an act…’; ‘it’s with her body that she vitally supports the “logic” of 
her speech’. ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, pp. 880–81. 
14. Johanna Drucker, ‘Beyond Conceptualisms: Poetics after Critique and the End of 
the Individual Voice’, The Poetry Project Newsletter, April–May 2012; https://pages.gseis.
ucla.edu/faculty/drucker/Paris/PoetryNewsletter_IndVoice.pdf.
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differential agency, that of humans and that of things – is that 
we claimed authorship. 
Furious was an experiment in authorship when the latter is 
construed not only by exploring what is authored (a body of 
work) but also by considering what/who authors: those writing 
hands, those technical prostheses and/in their afforded but non-
equal relation, those other processes of production, circulation, 
distribution. It sought to be what Walter Benjamin, in a peculiar 
exploration of authorship and political intent, once defined as 
‘operational’15 – the key to this being a certain correspondence 
between a political and literary ‘tendency’. Furious connects 
to this in the sense that the form it takes extrudes the hope it 
expresses, and in both cases the extrusion and the expression 
are meant politically. I take operationalization here to imply a 
material or literary articulation and also, now following Franco 
Moretti rather than Benjamin, and moving onto digital terrain, 
to entail the construction of new concepts.16 
One of these is a radical intersectionality. Furious begins and 
ends by locating computational capitalism within the contexts 
of the (misnamed) Anthropocene; the latter being taken as 
continuous with all human and non-human future possibilities, 
and as essentially experienced in relation to difference in situ-
ation, position, exclusion, discrimination and violence. This is 
the starting point for the identification of the need to elaborate 
a mode of intersectionality that begins with but does not stop 
at human crossings; that opens up the category ‘human’ even as 
it simultaneously explores the boundaries between human and 
non-human. This draws on, but also breaks with, Karen Barad’s 
new materialist sense of intra-activity as a way to understand 
15. Benjamin declared that ‘the literary tendency of a work can only be politically 
correct if it is also literarily correct’, adding that ‘the correct political tendency of a work 
includes its literary quality because it includes its literary tendency’. ‘The Author as 
Producer’, in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 2, London and New York: Harvard 
University Press, 2004, pp. 768–81, p. 769. 
16. See Franco Moretti, Distant Reading, London and New York: Verso, 2013.
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the agential. It recognizes the intention of materializing what 
might otherwise be invoked through discourse, in accounts of 
the formation of personhood and more broadly in accounts 
of agency or the capacity to act and respond in the world as 
valuable. But it is at odds with the degree to which intra-activity 
founds all that is inaugural (all that matters) in the unprevisible17 
encounter. To put it tongue-twistily, a putative politics based on 
the intra-sectional could allow matter itself to matter more than 
it mattered before (Barad’s demand being that it should),18 but 
the problem that then arises is how to account for that which 
is brought to the intersection, that pre-existing experience, or 
condition, or history. All these factors contribute to why an 
intersectional politics is found necessary, to why its importance 
continues to be demonstrated. 
So, recognizing a need to re-materialize intersectionality in 
relation to the demands made urgent by the Anthropocene, we 
did not seek to develop an intra-sectional account but rather to 
build a radical form of intersectionality. This expands agency, 
recognizes a diversity of agents, acknowledges the futility of 
assuming all are (in the last analysis) agents of the human (the 
fantasy of mastery), but asserts nonetheless the distinctiveness 
of (post-) human being, as a form (of) being alive which stands 
in contradistinction to the presumption of a heterogenous 
vitality – whether this is spread thin or thick – and insists on the 
distinctiveness of specifically human actions. It enables critique. 
Furious laughter? It also allows for laughter. Indeed it in part 
works through it. If Furious advocates the construction of a radical 
17. The neologism is from Beckett and is a play on the French prevoir. Beckett talks of 
the ‘ultimately unprevisible atom’ (cited in Conor Carville, Samuel Beckett and the Visual, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 57). 
18. See Karen Barad, ‘Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How 
Matter Comes to Matter’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 28, no. 3, 
Spring, 2003, pp. 801–31. ‘Discourse matters. Culture matters … the only thing that does 
not seem to matter anymore is matter’ (p. 801). 
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intersectional politics as a response to the digital condition, it 
also sought to make operational in its own approaches some of 
the elements that might be important in that politics. Specifically, 
Furious invoked Hélène Cixous, who declared the laughter of the 
god-slayer Medusa a feminist weapon, a way for feminism to at 
once affirm and critique, claim rationality and undermine the 
exclusionary claims of a rationality that works by excluding much 
that matters – including bodies that matter. Laughter allows 
writing to become full-throated, to be excessive, and may be a 
means through which to refuse/confuse/defuse divisions erected 
between materiality and its meaning. It is also a means through 
which to assert or explore distinctions between writing and 
code, even while one is constantly articulated through the other. 
Laughter, then, was one of our operators. It can disturb natural-
ized claims and assumptions, including those that conventionally 
divide the rational and the affective, ideation and the material, 
nature and culture. Laughter moreover can enable a mode of 
argumentation that is predicated not on deliberation alone 
(certainly not to the degree that this implies an always possible 
reconciliation through modulation) but that also rests on antago-
nism. Laughter calls out stupidity – the latter defined, following 
Patrick Crogan, who is concerned in particular with digitally 
realized stupidity, as failing to ask how we are governed.19
Laughter, new materialism and media theory Laughter com-
municates. This was also of use to us. Laughter can respond 
mockingly to the entirely serious and very fierce attention paid 
to the material ‘truth’ that characterizes the approach of various 
contemporary digital media materialisms. This latter is an atten-
tion that misses its mark because it refuses to see what is (also) 
there, all that which thickens, symbolizes, communicates. We may 
19. Patrick Crogan, ‘Indie Dreams: Video Games, Creative Economy, and the 
Hyperindustrial Epoch’, Games and Culture, vol. 13, no. 7, 2018, pp. 671–89.
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as well admit now that one of the spurs to writing the book was 
a kind of fury with the suggestion of excommunication; as that 
situation which will come, on whose doorstep we sit. Meanwhile, 
it is argued, communication itself is in trouble. Alex Galloway’s 
account of this trouble begins with hermeneutics and imma-
nence, which are then superseded by a third mode, designated by 
his invocation of the Furies (animals, ‘bitches’, defiling creatures), 
who come to define that condition of networked complexity 
we are now in.20 Against the daemonic intensity of the (entirely 
inhuman) Furies, and the post-critical response their figuration 
would seem to curate, we set the furious laughter of Medusa. For 
Cixous laughter is meaningful. It may therefore disrupt or dispute 
the seriality of the ex-communicative account (hermeneutics, 
symptomatics, swarms/systems) and for that matter the transla-
tion of these to the media forms/formats they are said to define: 
the text, the image, the system (the machine, the network). 
Contra Galloway’s claim, the last ‘system’ does not have to, or 
does not always or entirely, ‘combine and annihilate’ the others.21 
Furious understands systems thinking, and accepts a net-
worked condition, but does not ‘abdicate’ presence or difference, 
nor is it inhuman. On the contrary, as a contingent post-human 
body, writing furiously and with shared intent, we seek to 
find ways to do more than ‘put the world in flight’ through 
‘infuriation’ and we have a different sense of what antagonism 
can imply, of what a response to ‘furious media’ might be.22 We 
are not entirely writing against the Furies here. There is also 
the fourth way suggested by Galloway: a love in the middle of 
execrable, insufferable sweetness, standing for something beyond 
antagonism and difference. We’d back the Furies against this any 
20. Alex Galloway, ‘Love of the Middle’, in Alexander R. Galloway, Eugene Thacker and 
McKenzie Wark, Excommunication: Three Inquiries in Media and Mediation, Chicago and 
London: Chicago University Press, 2013. 
21. Ibid., p. 56. 
22. Ibid., pp. 59, 62.
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day, and we think they may have their reason(s). In a different 
era, Cixous suggested two aims for women writing: to ‘destroy’ 
and to foresee the unforeseeable, which is to say to ‘project’. In 
other words, ‘break up the “truth” with laughter’ and then ask 
what may be newly affirmed.23 This might also mean that the 
prospects of what lies beyond the portal (or what stronger AI, for 
instance, might open up as ‘alien’ media) could be explored in 
less schismatic ways. Perhaps that is gnomic. Some explication 
might be necessary.
Let us note here that excommunication theory (to call it that) 
is only one variant of new media new materialism, which itself 
swims in a larger sea. New materialism is a label given to four or 
five strands of thinking – speculative realism, objected oriented 
ontology (OOO), digital materialism as medium theory, new 
materialist feminisms – those of Barad (quantum materialism as 
post-critique)24 and to some extent Braidotti (with a more or less 
Deleuzean slant), notably. Braidotti herself rightly questions the 
claim to new materialism as ‘new’ in these formations, acknowl-
edging traditions of materialism that pre-date many of the 
present forms.25 Feminism, after all, was thinking about bodies 
as well as texts long before Harman and the OOO, speculative 
realism, software studies and attacks on Kantian correlationism. 
On the other hand, these forms of new materialism (or quasi-
new materialism) share what has been called an ‘atmosphere’,26 
a more or less contemporary discontent with post-structuralism 
and a hostility to historical materialism, critical theory and the 
‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ (as Keston Sutherland notes in this 
volume), which takes new forms. 
23. Cixous,‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, p. 888.
24. See Jussi Parikka’s characterization of Barad as insisting on ‘the mode of ‘critique’ 
as harmful for contemporary cultural analysis. Machinology, 2014, jussiparikk.net, n.pag.
25. Rosi Braidotti, ‘Borrowed Energy’, interview by Timotheus Vermeulen, Frieze, 
https://frieze.com/article/borrowed-energy, n.pag.  
26. Simon Choat, ‘Science, Agency and Ontology: A Historical-Materialist Response to 
New Materialism’, Political Studies, vol. 66, no. 4, 2017, pp. 1027–42, p. 1028. 
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This means that exploring what Jussi Parikka has called 
the prospects for ‘new materialism as media theory’27 demands 
acknowledgement that we are breathing in this ‘atmosphere’ 
(perhaps this could be defined as a conjuncture), and also 
perhaps an acknowledgement that even within media theory 
there are different variants. In what follows, I shift the focus 
of attention from critical theory (Galloway) towards German 
medium theory/media archaeological materialisms in order to 
pursue, or to re-find, a linkage between the vital and the digital. 
Dead or alive? Media without mediation? A rapid detour through 
Jane Bennett’s influential discussion of vital materialism is 
useful here. Bennett finds in assemblages of many kinds (non-
differentiation is part of the point) a vitality or agential capacity 
that she explores as ‘thing power’. In Vibrant Matter she argues 
that ‘edibles, commodities, storms and metals act as quasi agents 
with their own trajectories, potentialities and tendencies’ and 
contribute to what makes networks or assemblages operational. 
A force inheres in objects that is not fully comprehensible in 
human terms, a force that must be found in the object itself, its 
material. Bennett can thus ask: 
What counts as the material of vital materialism? Is it only human 
labour and the socio-economic entities made by men using raw 
materials? Or is materiality more potent than that? How can political 
theory do a better job of recognizing the active participation of 
nonhuman forces in every event and every stabilization? Is there a 
form of theory that can acknowledge a certain ‘thing-power’, that is, 
the irreducibility of objects to the human meanings or agendas they 
also embody?28
Bennett is clear that she prefers the more potent materialities 
of what might have previously been thought inert over entities 
27. Jussi Parikka, ‘New Materialism as Media Theory: Medianatures and Dirty Matter’, 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, March 2012, pp. 95–100.
28. Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, Durham NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010. 
20 thinking art
dominated by human ‘things’ (socio-economics, for instance), 
and while humans (among other actants) retain forms of agency 
in the models she envisages this is reduced: as things become 
live humans are viewed as more inert – they are also kept apart; 
no prosthesis or extension is allowed. Scott Lash has noted that 
vitalism has historically never been much preoccupied with the 
human, and this is evident here too. It may be partly why what 
is made by ‘men’ (sic) sits uneasily in Bennett’s account since it 
certainly relies on a mode of vitalism. It is that which provides 
for forms of agency, for a potency that sometimes appears 
charged with an élan vital. There are mystical undertones to 
the potentialities Bennett finds in multiple things and in their 
assemblages. How the latter are assembled is less clear, and if 
they communicate they certainly do not mediate. 
New materialist analyses of new media, also concerned to 
understand material force and also confronting the question 
of how that force is lively, or how it operates (and doing so in 
relation to that cathected relationship between a technology 
invested in the automation of cognition and matters of agency, 
and liveliness), operate at a different set of borders. This time 
the task is not to blur boundaries dividing inanimate things (and 
their agency) from conscious beings. Rather, but also in the inter-
ests of a (new) materialism, a rather different set of boundaries 
are to be reinstated. 
The point is to divide media from medium, the real from the 
representational. Bennett listens in and hears something like 
a life force. New media materialism makes it a priority to strip 
away the barnacles of what is imputed to digital materials or 
to digital operations (including Bennett’s mystic encrustations) 
in order to look harder at the real thing. Where Bennett wants 
to winkle a thing out of its perceived inertia, seeking ways to 
understand its aliveness and its agency, new materialism as a 
medium theory works instead to winkle the media thing out of 
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its historical contexts, its horizons, and in doing so to strip it of 
its accretions, its secondaries, which are regarded as unhealthy. 
Technical media objects and systems not representations. De-
scription of what is there, not theorizations that might encrust 
it.29 You might say the material turn in digital medium theory 
produces an insistence on finding the essence of the thing. The 
rest is thought inessential, an outer skin to be sloughed off, a 
rind we could do without or a filter habit we need to get over; the 
habit being to believe in magic (Bennett’s work has been rejected 
for this) or in mediation, the latter being a habit of accepting 
that the world comes to us as we are able to sense it and as 
we make it meaningful. This is the route that will produce an 
understanding both of technical media and of its (real) power; 
that which stands and operates prior to matters of significance as 
these might be interpreted and assessed.
In that strand of German Medium Theory embodied in 
Kittler’s work and latterly developed through Wolfgang Ernst’s 
work on temporality, which is in the same tradition and which 
has come also to be defined as a form of media archaeology, 
these arguments find full expression. They produce both a 
diagnosis (as Kittler put it: codes ‘determine’ us today )30 and a 
demand. The demand is for a particular form of analysis or ap-
proach to the study of mediatic forms. For both Ernst and Kittler 
this is at once a response to developments, since the rise of 
technical media makes such investigative orientations necessary, 
if they were not before, and constitutes an overdue recognition of 
what might have always been necessary to investigate technical 
29. The distance here from ‘thing theory’ might seem great. But there are obvious 
connections. In an eponymous article Bill Brown begins by wondering if things may 
not be let alone; ‘let them rest somewhere else … beyond theory … [in] some place of 
origin unmediated by the sign … something concrete that relieves us from unnecessary 
abstraction.’ Bill Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, Critical Inquiry 28, Autumn 2001, pp. 1–22; ‘fat 
chance’, he goes on to add. 
30. Friedrich Kittler, ‘Code (or, How you can write something differently)’, in Matt 
Fuller, ed., Software Studies: A Lexicon, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 2008, 
pp. 40–46, p. 40.
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media. Jussi Parikka, writing in more or less the same tradition, 
pushes this claim further and gives it an ontological justification 
when he argues that ‘new materialism is already present in the 
way technical media transmits and processes ‘‘culture”.’ This 
claim is somewhat peculiarly expressed,31 but it usefully indicates 
the degree to which approaches developed by Kittler and Ernst, 
around very specific technical media, have broadened to become 
a general orientation extant across a range of new-materialism-
inspired forms of investigation of the computational. It also 
points to the degree to which (or why) new media materialists 
regard themselves as insiders – their analyses being immanent to 
the material they are studying. This produces a series of accounts 
that are affirmative, ‘non-ideological’, and that regard themselves  
by virtue of their position as exceptionally effective. 
It is striking that in these approaches the central kernel to 
be reached, or the essential matter to be explored, is variously 
determined as software, hardware, code, algorithm. The process 
of sloughing off of everything else, purging it of the dirty real (all 
that dirty realism, for instance)32 thus produces not one, but a 
number of things. That essence is not as easy to get hold of as it 
might appear to be. We are at any rate entitled to ask again what 
kind of media objects are these? 
The claims made for them are big. They are often big objects: 
big data, powerful algorithms, global networks. Their scale and 
reach are also expanded by way of the promissory notes attached 
to them, which they seem to articulate or even materialize.33 Big 
data points to the coming of even bigger data, and even towards 
complete data and the end of all necessity for interpretation: ‘all 
31. Jussi Parikka, ‘New Materialism as Media Theory: Medianatures and Dirty Matter’, 
Communications and Critical Cultural Studies, vol 9, no. 1, 2012, pp. 95–100, p. 95. Bill 
Brown argues that each new media form reorganizes the relationship between people 
and things (‘Thing Theory’, p. 16).
32. See Fredric Jameson on dirty realism as a form of vital intensity: The Seeds of Time, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 145. 
33. Dana Boyd and Kate Crawford, ‘Critical Questions for Big Data’, Information, 
Communication and Society, vol. 15, no. 5, 2012, pp. 662–79. 
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the numbers’, meaning ‘no more theory’. Un-accidentally this now 
notorious suggestion from Chris Anderson first gained traction 
in Wired magazine.34 Or consider the algorithm, and its proving 
power, or claims made for machine learning and emergence. 
These examples point to the degree to which these things bloat; 
they threaten to become unreal objects, as Kate O’Riordan would 
put it.35 But there is also shrinkage. Look harder and these things 
become increasingly less substantial; they shrink. They become 
almost imaginary; imaginary because the imaginary, which is 
an intrinsic part of the constitution of these technical things, 
if these technical things are to work, has been stripped out of 
them. Abstraction not process is key here, and yet this operation/
orientation through which an object is discerned, out of which it is 
materialized, is claimed to get to the heart of things, to get at that 
which animates things. This constitutes a form of fetishism.36
To refer to the classical invocation,37 while disputing its claims 
to organize our desire,38 absence covers a lack. In attempting to 
distil the thing itself, the thing itself is radically diminished, 
and its relation to the world and the vibrancy of its material 
appeal are dimmed. In place of the latter, what returns might 
oddly enough be the magical. The fetish perhaps invites a mode 
of vitalism back in, since traditionally what is hidden may have 
unacknowledged powers. How does this fetish work? Is this a 
medium fetish? Wendy Chun and others have pointed to the 
34. Chris Anderson, ‘The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific 
Method Obsolete’, Wired, 16 July 2012, http://archive.wired.com/science/discoveries/
magazine/16-07/pb_theory. 
35. Kate O’Riordan, Unreal Objects, London: Pluto Press, 2017. 
36. Alex Galloway would say perhaps we would say that. He comments that ‘the 
ultimate villain for hermeneutics is fetishism’. ‘Love of the Middle’, p. 44. But we 
were never only hermeneutical; that is the point of insisting on writing and theory’s 
productivity. 
37. See Boštjan Nedoh, Ontology and Perversion: Deleuze, Agamben, Lacan, London: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, p.102. 
38. Cf. Cixous: ‘But we are in no way obliged to deposit our lives in their banks of lack.’ 
‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, p. 885. 
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fetishization of code within software and code studies, but this 
version might be more thoroughgoing.39 
The fetish is based on lack that is not recognized, or that is 
covered over (disavowed). An adherence to the material, a fetish-
ization of ‘the material’, allows digital materialism to say that 
it grasps the real while other accounts lack substance or reality. 
Their charge is not that what is missing in other accounts of 
technical media is a recognition of media power (though that 
is part of the argument made by Ernst, for example). The point 
is that the most necessary dimension, indeed the only really 
necessary dimension of technical media, is missing; that materi-
ally given technical capacity, which is said to be ironed out into 
discourse or representation, flatlined even, in accounts relying 
on second-order representations (dealing in dead simulation 
or reflection). A consequence of this (it is argued) is that the 
allocation of agency is misunderstood; too much being given to 
humans, and too little to the determining operations of technical 
systems – which do not so much mediate as order.40 
Thinking about medium fetishization might be a way to 
account for the hostility found in medium theory towards other 
accounts of new media that tangle with other forms of fetish-
ization (and with alienation and misrecognition): Marx’s account 
of commodity relations, in which relations between people are 
mistaken for relations between things, and Freud’s, in which 
desire is misrecognized, producing a form of self-alienation. 
In general, new materialism would sweep away such formations 
as (almost literally) without substance, as looking in the wrong 
way, at the wrong thing (perhaps as simply looking backwards).41 
39. Wendy Hui Kyong Chun, ‘Sourcery or Code as Fetish’, Configurations 16, 2008, pp. 
299–324. 
40. On dimensionality and animation, see Esther Leslie, Hollywood Flatlands: 
Animation, Critical Theory and the Avant-Garde, London: Verso, 2004.
41. Brown points out that the fetish has long been associated with a particular kind of 
‘thing theory’; for example, in Arjun Appadurai’s work. Brown, ‘Thing Theory’, p. 6; Arjun 
Appadurai, ‘Introduction’ in The Social Life of Things, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985. 
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However, exploring new materialist media theory through the per-
spective of the fetish provides a means through which to adumbrate 
what is missing in new materialist accounts of digital media. In 
them, the question of commodity relations and the matter of desire 
are present in their absence, are part of what the fetishized account 
covers up – cannot deal with – which may also be why it cannot or 
does not wish to think in terms of sex–gender distinctions, and 
also does not see why a systematic account of gender necessarily 
intersects with other elements of the same system (this being so 
even when a sympathetic orientation towards tackling discrimina-
tion is evident, as for example is the case for Parikka). Today a 
version of that misrecognition that Marx saw in social relations 
(where relations between people are mistaken for relations between 
things), which he also always understood to operate on bodies (to 
contribute to harming them), now operates on the bodies of the 
dividuated, data-produced, responsibilized, largely de-agentialized 
and discriminated subjects of information; operates on the social 
relation in general and on each of our lives. Going by way of the 
fetish is not the only way to go. We ourselves certainly would not 
parallel the two canonical forms it has taken ‘in theory’.42 But it is 
laughable indeed to consider that it is possible to reach around the 
instantiated relations, the material complexities and imbrications, 
the imaginaries these formations point to, and still produce or find 
the kernel or the ‘truth’ of the digital object. 
In some of its defiantly post-political veins, new materialist 
media analysis doesn’t actually care (much) about these things, 
being more interested in issues beyond the human entirely. It 
is in this sense, or in this variant, anti-human. Or it may care 
but presume such issues may not be approached except by way 
of what is viewed as ‘prior’ (Ernst), or structurally determining 
(Drucker). Seen in its own terms, the graver charge against 
42. ‘Break the old circuits… Let us defetishize’, Cixous, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, 
p.  891. 
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new media materialism, which it would of course seek to 
refute, might be that its claims to the real are undermined 
by a failure to grasp the full dimensions of those materials it 
is seeking to engage with. One way to put this is to suggest 
that it cannot generate a response (critical or otherwise) to 
the formation it finds itself in but is on the contrary (simply) 
continuous with it. 
‘Thus, to resist the present, I propose’, or, a goldfish responds43  
In the interests of linking this back to vitality and life, I want to 
rapidly jump from theory to a goldfish. More precisely to Matthew 
Weinstein’s animated video E Lobro,44 at the centre of which are 
the sinuous perambulations of a feminized goldfish – at once 
mocking life and human gender divisions and enacting them, as it 
slides between skeletons that are spindly and overgrown like the 
plants in a goldfish bowl.45 Weinstein’s fish is just as dead as his 
skeletons, and we are endlessly sure that none of them has ever 
quite lived, although all are highly animated. The aesthetic here 
might seem to resonate with what Claire Colebrook has described 
as a queer vitalism – passive vitalism as a field of potentialities 
that would enable life (including gendered life) to actualize – but 
might also be its obverse: dealing in a dead potentiality.46 Early 
explorations of artificial life tended to work through the uncanny, 
founding this on that sense of life found where it should not be 
(Metropolis, again, might be a canonical example). Here though, 
that has been routed. We are left, perhaps, with what Rosalind 
Galt has explored as the pretty or the decorative.47 
43. The phrase is Irmgaard Emmelhainz’s. ‘Can We Share a World Beyond 
Representation?’, p. 10.
44. www.matthewweinstein.com/works/e-lobro-15/video?view=slider. I am grateful to 
Matthew Weinstein for permission to reproduce a still here.
45. Martha Cook has written a beautiful account of E Lobro in an MPhil essay. I am 
indebted to her.
46. Claire Colebrook, ‘Queer Vitalism’, New Formations 68, 2010, pp. 77–92, p. 80.
47. Rosalind Galt, Pretty: Film and the Decorative Image, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011.
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Weinstein’s work both enacts the fetish of the digital, as 
medium fetish, and comments on it. In doing so a way is found 
to look askance at the online, constructed, on-screen bodily con-
dition. This work is certainly not pedagogic and nor is it resistive 
exactly, but it is diagnostic and revelatory of ways in which a 
particular distribution of the sensible is currently operated and 
makes its appeal. By contrast, disregarding the imaginary, unable 
to deal with the fetish it enacts, hard medium 
materialism all too easily (not inevitably) does 
not interrogate, but simply drifts into align-
ment with, that vision of the future offered by 
industry. One of the odder things about new 
media materialism is the extent to which, 
insisting on the material, it is in the end 
following the industry hype. Perhaps we might say it is dazzled 
by extant unreal objects. 
Also interested in looking askance, Furious, as a writing body 
and as a body of writing, constitutes another kind of not entirely 
human response to new media materialism as a normative 
perspective for thinking about new media. It is also, by the way, 
a body we do not fetishize. We stand behind it, I and I and I, 
recognizing our limits of movement, and our accountability, but 
not registering an absence. It is by way of an authorship at once 
asserted and partially refused (or defused so that its authority 
questions itself), which is conspicuously different from an actu-
alization, but which shares with it a sense of affirmation, that we 
find room to move while also recognizing our place and location. 
The point was to find a place to write neither from the im-
possible outside, where the fantasy of un-mediation might place 
us, nor as entirely secured from within – as a new materialist 
medium theory that takes its status as ontologically determined 
in precisely the same way as the materials it studies believes 
itself to be. Against the fetish of the material which produces 
28 thinking art
an account that is lacking while insisting it is affirmative – and 
insists it is entirely true – Furious responds by insisting on the 
specific materiality of writing (including in this its automation, 
as well as the labour it demands by hand) as well as the material-
ity of the digital. It insists on their co-dependence. 
We affirm the open potential of digital media and of digitally 
mediated bodies and worlds. Our resistance to compulsion/the 
compulsory is not located in relation to technology, let alone 
information technology. We are interested in precisely how it may 
fracture (rather than confirm) a series of divisions, including those 
between forms of activity and agency, and those that organize 
life in human terms/hierarchies. But we maintain our (post-) 
humanity and recognize our situated position in computational 
capitalism – also a system, but not that derived from an entirely 
informational or cybernetic account – in which feedback is indif-
ferent to intent, including intent to make, inaugurate, author. 
This also points the way for a rethinking of that political 
relationship between vitalism, the digital and materialism by 
opening – as a suggestion at least – the possibility of rethinking 
agency in terms that go beyond a division between vitalism (as 
an inhuman life force) and life as confined to the all too often 
normatively inscribed body. This task might entail a rethinking 
of a peculiar limitation that is ‘traditional’ in digital theory: to the 
extent that Donna Haraway (or her cyborg) has become a founding 
figure of cybercultural theory, it is even hallowed. It is the one 
that says, ‘as machines become more lively, we become more inert’. 
But why should this sum add up? The system (does not need to be) 
closed. There is activity all around. Finding new ways to calculate 
it and doing so as part of a technophile project of feminist techno-
science is an urgent task. As Cixous put it: ‘Not a minute to lose. 
Let’s get out of here.’48
48. Cixous, ‘The Laugh of the Medusa’, p. 885. 
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The dismal half-heartedness of new materialism’s professions 
of antipathy to capitalism shapes and colours all its pronounce-
ments on the future of life. Capitalism is reproved, indistinctly 
and in passing, as if with due diligence, for a catalogue of oddly 
abstract vandalisms: everything from squashing with its ‘axioms’ 
the ‘multi-directional opening out’ of ‘social and cultural move-
ments’ and ‘multiple curiosity-driven knowledge practices’ to 
preventing the ‘virtuality of the cosmos’ from remaining ‘as a 
form of commons for all life’.1 Capitalism evidently is the target 
of these remonstrances because it is called out by name, and 
these certainly are undesirable things for capitalism to get 
up to, and it may seem a bit sulky not to link arms with new 
materialism in its dauntless proclamations of the new resistance. 
Resistance it must be, because this word, too, is a keyword. Why 
would any honest hater of capitalism shrink from ‘taking “living 
matter” as a zoe-geo-centred process that interacts in complex 
ways with the techno-social, psychic and natural environments 
and resists the over-coding by the capitalist profit principle (and 
1. Rosi Braidotti, ‘A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities’, Theory, 
Culture & Society, vol. 36, no. 6, 2018, pp. 31–61, p. 53; Elizabeth Grosz, ‘An Interview with 
Elizabeth Grosz: Geopower, Inhumanism and the Biopolitical’, interviewers Kathryn 
Yusoff and Nigel Clark, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 34, nos 2–3, 2017, p. 132. 
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the structural inequalities it entails)’ and by opposing ‘end up on 
an affirmative plane of composition of transversal subjectivities’? 
What could possibly be the harm in ‘a posthuman thought that 
might inspire, work with or subtend informational and scientific 
practices and resist the trans-species commodification of life by 
advanced capitalism’?2 Resistance, surely, is welcome, whatever 
process of complex interaction or subtensive thought it comes 
from. If it cannot exactly come from humans, it can still be of 
benefit to (some of) them. ‘The inhuman within the human, as 
resistance, is the creative force that enables (some) humans to 
transform their conditions of existence, to make, create, invent.’3 
(The parenthesis will be understood to signify, very efficiently, 
acknowledgement of the diversity of humans and the obviously 
very different positions they are in relative to the inhuman 
within the human, and humility with respect to the fact that not 
all humans will be equally enabled to transform their conditions 
of existence by making new use of this creative force.) 
Resistance that must not come from humans may ultimately 
be provided by matter itself, understood in the new way, fol-
lowing Derrida’s explanation of ‘the desubstantialization of 
matter that occurs as a result of the deconstructive inscription 
of materiality as the impossible relation to the other’, no longer 
as matter, but now as ‘the force of materiality’ that is impossible. 
Matter in this new sense may even in addition represent the 
most sophisticated method of avoiding the human altogether, 
which would in turn liberate resistance from politics. ‘As the 
undoing of the power of the subject, the force of materiality 
cannot lead to a political program.’ The force of materiality as 
resistance that cannot lead to a political program also frees the 
opponent of capitalism, whose power as a subject has at last 
been altogether undone, from the dead end of a future that can 
2. Braidotti, ‘A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities’, p. 42.
3. Grosz, ‘An Interview with Elizabeth Grosz’, pp. 135–6.
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be anticipated. ‘Because it refers us to the radically other, materi-
ality is also the opening of an unforeseeable future, an à-venir (to 
come) that cannot be anticipated as a form of presence.’ Resist-
ance by referral to the radically other, or ‘the impossible’ that ‘is 
curiously more material and real than concrete actuality’, can 
allow no exceptions to its more radical undoing, irrespective of 
history; the most revolutionary critique and even revolutionary 
warfare is no different from any other ‘purposive or end-oriented 
action that is based on rational calculations or the projection of 
an ideal end’, since the force of materiality that is impossible and 
more real than concrete actuality ‘resists and confounds’ all this 
along with ‘any teleology such as that of Marxism’.4 
The resistance of capitalism and the resistance of Marxism 
are, to use Cheah’s word, ‘curiously’ alike, or even identical, for 
new materialism, and it is a curiously short hop from one to the 
other. Marxism, once it has been successfully resisted, in the new 
way, in the name of the force of materiality, the inhuman and 
transversal subjectivities, turns out to be not the revolutionary 
critique of capitalism that its diehard adherents even now persist 
in mistaking it for, but, like capitalism, a morbid precursor to 
the vitality of the posthuman plane of immanence to come, that 
minoritarian paradise full of the flourishing of ‘new kinds of 
economically productive practices in a market economy liber-
ated from capitalist axioms’.5 And the beautiful thing is, what a 
simple thing it is to get there. It is as easy to enter as the heaven 
on earth accessed by somebody else bringing the washing in 
from the back garden in a Craig Raine poem. We need only give 
up our ‘Promethean ideas of human mastery over nature’ and 
4. Pheng Cheah, ‘Non-dialectical Materialism’, in Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, 
eds, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, Durham NC: Duke University 
Press, 2010, pp. 75–81. As Byung-Chul Han has pointed out, it is not deconstruction but 
capital that ‘wipes out’ teleology, along with ‘every in-order-to’, with the result that ‘life 
has never been so fleeting as it is today’. Topology of Violence, trans. Amanda Demarco, 
Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 2018, p. 19. 
5. Braidotti, ‘A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities’, p. 53.
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Marxism, along with the ‘kind of species-narcissism’ defined 
by the toxic imperative that ‘“life” must remain special – that 
is, radically other to matter’.6 Materialism is still, or, rather, is 
now for the first time, the proper vehicle for this transformation, 
provided that ‘the legacy of Marxism and its particular claim to 
materialism’ is first swiftly revaluated in the light of the ‘para-
digm shift from the (time-honoured and still prevalent) confla-
tion of materialism with economism to a revamped materialism 
defined primarily as signification and subjectivity-in-process.’7
Or Dietzgen, for example
Materialism, in the sense in which Marx, Engels, Dietzgen, 
Plekhanov, Lenin, Luxemburg and other revolutionaries used 
the word, was never merely a theory of matter or materiality, but 
always also, and primarily, a revolutionary pedagogy.8 It was how 
groups of individuals who dedicated their lives to the destruction 
of capital disciplined their ‘thought-capacity’ and taught them-
selves and each other about the world. Most of this teaching went 
on outside institutions of learning, or in defiance of their culture, 
and had little or nothing to do with the production imperatives 
of academic capital and the academic career. (The thought that 
this revolutionary materialism would one day be pensioned off 
or archived for being too romantic about subjectivity, for clinging 
to the outmoded human, and for being credulous enough to try 
to anticipate in detail and work out in practice forms of future 
social relations, instead of standing back and gaping at ‘the 
6. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, ‘Introducing the New Materialisms’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 17; Jane Bennett, ‘A Vitalist Stopover on the Way to a 
New Materialism’, in ibid., pp. 59–60. 
7. Rey Chow, ‘The Elusive Material, What the Dog Doesn’t Understand’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 226. 
8. As Susanne Lettow has explained, throughout the works of Marx and Engels 
‘practice, activity, production, and conditions of life are all characterized as material … 
the adjective “material” functions as placeholder for a whole bundle of bodily, natural, 
technological and social issues.’ ‘Turning the Turn: New Materialism, Historical 
Materialism and Critical Theory’, Thesis Eleven, vol. 140, no. 1, 2017, pp. 106–21.
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opening of the unforeseeable’; and the thought that, in prefer-
ence to the old, crude revolutionary materialism that flourished 
in defiance of academic capital, the thinkers of this new future 
would find proof of the vitality of the new and improved mate-
rialism in ‘the exuberant growth’ of ‘new fields of scholarship 
… concentrated in a number of creative trans-disciplinary hubs, 
which have generated their own extra-disciplinary offspring’9 – 
for the old dialectical gropers in the dark of ‘socialist humanism’, 
this thought would have been the definition of the foreseeable: it 
was the academy they already knew.) When Joseph Dietzgen, the 
self-taught ‘philosophical working man’, a tanner by trade, and 
the most dedicated exponent of revolutionary materialism among 
Marx’s friends and contemporaries, wrote of ‘us dialectical or 
Social-Democratic materialists’, he meant, and was understood 
by his comrades to mean, those of us who are the implacable 
enemies of capitalist society and bourgeois thought, who study 
nature and the world in all its detail in order to learn how to 
destroy capitalist society.10 
The first and fundamental lesson of the revolutionary 
pedagogy of materialism, according to Dietzgen, is that con-
sciousness – not excluding such rare examples of consciousness 
as the thought that ‘the desubstantialization of matter occurs 
as a result of the deconstructive inscription of materiality as the 
impossible relation to the other’ – is to be explained ‘from the 
                       9. Braidotti, ‘A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities’, p. 38.
10. Joseph Dietzgen, Excursions of a Socialist into the Domain of Epistemology 
[Streifzüge eines Sozialisten in das Gebiet der Erkenntnistheorie] (1887), in Some of the 
Philosophical Essays on Socialism and Science, Religion, Ethics, Critique-of-Reason and 
the World-at-large, trans. M. Beer and T. Rothstein, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1906, p. 
294. Dietzgen was dubbed the ‘philosophical working man’ by Bruno Wille in an article 
recollecting Wille’s visit to Dietzgen’s tannery in Der Sozialistiche Akademiker, 1896, cited 
in Eugene Dietzgen, ‘Sketch of the Life of Joseph Dietzgen’, Some of the Philosophical 
Essays, p. 19: ‘I discovered by his very first sentences that he was perfectly at home in 
the regions of higher mental life. Not a trace of the dust of the shop was on his soul. No 
professor could rise from his desk more spiritualized than this tanner did from his manual 
labor. In a few minutes, we were deeply engaged in a discussion of philosophical books 
and problems. … This philosophical working man had even occupied himself with antique 
literature, and with better success than is generally shown by a graduate of a college, in 
spite of the fact that he was not familiar with Greek and only a beginner in Latin.’
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way and manner of bread-winning’. Or, as Dietzgen more expan-
sively put it, ‘that the way … in which man earns his daily bread, 
that the level of civilization on which a generation physically 
works, determines the mental standpoint or the way in which 
it conceives and must conceive the True, the Good and Right, 
God, Freedom and Immortality, Philosophy, Politics and Law.’11 
This fundamental knowledge, which may indeed be dogmatic, 
cannot be reached by any temporary theoretical accommodation. 
It can only be lived. It is true and it makes sense only for the 
determined revolutionary who accepts it wholeheartedly and 
radically internalizes it; it is then no longer merely a proposition, 
but a ‘critically firm, undoubted standpoint’. (Dietzgen explains 
that it was his experience of the revolutions of 1848 that awoke 
in him a great ‘desire to acquire a critically firm, undoubted 
standpoint’: essential to the idea of materialist pedagogy is some 
kind of originary seizure or captivation of life by a singular pitch 
of desire, an experience of intensity that can only be made to 
erupt by living in and through a moment of real revolutionary 
possibility).12 Once this knowledge is a firm standpoint, it makes 
sense of everything else. But it does not make sense of anything 
in the way that a Promethean intellect astride the world (or its 
new materialist caricature) would make sense of everything. It 
does not lead to and is not the product of an omnipotent human 
mastery; in fact, it is almost the very opposite. 
Dietzgen’s revolutionary materialism is rooted in permanent 
wonder at the inexhaustibleness of everything that can be 
thought, examined, learned, understood, picked up or tried 
out. It is a revolutionary pedagogy for which the power of 
11. Dietzgen, Excursions, pp. 300, 279. For a useful overview of Dietzgen’s work that 
argues that Dietzgen should be credited as the inventor of ‘dialectical materialism’, see 
Tony Burns, ‘Joseph Dietzgen and the History of Marxism’, Science & Society, vol. 66, no. 
2, Summer 2002, pp. 202–27. Burns concludes with the disappointingly sober judgement 
that Dietzgen’s contribution to Marxist theory was minor and that his philosophy was 
not very original. But Burns says nothing about Dietzgen’s ideas (crucial for the present 
essay) about the relation of thought to work. 
12. Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 279.
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the work of learning consists in the reality that this work is 
never done, not because the human intellect is too little or too 
restless, but because ‘the stuff that is given as material for our 
thought-capacity is as infinite as space’.13 This is true of every 
object, every life, every idea, every possibility: nothing is ever 
exhausted by thought, not even when it is present or foreseeable, 
but there is always more that thought can do, always more to 
find, always more to sense and to know. ‘Whether one wants to 
measure the Infinite or merely the smallest atom, one always has 
to deal with the Immeasurable’, Dietzgen wrote. ‘Nature, both as 
a whole and in its parts, is inexhaustible, not knowable to its last 
particle – consequently without beginning and end.’14 This is a 
‘social democratic’ type of infinity: its emphasis falls squarely on 
the inexhaustibleness of the object and the therefore endlessly 
compelling, endlessly frustrating, endlessly rewarding work of 
discovery that follows serious engagement with any object at all, 
by anyone at all who really tries. 
What the intellect – or in Dietzgen’s aggressively direct 
materialist language, what the ‘head’ – does with this infinite 
stuff, when activated by materialist motives, is work. ‘Thought 
is work.’15 The revolutionary materialist determination to 
re conceptualize work has remained fundamental for Marxist 
feminist critique and for contemporary social reproduction 
theory. As Nancy Hartsock wrote: 
The liberation of women – and all human beings – depends 
on understanding that work is essential to our development as 
individuals and on creating new places in our lives for our work. We 
must develop a new conception of work itself. To begin this process, 
we must clarify what is wrong with the capitalist and patriarchal 
organization of work and define the requirements of human work. 
13. Joseph Dietzgen, Das Wesen der Menschlichen Kopfarbeit [The Essence of Human 
Headwork], Stuttgart, 1903, p. 64; my translation.
14. Dietzgen, Excursions, pp. 317–18.s
15. Dietzgen, Das Wesen der Menschlichen Kopfarbeit, p. 58. 
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‘Human’ evidently does not mean, here, ‘not animal’ or ‘not 
machine’, but ‘what we have been prevented from doing together, 
for ourselves, by capitalism and by patriarchy’.16 Human work 
in this sense might very well be work that animals or machines 
could do: the point is, we have to fight to find out). Materialist 
motives are motives of the whole body, not only of the head. 
‘Thinking is bodily work’, Dietzgen the proletarian philosopher 
insisted.17 Sensory experience is a kind of thought, and thought 
is a sensory experience. Contrary to the curious idea, central to 
the criticism of many new materialists, that ‘the predominant 
sense of matter in modern Western culture has been that it is 
essentially passive stuff’,18 for Dietzgen, who with Engels was the 
most prominent exponent of materialism in the Marxist tradi-
tion, matter is everything and everywhere, active and passive, in 
the most intimate activity of the mind as well as in the force of 
gravity.
We, modern Socialists, are not of the narrow opinion that the 
ponderable and tangible matter is matter par excellence. We hold 
that the scent of flowers, sounds and smells are also material. We 
do not conceive the forces as mere appendices, mere predicates of 
matter, and matter, the tangible one as ‘the thing’ which dominates 
over all properties. Our conception of matter and force is, so to 
speak, democratic. One is of the same value as the other; everything 
individual is but the property, appendix, predicate or attribute of 
the entire Nature as a whole. The brain is not the matador and 
the mental functions are not the subordinate servants. No, we 
modern materialists assert that the function is as much and as 
little an independent thing as the tangible brain-mass or any other 
materiality. The thoughts, too, their origin and nature, are just as 
real matters and materials worthy of study as any.19 
16. Nancy C.M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays, Boulder 
CO: Westview, 1998, p. 45.
17. ‘Denken ist eine leibliche Arbeit’, in Dietzgen, Das Wesen der Menschlichen 
Kopfarbeit, p. 64.
18. Diana Coole, ‘The Inertia of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 17.
19. Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 301. Dietzgen would have been surprised by the new 
materialist complaint that ‘humanism and dialecticist thought’ is all about ‘prioritising 
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Dietzgen’s materialist wonder at the inexhaustibleness of 
infinite nature and the infinity of every object for the head and 
the senses remained fundamental to the character of revolution-
ary materialism in the Marxist tradition for many decades, as 
did his contempt for the infantile and fantastical idea of man or 
the human as a Promethean project manager squatting on the 
cosmos and dominating everything. ‘The outer world, the objec-
tive world, does not exist only outside me, but also within me, 
inside my own skin’, wrote Georgy Plekhanov, the most influ-
ential proponent of Marx’s revolutionary materialism in Russia 
before the revolution of 1917. ‘Man is only a part of nature, a 
part of being; that is why there can be no contradiction between 
his thought and his being.’20 For Plekhanov, as for Dietzgen, 
there can be no meaningful materialism, or, in other words, no 
pedagogy for revolutionaries determined to destroy capitalist 
society, without a theory of work rooted in wonder at the in-
exhaustibleness of everything that remains to be learned, under-
stood, known, and, consequently and ultimately, realized or 
won as reality for workers who, until that time, are condemned 
under capital to exist in crushed and voided states of indirect or 
direct slavery. There can be no revolutionary materialism that 
is not a theory of work. Dietzgen’s theory of work is about both 
the work that we do now, work that is done already as ‘thought’ 
and as ‘breadwinning’, and work that is not done yet, but that 
might yet be done, if and when we free ourselves from capitalist 
relations of production, and dedicate our lives to exploring the 
infinity of nature, of thought itself, of others who work with 
us, and of every object that seriously engages our attention. The 
work of thought that is necessary now to conceive these new, 
mind over matter, or culture over nature’. Iris van der Tuin and Rick Dolphijn , ‘The 
Transversality of New Materialism’, Women: A Cultural Review, vol. 21, no. 2, 2010, pp. 
153–71, p. 156. 
20. G. Plekhanov, Fundamental Problems of Marxism, ed. D. Ryazanov, London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1937, p. 13.
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future forms of work and exploration of the inexhaustible is 
also how the absolute poverty of existence under capital can be 
made more and more excruciatingly explicit. Materialism must 
learn ‘how the unknowable changes into the knowable’, Dietzgen 
wrote;21 and for a materialist this is true in two cases above 
all. The materialist must study how the suffering inflicted on 
the worker by the capitalist crushing of life – suffering that is 
certainly felt and endured, but that may yet be ‘unknowable’ for 
what it is – can be clearly and firmly known. And the materialist 
must study how the world that may be won and the life that may 
be lived after the destruction of capital can be kept as fully as 
possible within reach: as vision, as poetry, as fantasy, as science, 
as prediction, as teleology, as desire, as a programme or as a 
dream; in any case wholeheartedly, and always at the most vivid 
point of tension and overlap between the unknowable future, or 
what cannot yet be drawn up as a blueprint for society, and the 
knowable future, or what people who are crushed do know that 
they want above all else and would even risk life to get. These 
are simple thoughts, rough even, and philosophically primitive: 
thought is work, thought is bodily labour, consciousness is 
determined by the manner of breadwinning, the world is in-
exhaustible for thought, we never get to the end, there is always 
everything still to learn and to win. They are simple thoughts 
in the sense that they do not require a very complex logic, and 
in the sense that they leave out of consideration a great number 
of complexities and contingencies, almost to the point where it 
is difficult to believe that contingency has really been reckoned 
with at all. As lessons of a revolutionary materialist pedagogy, 
they are not difficult to understand. They are easy to understand, 
but intensely difficult to live with. 
21. Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 327.
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Work: from Engels’s (anti-poetic) to Marx’s (poetic)  
materialism
Engels concluded the chapter on ‘work’ in his Dialectics of Nature 
with an irritable footnote on the perils of confusing ‘the concept 
of work in the physical sense of the word’ with work ‘in the 
economic sense’.22 The ‘concept of work in the physical sense of 
the word’, says Engels, is how ‘modern mechanics expresses the 
conversion of mechanical motion into another form of motion’. 
If, as in a steam or heat engine, heat is converted into mechanical 
motion, i.e., molecular motion is converted into mass motion, if 
heat breaks up a chemical compound, if it becomes converted 
into electricity in a thermopile, if an electric current liberates the 
elements of water from dilute sulphuric acid, or conversely, if the 
motion (alias energy) set free in the chemical process of a generating 
cell takes the form of electricity and this in the closed circuit once 
more becomes converted into heat – in all these processes the form 
of motion that initiates the process, and which is converted by it 
into another form, performs work, and indeed an amount of work 
corresponding to its own amount. 
Work, therefore, is change of form of motion regarded in 
its quantitative aspect [Arbeit ist also Formwechsel der Bewegung, 
betrachtet nach seiner quantitativen Seite hin].23 
For Engels, it is obvious that any account of nature that is 
truly materialist will comprehend and make use of the discover-
ies of modern mechanics. But an account of nature that is 
not only materialist but also dialectical will go further yet. A 
dialectical materialist will not merely make use of the discover-
ies of modern mechanics, but will work out their truth by means 
of the logic of contradiction and identity. Engels singles out for 
praise the Lectures on Mathematical Physics of Gustav Kirchoff, 
and cites from that work Kirchoff’s exemplary dialectical 
22. Frederick Engels, Dialectics of Nature, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected 
Works, vol. 25, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1987, p. 391.
23. Ibid., p 388.
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definition of the state of rest: ‘Rest is a special case of motion’ 
(Die Ruhe ist ein spezieller Fall der Bewegung).24 According to Engels, 
Kirchoff ‘thus proves that he can not only calculate but can 
also think dialectically’.25 Thinking dialectically, Engels warns, 
requires conceptual clarity, and for this the materialist must be 
careful about words and exercise strict lexical discipline. The 
footnote that ends the chapter on work in Dialectics of Nature 
explains that, because in German the word Arbeit has been used 
for both ‘the concept of work in the physical sense of the word’ 
and work ‘in the economic sense’, ‘it has been possible in recent 
pseudoscientific literature to make various peculiar applications 
of work in the physical sense to economic conditions of labour 
and vice versa.’26 Engels’s prescription is that the German word 
Werk should be used for the conversion of mechanical motion 
in order to distinguish this from the work that is sold as labour-
power, which is called (and was always called by Marx) Arbeit. 
This footnote is Engels showing off his anti-poetic tendency. 
It is the same Engels who wrote to Marx after he first read the 
completed manuscript of Capital to complain bitterly that the 
work had not been organized in the style of a textbook, to make 
it as easy as possible to read and to absorb. But despite the 
apparently indelible reputation of Marx as a ‘dialectical material-
ist’, what Engels calls ‘thinking dialectically’ with strict lexical 
discipline, or ‘dialectical materialism’, was less interesting to 
Marx than what Engels derogatively calls ‘peculiar applications’ 
of the discoveries of modern science to the economic conditions 
of labour. For Marx does in Capital precisely what Engels the dia-
lectical materialist says must not be done. Marx calls the worker 
in the chapter of Capital on relative surplus value a ‘repellent 
24. Gustav Kirchoff, Vorlesungen über mathematische Physik, Teubner, Leipzig, 1876, p. 
32; my translation. Kirchoff echoes the young William Wordsworth: ‘Calm is all nature as 
a resting wheel’.
25. Engels, Dialectics of Nature, p. 388.
26. Ibid., p. 391.
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but elastic natural limit’ that exists in order to be crushed flat 
under the force of valorization.27 This force is what Marx calls 
in the Grundrisse the ‘specific gravity’ of capitalist society.28 The 
worker is aggressively defined by Marx in Capital as precisely 
nothing but an example of the conversion of mechanical motion 
(the motion of the body voided in the form of ‘living labour’) 
into another form of motion, what Marx famously calls, in the 
Grundrisse, the ‘moving contradiction’ of capital itself.29 
Marx’s whole description of the universe of the so-called 
‘capital-relation’, which he describes as a universalized non-
relation – from the violently separated ‘speck-like’ existence of 
the individual labourer right up to the sublime heights of the 
infinity of the spiral of limitless accumulation – is one great 
‘peculiar application of work in the physical sense to economic 
conditions of labour’. This is, on Engels’s terms, strictly speaking, 
not a disciplined, dialectical materialist account of capitalist 
production, but a vivid confusion of physics and economics, at 
all points quasi una fantasia, an inexorable nightmarescape of 
deliriously ‘pseudoscientific’ illuminations of the hell of ‘work-
torture’.30 What for Engels the dialectical materialist is lexical 
indiscipline liable to produce confusion and give support to 
‘pseudoscience’ (in this case, mixing up the work done by matter 
with the work done by human beings) is poetics for Marx. The 
tangling up of mechanics and economics is at the core of the 
consciously deranged, wildly catachrestic, revolutionary poetics 
of Capital. Marx’s description of ‘labour-power’ is a specifically 
poetic image of work ‘in the economic sense’ as a mechanical 
27. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, trans. Ben Fowkes, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, p. 527; translation emended. The original German is 
die widerstrebende, aber elastische menschliche Naturschranke. Fowkes tidies this up into 
‘obstinate yet elastic barrier’. 
28. Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), 
trans. Martin Nicolaus, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p. 106.
29. Ibid., p. 706.
30. For Marx’s description of the ‘speck-like’ existence of the worker, see Grundrisse, 
p. 385. For the neologism ‘work-torture’, see Marx, Capital, Volume 1, p. 548; translation 
emended. Fowkes softens Arbeitsqual, literally ‘work-torture’, to ‘drudgery’. 
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force or performance of work in the sense understood by physics: 
the ‘peculiar application’ of one to the other is not verbal slip-
page or a category mistake; it is the hell of valorization. 
The capitalist hell of valorization is where matter is ‘a matter 
of complete indifference’. The specific materiality of every person 
or thing, even of nature, is of virtually no consequence in this 
hell, where all that matters is the production of surplus value, 
or the emptying out of value, from no matter what character of 
human, animal or mechanical vessel. Hell is essentially logical 
before it is material. The fate of matter damned to the hell of 
capitalist logic is to exist only in what Marx calls ‘value-objective’ 
(wertgegenständlich) form. The conspicuously hideous neologism 
Wertgegenständlichkeit, or ‘value-objectivity’, is a ‘peculiar applica-
tion’, to borrow Engels’s phrase, of one logic to another, each one 
mutually repellent: Ricardo’s to Hegel’s. ‘However important it 
may be to value that it should have some use-value to exist in, it 
is still a matter of complete indifference what particular object 
serves this purpose’, Marx serenely explains.31 The grotesque 
inversion is essential to the poetics: not what is important to 
human beings, but what is important to value, as though value 
could find anything important, is what matters. Human beings 
need not even be directly mentioned here, since they will be 
understood to be comprehended under the category of ‘object 
that serves a purpose’. Marx found this thought about the 
‘indifference’ of objects, which he developed into a thought about 
the indifference of materiality and the indifference of forms of 
labour, or the indifference of matter and life, in Mercier de la 
Rivière’s L’Ordre naturel et essential des sociétés politiques (1767). 
The specific resonance of the word, not merely its meaning 
for the logic of value, is what excited Marx, who consistently 
read works of political economy, as well as works of science, in 
31. Marx, Capital, Volume 1, pp. 310–11.
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the attitude of a satirical poet, permanently on the lookout for 
slips of the concept, always listening out for bits of idiomatic 
dissonance, ironies and unintended creeps of connotation that 
could be grafted onto or parodied in his own critique, to make 
his reader wince, recoil or heave. Mercier de la Rivière’s L’Ordre 
naturel et essential des sociétés politiques was the literary source 
of a specific poetic inspiration: the idea of the indifference of 
matter and human beings. ‘With silver’, writes Mercier de la 
Rivière, 
one buys commodities, and with commodities one buys silver: selling 
or buying is in every case … the exchange of any value for any other 
value: that one of these values should be silver, or that both should 
be useful commodities, is a matter of complete indifference in itself.32
Rien de plus indifférent en soi. So long as the perfected form of 
mechanical motion, the perpetuum mobile called the valorization 
of values, continues unobstructed, the material form of the 
object sent spinning round this spiral to infinity is a matter 
of complete indifference, and vice versa. In capitalist logical 
hell, indifference is the ‘in-itself ’. Polystyrene, human being, 
exoplanet or bat shit, none of this need be brought down to 
the same level by a ‘flat ontology’, because everything is already 
equal. Capital takes care of that. Objects already ‘have a life of 
their own’, prior to the vivifications of new materialism: an indif-
ferent life.33 Everything is ‘some use-value’ for value ‘to exist in’, 
32. Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière, L’Ordre naturel et essential des sociétés politiques, 
Librairie Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1910, p. 261; my translation. Cf. another of Marx’s source 
texts (and the target for some of his best signature vitriol), Antoine-Elisée Cherbuliez, 
Riche ou Pauvre. Exposition succincte des causes et des effets de la distribution actuelle des 
richesses sociales, Paris: Librairie d’Abel Cherbuliez, 1840, p. 32: ‘There is no difference 
between a capital and any other portion of wealth: it is only by the use that is made of it 
that something becomes capital.’ My translation. 
33. ‘If materiality is agentive, then objects have a life of their own; they actively 
interact with, resist and co-shape other entities, including humans.’ Hans Schouwenburg, 
‘Back to the Future? History, Material Culture and New Materialism’, International Journal 
for History, Culture and Modernity, vol. 3, no. 1, 2015, pp. 59–72, p. 65. Who ever doubted 
that humans are resisted and shaped by objects?
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and it is ‘a matter of complete indifference what particular object 
serves this purpose’.34
This is the truth about ‘indifference’, the truth that Marx 
makes resound by a poetic specification of the extinction of 
material specificity. Truth like this could not be made to resound 
as it does in Capital without intense, compelling poetic aggres-
sion. Partly for the reason that there is no aggression in it, or 
none that is compelling, and partly for the reason that it is not 
remotely poetic, new materialism’s version of this thought about 
the equality of all matter ends up feeling like a late blossoming 
of the species of florid reverie that Marx called ‘utopian’. The 
problem with utopian thought, according to Marx, was not 
that it was too fantastical or that it envisioned a world too 
good or perfect for reality; the problem was that it never could 
specify the work that is actually necessary to get to the world 
it envisioned. It was not interested in how to get there, because 
it was not really interested in violence: neither in the forms of 
violence that are inexorable in the capitalist process of produc-
tion, the violence that exists now and that must be fought and 
abolished, nor in the revolutionary violence that will unavoidably 
be necessary and essential to finding and building the world that 
we know we want. Theoretical solutions suffice for envision-
ing a world that need only be desired in theory, and are good 
for human beings who are not crushed right now, every day, 
unbearably, to the point where their existence feels unendurably 
speck-like, and for whom every possibility of exploration of the 
infinite is cut off and shut down. But for human beings who are 
34. It is not clear why Bruno Latour thinks that it remains the urgent ‘political task’ of 
theory and science to ‘establish the continuity of all entities that make up the common 
world’, or why he thinks that ‘the common world’ will not show up until that ‘task’ has 
been completed. The continuity of all entities was easily established, in plain logical 
terms, in Capital. Admittedly, it was a bad, not a good continuity, or, in Latour’s other 
terms, a bad and not a good ‘composition’, and it did not bring about a world that 
was common enough. Was this failure down to Marx’s faulty concept of continuity, 
or did he not establish the continuity well enough? Bruno Latour, ‘An Attempt at a 
“Compositionist Manifesto”’, New Literary History, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 2010, pp. 471–90, 
p. 485.
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crushed like that and do feel all those things, every day, and who 
have no way out, reticent and cautious styles of theorizing about 
aggression and violence, or theories that simply avoid aggression 
and violence altogether, are not only risible, but obscene. 
‘The focus on life itself ’, writes the new materialist Rosi 
Braidotti, ‘may encourage a sort of biocentred egalitarianism, 
forcing a reconsideration of the concept of subjectivity in terms 
of “life-forces.”’ This focus that encourages egalitarianism and 
forces reconsideration of the concept of subjectivity also 
dislocates but also redefines the relationship between self and 
other by shifting the axes of genderization, racialization, and 
naturalization away from a binary opposition into a more complex 
and less oppositional mode of interaction.35 
The oppositional mode of interaction, whatever that might 
be, is the regular target of new materialist demurral. In their 
introduction to the volume of essays they co-edited, New 
Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, Diana Coole and 
Samantha Frost carefully say that one thing the diverse field 
of new materialist thinkers all feel in common is an ‘antipathy 
toward oppositional ways of thinking’.36 Oppositional ways of 
thinking cannot, presumably, just be opposed, but can be and 
regularly are dispreferred in principle in favour of something 
‘more complex’ to do with ‘shifting’ things. The lesser complexity 
of oppositional thinking itself is no longer up for discussion. The 
primitive forms of complex thinking that start with recognition 
of an impasse of opposed forces or irreconcilable differences 
that cannot be dissolved but must be lived (as fully as possible, 
for as long as it might take, however slow the progress) and 
ultimately destroyed are skipped over in silence. But it was this 
form of thinking, ‘oppositional’ in the old sense that it was a 
35. Rosi Braidotti, ‘The Politics of “Life Itself ” and New Ways of Dying’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 204.
36. Coole and Frost, ‘Introducing the New Materialisms’, p. 8. 
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conflict to the death, that was responsible for transforming 
the materialism of the eighteenth century into a ‘weapon of 
critique’, in Marx’s famous phrase, and a revolutionary pedagogy. 
Opposition – steadfast, irreconcilable, absolute – was not merely 
the condition of this transformation, but also the whole point 
of it. For Dietzgen, the point of the new materialism of Marx 
and Engels was precisely that it is the ‘materialism of Social 
Democracy’, a weapon in the hands of revolutionaries opposed 
to the bourgeois state and the domination of life by capital. The 
new materialism of Social Democracy is the opposite of the old 
‘metaphysical materialism’ that was concerned only with the 
nature of concrete phenomena and not with the relation of mind 
to matter and therefore not with the whole of nature understood 
as comprehending the immeasurable’ (revolutionary materialism 
‘embraces in one conception both true fancies and true paving 
stones’).37 
Whether one wants to measure the Infinite or merely the smallest 
atom, one always has to deal with the Immeasurable. Nature, both 
as a whole and in its parts, is inexhaustible, not knowable to its last 
particle – consequently without beginning and end.
This sounds like mysticism, until it is recognized for what 
it really is: a proletarian exhortation, a call to seize hold of the 
whole of experience, to explore all of life and the world, to keep 
looking, to keep the greatest conceivable goals in sight, and never 
to give up. The impossibility of knowing anything ‘to its last 
particle’ does not have the character of a legislative restriction 
on thought: it is not a figurative simplification of Kant’s critical 
establishment of the limits of knowledge. The point of Dietzgen’s 
essentially exhortative principle is that it is useful as a weapon in 
the hands of the proletariat: a means of fighting off the agonies 
of inhibition and hacking clear of intellectual paralysis. The 
37. Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 335.
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philosophical cover story is the Hegelian one about refusing 
to accept the idealist ejection of reality in the form of ‘thing in 
itself ’ into a region beyond the reach of knowledge and experi-
ence. But the vital emphasis for Dietzgen is on the assertion that 
nothing can be known in the sense of being exhausted.
Nothing in the world, not an atom of it, is to be known out and out. 
Everything in the world is inexhaustible in its secrets, no less than 
it is imperishable and indestructible in its essence. With all that, we 
learn every day more and more to know the things, and learn that 
there is nothing which is closed to our mind.38 
For Dietzgen, this was the theoretical bedrock of specifically 
revolutionary or ‘Social Democratic’ materialism. Revolutionary 
materialism is not a philosophical doctrine or world-view, simply, 
but a pedagogy: it is how ‘we [revolutionaries] learn every day 
more and more … and learn that there is nothing which is closed 
to our mind’ – just as, and for this very reason, there is no form 
of relation, no form of work, that is closed to our lives. Revolu-
tionary materialist pedagogy cannot do without the ‘immeasur-
able’, the ‘infinite’ and the ‘inexhaustible’, not only because this 
materialism must fight against a society in which it is only (as 
Proudhon put it) ‘the power to consume’ that is allowed to be in-
finite, but more fundamentally because learning ‘every day more 
and more’, learning everything possible from experience, is what 
keeps alive the possibility of a human subject full of potential to 
be developed, the same subject that capital systematically sucks 
empty and hollows out into the grotesque parody of a subject, 
‘labour-power’. The materialist who confronts an ‘inexhaustible’ 
world, no part of which is ‘closed’ to the mind, is the opposite 
of the worker who exists only as a quantity of socially necessary 
‘labour-power’ to be exhausted, and who is, value-objectively 
speaking, of no consequence before or after the duration of the 
38. Ibid., p. 326.
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process of that exhaustion. This opposition of the life activated 
by materialist pedagogy to the grotesque emptiness of existence 
as nothing but ‘the subjective element in the production process’ 
is not a mere opposition of categories – a product of the ‘op-
positional ways of thinking’ that new materialists of every sort 
apparently find ‘antipathetic’ – but a struggle that is deeply felt 
by the worker and a source of pain that must be lived with and 
lived up to, every day, and even ‘every day more and more’. 
This opposition is simply not dismissible by talk of the 
outmodedness or insufficient complexity of binaries. It is 
an opposition that workers are fundamentally stuck with, a 
basic determination of life. Contradiction, of the kind pas-
sionately characterized by Feuerbach as ‘abhorrent contradiction’ 
(abstoßender Widerspruch), is intrinsic to this opposition.39 The 
parody form of the subject that is nothing but the exhaustion of 
a nonhuman power is crushing: it is the felt fact of unlived life.40 
This is the truth of Marx’s long familiar but even now scarcely 
understood or only delicately grasped description of the com-
modity form in Capital as ‘sensuous-supersensuous’ (a predicate 
that Marx lifted from Hegel, as usual in satirical style). The 
commodity is felt unlived life. 
At one pole, a subjectivity that can be realized ‘every day more 
and more’ in the work of discovering the true inexhaustibleness 
of others, objects and the world; at the other pole, the blanking 
39. Ludwig Feuerbach, Werke 3, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975, p. 32. ‘logical 
being is in direct, unmediated, and abhorrent contradiction with the being of the 
intellect’s empirical and concrete perception.’ Ludwig Feuerbach, ‘Towards a Critique 
of Hegel’s Philosophy’, in The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings, trans. Zawar Hanfi, London: 
Verso, 2012, p. 76. 
40. On being crushed, see Alexander García Düttmann, ‘Against Self-Preservation, 
or can SCUM be Serious?’, World Picture 9, Summer 2014: ‘In conclusion, it can be said 
that the question of seriousness, a question that no doubt sounds ceremonious to many 
ears, needs to be understood as a wreath that binds together, if only loosely, at least 
four distinct, conflicting and at the same time interdependent questions, four questions 
posed against self-preservation, against the background and against the imposition 
of self-preservation. The four questions are: “What can I do to avoid being crushed?”; 
“What do I judge to be important in my life?”; “How can I be old and young enough, old 
enough to be young enough?”; and “How can I, how can creation, disclose eternity?”’ 
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out and blocking in of that subjectivity by its indifferent conver-
sion into labour-power that exists only in order to be exhausted 
in the valorization of value. This polarization is what, in The 
German Ideology, Marx calls ‘the contradiction between the indi-
viduality of each separate proletarian and labour, the condition 
of life forced upon him’.41 Labour, in this specifically capitalist 
form as a ‘condition of life’ that grows steadily more ‘hateful in 
its contentlessness’ the longer the proletarian is forced to submit 
to it, is contradictory in the sense that for the proletarian it is 
both everything and nothing. Labour is all that the proletarian 
is ‘for the entirety of his life’, and at the same time labour is 
‘separate’ from or ‘outside’ of the proletarian and even out of his 
reach, not only in the sense that he cannot determine for himself 
what activity it will be, or how long he will do it for, or where 
and when he will do it, but also, and most importantly for Marx, 
that he cannot get past its contentlessness and fill it with the 
truth of discovery described by Dietzgen in his revolutionary 
materialist exhortation to a kind of learning from experience 
that discloses the true inexhaustibleness of the world. A form 
of work that is really free would do precisely that, and would 
be ‘every day more and more’ knowledge – of oneself, others, of 
objects, of the world – even when it is frustrating, painful or 
otherwise unproductive. Dietzgen makes sense of this idea of 
materialism with a musical analogy: 
In my opinion only that person is able to understand the nature of a 
violin who knows thoroughly how to play it – who knows what there 
is in it and what is to be done to bring it out of it.42 
It is after playing the violin for decades that the infinity of the 
infinitesimal movement of a fingertip begins to appear in reality 
– that is, really to be felt and known – as the sort of ‘substantial 
41. The German Ideology, in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Volume 5: 
1845–1847, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976, p. 79.
42. Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 264.
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truth’ that Dietzgen describes. This is where the infinitesimal 
becomes infinite for real: sensation becomes truth ‘conceived 
through the eyes, ears and hands’ that is the ‘product of univer-
sal life’.43 The material human being is in this sense strictly like 
the material violin: the point of knowing each other is to learn 
how to know each other thoroughly, to find out what there is in 
ourselves and what is to be done to bring it out of us, and the 
point of revolutionary materialism is to teach ourselves how to 
transform socially productive work so that we really do learn 
about ourselves and others by working together. Production will 
then be the production of our own lives.
The work is infinite because individuals are inexhaustible. 
The new materialist or post-human caricature of Marxism as 
a philosophy of domination over nature fails to recognize this 
vision of a fundamental relation of work to the inexhaustible, 
and misses its poetic character. This is not surprising, because 
new materialism has nothing to say about work. 
Old anti-Marxisms
Only a theory that is well defended against recognition of the 
reality of this struggle – its reality today, for the vast majority 
of people alive now – could reinterpret this revolutionary 
optimism about the power of materialist pedagogy to disclose 
the inexhaustible as an outmoded fantasy about the masterful 
or Promethean human being standing astride nature and trying 
to dominate or colonize everything. The relation that Dietzgen 
43. ‘Truth is of a substantial nature and not of an ideal one; it is materialistic; it is not 
to be conceived through thoughts alone, but also through the eyes, ears and hands; it is 
not a product of thought, but on the contrary, the thought is a product of universal life.’ 
Dietzgen, Excursions, p. 313. Masterfully knowledgeable movement of the fingers is in this 
way not merely analogous to conceptual thinking (understood narrowly as thinking with 
the use of concepts), but is essentially the same thing. Dietzgen quotes Hegel: ‘“The 
contentedness in receiving and the parsimony in giving are not virtues in the domain of 
science,” says Hegel in the preface to his “Phenomenology of the Mind.”’ (Excursions, p. 
329). Neither are they virtues in the movement of a fingertip, or in sensation. 
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and Marx tried to conceptualize – poetically, passionately and 
with philosophical daring, in the name of the proletariat and for 
individual workers – is not between a masterful human subject 
who knows everything and a nature that is there only to be 
dominated or colonized; the relation is between work and the 
inexhaustible. If mastery of a kind is nonetheless essential to the 
work that might be done to actualize this relation, it is because it 
is at the far reaches of discovery that work in this sense tends to 
get most seriously arduous, compelling, demanding and intense. 
But if actual oppositional thinking is antipathetic for new 
materialists, some signifying of opposition is nonetheless permis-
sible, for the purposes of keeping up appearances. ‘A Marxist label’, 
write Coole and Frost of some of their fellow new materialists, 
‘has helped to signify their opposition to dominant neoliberal 
trends.’ The next sentence of the introduction makes clear that 
when they say ‘label’, they mean it. ‘Coming after poststructural-
ism and its criticisms’, they write, ‘no workable version of Marxism 
can advance a historical metanarrative, aspire to the identification 
of determining economic laws, valorize an originary, pristine 
nature, or envisage communism as history’s idealized material 
destiny.’44 Marx’s own thought would certainly not qualify as a 
‘workable version’ of Marxism, according to the tough new stand-
ards of new materialism. For contrast, some workable versions 
of ‘poststructuralism and its criticisms’ are provided in the New 
Materialisms volume by Pheng Cheah and Rey Chow. Cheah ex-
plains that Marxism’s stubborn attachment to the ‘proletariat as a 
sociohistorical subject’ stops it from recognizing that the ‘relation 
to alterity is more material than matter as substance or presence’.45 
Because Marxism cannot or will not let go of class, history and 
subjectivity, and all the other hang-ups of oppositional thought, 
it is stuck with a concept of matter that is not material enough, a 
44. Coole and Frost, ‘Introducing the New Materialisms’, p. 30. 
45. Cheah, ‘Non-Dialectical Materialism’, p. 75.
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matter that is less material than Derrida’s ‘materiality without 
materialism and even perhaps without matter.’46 This explains the 
failure of Marxists to grasp that ‘the impossible is curiously more 
material and real than concrete actuality.’ The new materialist’s 
matter is more material than the old materialist’s matter, and this 
new, more material materiality makes life harder in theory for 
the new materialist than it was for the Marxist, who could still 
naively enjoy the delusion that economic laws can be identified 
and communism can be envisioned. The new materialist has 
to deal with a more material materiality that is no longer ‘easily 
instantiated by concrete figures that are recognizable by political 
discourse’, like the working class.47 Easily instantiated concrete 
figures like the working class are not workable in light of the more 
material materiality of the impossible. Yet the new materialist 
need not despair, because the question what concrete figure might 
be available to instantiate materiality is after all not even a new 
question; ‘perhaps the better question to ask’, Cheah consolingly 
suggests, ‘is not that of the relevance of these new materialisms to 
political thought and their implications for concrete politics but 
how they radically put into question the fundamental categories 
of political theory including the concept of the political itself.’48 
New Materialist Rey Chow has another idea for a better 
question than the old unworkable Marxist one about how to 
change the world. In a spirit of liberal non-exclusivity that here 
extends right up to the periphery of the Marxist scrapyard, she 
asks: ‘what if we were to adopt Marxism’s focus on materialism/
materiality (as a way to critique the philosophy of conscious-
ness), yet without defining it (as Marxism tends to) as an agency 
of change-as-improvement?’49 Jane Bennett is comparably 
46. Cited in ibid., p. 77.
47. Ibid., p. 89.
48. Ibid.
49. Rey Chow, ‘The Elusive Material, What the Dog Doesn’t Understand’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 224.
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hospitable to a certain Marx, to borrow Derrida’s phrase. 
The Marx of The German Ideology, The Communist Manifesto 
and Capital may no longer be workable, since that Marx was 
a humanist, but room can be made in a roster of honorary 
proto-new materialists for ‘the Marx of his dissertation on 
Democritus’ – that is, for the one piece of writing that Marx 
did according to university regulations for submission, while 
he was a member of a university, constrained by the norms of 
academic intellectual decorum.50 Contrary to the spirit of this 
early work and its promising intimations of the budding new 
materialism, Marx would shortly leave the university, and would 
become an aggressive, loud-mouthed, wildly poetic communist 
whose pre-deconstructive obsession with the ‘sociohistorical 
subject’ of the worker led him into the error of overvaluing 
human beings. He ended up a casualty of what Bennett calls 
‘species-narcissism’, a kind of deep numbness to things other 
than ourselves, nourished by the toxic belief that human life 
is ‘special – that is, radically other to matter’. There is nothing 
wrong with thinking that we are alive; the trouble starts when 
‘we humans … think of ourselves as the most special of [life’s] 
expressions’.51 No polystyrene, bat shit or exoplanet would be 
so narcissistic, so why should we?52 Can it be that humans are 
uniquely susceptible to ‘humancentric prejudice’?53 (Dietzgen was 
50. Jane Bennett, ‘A Vitalist Stopover on the Way to a New Materialism’, in Coole and 
Frost, eds, New Materialisms, p. 48.
51. Ibid., p. 60.
52. Slavoj Žižek, in ‘Marx Reads Object-Oriented Ontology’, describes a similar sort of 
elective emptying out performed by new materialism in its anxiety to prevent us humans 
from overvaluing ourselves: ‘the vision of “democracy of objects” where all objects 
occupy the same ontological standing, or the “inhuman” view of an assemblage deployed 
by Jane Bennet [sic], are only possible from the standpoint of an (empty) subject.’ Slavoj 
Žižek, Frank Ruda and Agon Hamza, Reading Marx, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018, p. 58. 
My criticism is related to this one but is different. Once new materialism has uncritically 
misidentified the problem with humanist ontology as ‘narcissism’, it then anxiously sets 
about contriving a corrective ontology answerable to the imperative to stop being so 
narcissistic. 
53. Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, ‘Liberation for Straw Dogs? Old Materialism, 
New Materialism, and the Challenge of an Emancipatory Posthumanism’, Globalizations, 
vol. 12, no. 1, 2015, pp. 134–48, p. 138.
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apparently never prey to such anxieties about narcissism, despite 
being an old materialist, a humanist and an un-deconstructed 
revolutionary: ‘Men are, and have a right to be, proud of their 
intellect, but it is puerile to give to a thing, which appears to 
them of primary importance, the primacy of the world.’54) New 
materialist Rosi Braidotti, in an idiom reassuringly similar to 
that of a marketing pitch for a new technology, celebrates the 
arrival in new materialism of the posthuman that is at last 
‘empirically grounded, because it is embedded and embodied’ and 
that ‘functions less as a substantive entity than a figuration’ and 
that ‘is a theoretically-powered cartographic tool that aims at 
achieving adequate understanding of … processes of undoing the 
human’ and that ‘provides a frame to understand the ongoing 
processes of becoming-subjects in our fast-changing times’, while 
it also ‘enables us to track, across a number of interdisciplinary 
fields, the emergence of discourses about the non/in/trans/meta/
post-human, which are generated by the intersecting critiques of 
humanism and of anthropocentrism’.55 But even in this light of 
the new dawn of the new, one sober note of caution is found to 
be necessary. All these gains may yet be reversed, says Braidotti, 
by ‘the reinvention of a pan-human’, which is ‘explicit in the 
conservative discourse of the Catholic Church, in corporate 
pan-humanism, [and] belligerent military interventionism’, but 
which, more ominously, ‘is more oblique but equally strong in 
the progressive Left, where the legacy of socialist humanism 
provides the tools to re-work anxiety into political rage’.56 
Instead of wallowing in political rage fabricated out of anxiety 
using the tools of the legacy of socialist humanism, and instead 
of the old humanist Marxism that does not meet the require-
ments of signifying opposition to dominant structures by means 
54. Dietzgen, ‘Social-Democratic Philosophy’ (1876), in Some of the Philosophical Essays, 
p. 176.
55. Braidotti, ‘A Theoretical Framework for the Critical Posthumanities’, p. 4.
56. Ibid., p. 6.
55new MATeRIALISM
of a label, new materialists often like to quote Deleuze. But 
the Deleuze they embrace is not the foul-mouthed, aggressive 
co-author of Anti-Oedipus, whose question for the academy was 
‘Should one, or should one not, suffocate from what one eats, 
swallow air, shit with one’s mouth?’57 New materialism prefers a 
muted palette of Deleuzean motifs, the greys and beiges of the 
late philosophical writing about immanence, cuts, folds, planes 
and becoming. The savage palette of Deleuze, the really lurid 
primary colours, the fauvist Deleuze full of the aggression and 
violence that he loved and idolized in Nietzsche, is passed over 
in polite silence. The Deleuze of Anti-Oedipus was the ‘active, 
aggressive, artistic, productive, and triumphant’ Deleuze, the 
lover of ‘wild production and explosive desire’ and of ‘openly ma-
levolent activity’, the Deleuze whose ultra-violent, ‘schizoanalytic’ 
attack on the logic of ‘representation’ is now almost insufferably 
untimely (‘The whole of desiring-production is crushed, subjected 
to the requirements of representation, and to the dreary games 
of what is representative and represented in representation’).58 
This certain Deleuze was obsessed with ‘the truth that sexuality 
is everywhere’, such as in ‘the way the bourgeoisie fucks the 
proletariat’ and in how ‘Hitler gave the fascists hard-ons’.59 This 
certain Deleuze has suffered at the hands of new materialism 
the very fate whose despicable morbidity he spelled out in his 
1965 essay on Nietzsche: ‘he ceases to be a poet and becomes 
a “public professor”’.60 As Lenin said, with reference to another 
episode in the long history of ‘antipathy to oppositional ways of 
thinking’, ‘professors use and desire to use the freedom of the 
universities not to fan the conflagration but to extinguish it.’61 
57. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, London: Continuum, 2012, p. 41.
58. Ibid., pp. 132–3, 62, 123, 61.
59. Ibid., p. 322.
60. Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Anne Boyman, New York: 
Zone, 2005, p. 69.
61. V.I. Lenin, ‘The Lessons of the Moscow Events’, Collected Works, 4th English edition, 
Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, vol. 9, p. 381.
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All this comes back to poetics, and ultimately back to the 
poetics of Marx’s Capital. The theorizing that Braidotti calls 
‘undoing the human’ and Bennett calls getting over our ‘species-
narcissism’ is fundamentally about proscribing the really violent 
and revolutionary poetics of self-extinction. New materialism 
proclaims its renunciation of the grandiose self, the inflated 
ego, the self astride the world, the self that is different from and 
better than animals and matter, but in fact it keeps all these 
objectionable personae alive on a formula of repudiation liberally 
administered by drip-feed. The self that is actually written out 
of new materialism’s theory of everything is not the egomaniacal 
or hyperbolized self but the one that is crushed, emptied and 
infinitely diminished: Marx’s worker, whose existence in the 
capital-relation is ‘specklikeness’ in a blizzard of indifference.62 
By theorizing a new ‘egalitarianism’ intrinsic in matter itself, by 
rolling out the new concept of matter so that it comprehends 
life, the universe and everything that could ever be valued, and 
by insisting that this materiality is a more material materiality 
than any oppositional mode of thinking (or revolutionary social 
criticism) ever dreamt of, new materialism in effect papers 
over the bottomless crack in social reality where the speck of 
existence that is yet to be materialized is stuck in a perpetual 
plummet. One way of saying what this means is to say that new 
materialism casually abolishes the logic of potentiality that Marx 
developed out of Aristotle to create the figure of the worker who 
is not yet anywhere near being able to live the life that we know 
is meant for us; the living individual who is blocked, crushed 
and emptied by the world and who precisely for that reason was 
62. Cf. Grit Höppner, ‘Rethinking Socialization Research through the Lens of New 
Materialism’, Hypothesis and Theory, 13 September 2017, p. 6: ‘Since new materialist 
scholars do not center agency in a single human who has a preexisting disposition in 
processing meaning and knowledge, they refuse to think of a human as origin or result 
of agency, as is common in a concrete way of thinking that argues for childish, youthful 
or adult forms of agency. In new materialism, agency is negotiated by heterogeneous 
“mediums.” New materialist scholars ask: who actually socializes whom or what – does 
the wheelchair socialize the person or does the person in fact socialize the wheelchair?’
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long ago equal to any and every material thing, even prior to the 
good news about the new egalitarianism, since the human being 
and polystyrene are perfectly alike in being ‘value-objectively’ a 
matter of complete indifference. 
Another way of saying the same thing is that new materialism 
specifically evacuates the aggression that has been essential 
to the history of materialist criticism as a form of socially 
revolutionary thought. Marx’s writing is full of violent critique: 
a violence that does not merely condemn, or mimic, but that 
reacts against and sparks off the violence of social relations, by 
testing to conceptual and imaginative extremes the strength of 
the logic of those social relations to hold up under the derange-
ments of poetic fire. Marx’s materialist critique proceeds not like 
a textbook but by spinning out into deliriums of pseudoscientific 
or cognitively intractable conceptualization, jamming together 
the sensuous and supersensuous, physics and economics, Ricardo 
and the werewolf, bat shit and Hegel, grabbing at the language 
of political economy and pulling out its gruesomely obtruding 
ironic innards, violating at every turn the lexical discipline of its 
own logic of categories. All this is Marx’s poetics: the materialism 
of Marx’s thought is right there, not in the familiar, and in fact 
lazy and fictitious, projections about so-called teleology, or the 
passive and inert world of matter astride which stands the great 
Promethean human being swinging his dialectics, which is just 
the liberal propaganda of professors, but in the logically fucked-
up, fantastical, intolerably true description of the extinct self and 
life of the worker as an atomic speck crushed under the spiral 
of valorization’s infinity. Marx’s materialist vision of human 
life puts intense pressure on the subject to experience this 
truth, which means, as the manual labourer and old materialist 





Art’s anti-capitalist ontology: 
on the historical roots of the 
artist as an anti-capitalist
DAVe beeCH 
Historically, ‘the art question’ – what is art? – has been prin-
cipally concerned with the classification of objects and their 
effects, although since the 1960s it has been redirected somewhat 
towards the institutional procedures by which objects are 
marshalled across the threshold of art.1 This essay maps a route 
out of the opposition between an ontology of art objects and 
an institutional theory of art by retracing the history of the art 
question, which, I will argue, is rooted in disputes over labour. 
My point is not that the ‘real’ referent of inquiries into the 
definition of art is artistic or aesthetic labour (Marcuse’s concept 
of art as non-alienated labour),2 nor that the artist is the decisive 
factor in determining what is or is not art (Judd’s dictum).3 My 
1. The phrase is from Nigel Warburton, a British analytical philosopher (The 
Art Question, London and New York: Routledge, 2002). Here, I link it to the more 
‘continental’ idea of art’s ontology. My purpose is to comment on the way both traditions 
interrogate the peculiarity of art, as well as to contribute to debates within the social 
history of art which overlap them.
2. Herbert Marcuse, ‘The Foundation of Historical Materialism’ (1932), in Studies in 
Critical Philosophy, trans. Joris de Bres, London: New Left Books, 1972. The notion of the 
artist as the exemplification of non-alienated labour is perhaps expressed more clearly by 
Braunschweig, Sánchez Vázquez, Schapiro and Brantlinger.
3. This is Judd’s dictum: ‘If someone says his work is art it’s art’ (Donald Judd, 
‘Statement’ in the exhibition catalogue Primary Structures: Younger American and British 
Sculptors, New York: The Jewish Museum, 1966, reprinted in Donald Judd, Complete 
Writings 1959–1975, Halifax NS: Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design and 
New York: New York University Press, 1975, p. 190). The phrase ‘Judd’s dictum’ comes 
from Art & Language, responding to Joseph Kosuth’s comments in his essay ‘Art After 
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aim, rather, is to resituate the art question within the history 
and legacies of the confrontation between art, handicraft, 
commerce and industry during the prolonged struggle in Europe 
to elevate art above manual labour during the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism. 
The inquiry into the ontology of art which was inaugurated 
by the Jena Romantics arose historically out of debates about the 
grouping, status and common features of painting, sculpture and 
related arts, which ran from the Renaissance to the middle of the 
eighteenth century.4 Vasari’s category of the Arti del disegno and 
Batteux’s 1746 theory of the Beaux Arts bookend an ambitious 
project to draw a new line of demarcation within the hierarchy 
of the liberal and mechanical arts in which certain specified arts 
are grouped together and reclassified. The aim was to promote 
painting and sculpture (and related arts) from the mechanical to 
the liberal arts, but the struggle culminates instead with these 
arts being assigned a name of their own – the beaux arts, fine 
arts, die bildende Kunst, Fri Konst and cognate terms.5 
Philosophy’. See Charles Harrison, Essays on Art & Language, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 
1991, pp. 84–5; Joseph Kosuth, Art After Philosophy and After: Collected Writings 1966–90, 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1991. Also, for a discussion of these ideas, see Peter Osborne, 
‘Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy’, in Michael Newman and Jon Bird, eds, Rewriting 
Conceptual Art, London: Reaktion Books, 1999, pp. 47–65. 
4. I will distinguish the terms ‘art’, ‘arts’ and ‘fine arts’. Although these terms are often 
treated as interchangeable, and common language allows them to be used as synonyms, 
I will use them to refer to historical forms of the classification of labour. ‘Arts’, in the 
plural, refers to specific skilled practices such as cooking, fishing, basket weaving and 
rhetoric, which historically were divided in to the mechanical and liberal arts. ‘The fine 
arts’ are the group of specific arts attached to painting and sculpture. ‘Art’ in the singular 
refers to the concept of art in general, which is not reducible to painting, sculpture or 
any of the specific arts. The concept of art in its generality is first formulated by the Jena 
Romantics as the question: ‘what is literature?’ This question is marked by transition from 
the numerous specific arts to art in general. For them literature is conceived not narrowly 
as one of several arts but as an abstraction: ‘art considered as literature … [and] literature 
considered as the essence of art’. See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, 
The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism, New York: State 
University of New York Press, 1988, p. 83. 
5. Poetry and music had always been included within the liberal arts, and therefore 
the challenge to the classification of painting, sculpture and architecture as mechanical 
arts began without them in the idea of the arts of design. Later poetry, music, painting, 
sculpture and dance were grouped as the fine arts, but the exact selection was never 
completely settled.
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This episode in the historical reclassification of painting and 
sculpture (and related arts) has something to tell us not only 
about what art is but also about how this question comes to have 
a meaning for us, and how it might be answered in a more satis-
factory way. In place of identifying the features that objects must 
have in order to be categorized as art, or displacing that inquiry 
to investigate the conditions of art’s heavily policed borders, or 
acknowledging that there is no limit to what can be included in 
the category of art, I want to reconsider the indeterminacy of 
art as a category by reconstructing how it was formed through 
contingent social processes. 
While the historical claims made for painting and sculpture 
(and related arts) ultimately came to be expressed in the alleged 
properties of objects – and the experience of them – they were ini-
tially assigned to types of labour. The ostensive qualities of works 
of art were initially understood as the result of specific forms of 
labour; that is to say, the concrete combination of mental and 
manual capacities needed to produce a range of products within 
each specific art.6 My argument re-emphasizes the significance 
of labour, but instead of claiming that art is the result of a certain 
kind of labour I want to characterize the contested and shifting 
boundary that is formed and reformed around art as a highly 
codified representation of struggles over labour. My intention is 
to clarify questions about the relationship between art, on the one 
hand, and handicraft, manufacturing, commerce and industry, on 
the other, by reconnecting questions about the relative merits and 
implied ontologies of various categories of object to a lingering but 
6. André Félibien’s famous elaboration of the hierarchy of genres, delivered in a lecture 
at the Académie Royale in 1669, is clearly articulated around a hierarchy of labour. His 
elaborate scale of works of art is based on a binary distinction between mechanical and 
mental procedures for making paintings. At one end of the scale is the copying of nature 
(‘the representation of a natural form which consists simply of drawing lines and mixing 
colours is considered to be work of a mechanical kind’), and at the other end is the 
genius painter (‘an ingenious and learned Author; as he invents and produces thoughts 
quite his own’). See André Félibien, ‘Conférence de l’Académie Royale de Peinture et de 
Sculpture’ [1669], trans. Linda Walsh, in Steve Edwards, ed., Art and its Histories: A Reader, 
New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1999. 
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largely unacknowledged history of the differentiation of types of 
activity appropriate to them.7 
Art and the marketplace
To judge from the panic which erupts in the discourses of art 
every now and then, art is not a specific kind of object but the 
effect of a specific kind of economy. For certain art historians, 
critics and artists it seems the existence of art is perpetually 
threatened by its contact with, or – more seriously – its descent 
into, culture produced entirely for commercial gain. The stooge 
can be graphics or the culture industry or kitsch or commodity 
production, and any number of other specimens, but the logic 
remains: art is not x or y and therefore art is diluted or negated 
by becoming (more like) x or y. T.J. Clark, speaking in 2000, tells 
this familiar tale with some urgency: 
Is not visual art in the process of becoming simply and irrevocably 
part of the apparatus of image life production? Is not this the real 
sense of the much-noticed fact (a flip through the pages of Artforum 
or Parkett confirms the fact, relentlessly, monotonously) that the 
one demarcation between visual art and the fashion industry, for 
example, simply does not exist any longer? Not only does it not exist 
but art glories in its non-existence. The non-existence is one of art’s 
great present themes… Modernism always stood in close, dangerous 
proximity to the realm of appearances it fed on.8 
Clark understands the critical demands of operating at 
the uncomfortable points of contact between art and popular 
7. Here is a typical example of the philosophical inquiry into the ontology of art that 
defines the category by focusing on the properties of objects rather than the history 
of struggles over labour: ‘The central question for the ontology of art is this: What sort 
of entities are works of art? Are they physical objects, ideal kinds, imaginary entities 
or something else? How are works of art of various kinds related to the mental states 
of artists or viewers, to physical objects, or to abstract visual, auditory or linguistic 
structures? Under what conditions do works come into existence, survive, or cease to 
exist?’ Amie Thomasson, ‘The Ontology of Art’, in Peter Kivy, ed., The Blackwell Guide to 
Aesthetics, Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, p. 78.
8. T.J. Clark, ‘The Painting of Postmodern Life?’, Quaderns portàtils 20, Barcelona: 
MACBA, 2000, pp. 7–8.
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culture, but in this instance the politically charged subversion of 
the distinction of art from commercial culture appears to him 
to have gone too far.9 Here, the ideological demarcation of art as 
a practice is not completely independent from its material and 
economic conditions. In my analysis, emphasis will be placed in 
particular on the historical construction of a specific mode of 
production for artworks, including the specific social division 
of labour in which the artist is assigned a place of privilege. So, 
Clark’s anxieties about art’s proximity to the fashion industry, on 
my reading, is an instance of the complete erosion of the divide 
between art and design, that is to say of art becoming nothing 
but a commercial activity, which he highlights by taking fashion 
as the exemplification of commercial culture. His analysis of 
the collapse of the distinction between art and commerce falls 
mainly on artworks themselves and the failure of nerve of a 
generation of artists who no longer demonstrate fidelity to the 
modernist romance of aesthetic labour, or the elitist opposition 
of avant-garde and kitsch, or the formal scrutiny required for 
the critical deployment of popular forms within practices of 
negation.10 What it rests on, though, is a keen sense of an implied 
antagonism between art and the marketplace. 
I do not want to overstate the specific case. Clark has his own 
variant of this narrative of art’s threat from commercialization, 
but the pattern of thought is common. Andrea Fraser, reflecting 
9. Clark’s entire body of work, it could be said, interrogates the traffic between art 
and popular culture, or art and the horizons of official taste. Here is a typical example: 
‘what is special about Abstract Expressionism – what marks it off from all other 
modernisms – is that the engagement is with the vulgar as opposed to the “popular” or 
“low”. I think we should understand the “popular” in nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
art as a series of figures of avoidance of the vulgar: that is, figures of avoidance of art’s 
actual belonging to the pathos of bourgeois taste: a perpetual shifting and conjuring 
of kinds of simplicity, directness, naivety, sentiment and sentimentality, emotional and 
material force, in spite of everything about art’s actual place and function that put 
such qualities beyond its grasp.’ T.J. Clark, Farewell to an Idea: Episode from a History of 
Modernism, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1999, p. 379.
10. The phrase ‘practices of negation’ is Clark’s own. See T.J. Clark, ‘Clement 
Greenberg’s Theory of Art’, in Francis Frascina, ed., Pollock and After: The Critical Debate, 
London: Harper & Row, 1985, pp. 47–64. 
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in 2004 on a work that she produced which consisted of having 
sex with a collector, puts the same opposition to work for some-
what different ends:
Well, yes, it’s art, and the question I’m interested in posing is 
whether art is prostitution – in a metaphorical sense, of course. Is 
it any more prostitution because I happen to be having sex with a 
man than it would be if I were just selling him a piece? In fact, I 
remain much less comfortable with selling the DVDs of ‘Untitled’ 
than I was with producing the piece. The ‘normal’ sales situation 
that one has in the art world feels much more exploitative to me 
than any aspect of my relationship with, or the exchange with the 
participating collector. That’s where I lose control of it. That’s where 
the speculation begins.11
The sale of art, in this scenario, represents a crisis for the artist 
that is at once moral and economic (subjecting the artist to both 
discomfort and exploitation). These tropes, perhaps, link anxi-
eties about art sales to the concept of alienated labour and the 
activist tradition intent on abolishing it. But I want to investigate 
the more specific assumption, here, that art and commerce are 
seriously at odds. If Clark only implied by association that art 
is endangered by the marketplace, in Fraser the antagonism 
between art and commerce is as explicit as when this idea was 
first formulated. The conception of art as antagonistic to sales 
is firmly established by the time of Kant’s formulation of the 
twofold freedom of the fine arts. These specific arts, he said, must 
be free in the sense that they have no extrinsic purpose, but also 
‘free in the sense of not being a mercenary occupation and hence 
a kind of labor, whose magnitude can be judged, exacted, or paid 
for according to a determinate standard’.12 
The history of art’s antagonism to commerce is a component of 
art’s elevation above handicraft and other commercial activities. 
11. Andrea Fraser, ‘In Conversation’, The Brooklyn Rail, https://brooklynrail.
org/2004/10/art/andrea-fraser; accessed 21 May 2020. 
12. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987 [1790], p. 190.
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Currently, political activism within art’s institutions has shifted 
from the ideological critique of institutions to the demand for 
artists and art workers (interns, studio assistants and others) to 
be paid by them.13 My inquiry into the history of the antagonism 
between art and capitalism is a rebuttal to forms of ‘capitalist 
realism’14 in art that declare artworks are commodities, artists are 
workers, and the myth of the artist as antagonistic to commerce 
contributes to the exploitation of artists as unpaid labourers. My 
purpose is not to endorse the condemnation of design, craft and 
kitsch as a warning to artists but to investigate the history of 
anti-capitalism within art.
What is the historical source of the idea that art is antagonistic 
to commerce or sales? In some sense, we might say, concerns about 
the corruptions of buying and selling are not limited to the field 
of art and are present in one form or another throughout history. 
However, the origin I have in mind is not unearthed by identifying 
the first formulation of the idea. Nor is the structural antagonism 
between art and the marketplace realized when individual paint-
ers and sculptors in the Renaissance manage to secure certain 
privileges within the feudal organization of the arts in the guilds 
and court. We need to unpick the relationship between the specific 
rejection of commerce in art and the longer tradition of the noble 
amateur, a task that is hampered by the history of borrowing, 
substitution and transformation between the two. 
Since amateurism is a norm for the nobility, and this survives 
in modified forms after the bourgeois revolutions, the reforma-
tion of art according to the principle of the rejection of com-
merce is difficult to pinpoint, especially if we restrict our view to 
a history of ideas. Some clarity is brought to this investigation, 
13. See Dani Child, Working Aesthetics: Labour, Art and Capitalism, Bloomsbury, London, 
2019; Precarious Workers Brigade, Training for Exploitation? London: Journal of Aesthetics 
and Protest, 2017; Leigh Clare La Berge, Wages Against Artwork: Decommodified Labor 
and the Claims of Socially Engaged Art, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2019.
14. See Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Winchester: O Books, 
2009. 
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however, if we focus our attention on the changing mode of 
production of art. This amounts to indexing the art question in 
philosophy and the normative separation of art from commerce 
in art’s discourses to the study of the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism – with the proviso that this historical passage does 
not see art adopt a standard capitalist mode of production, since 
the latter consists principally of a confrontation between capital 
and wage-labour that is almost entirely absent in the production 
of artworks.15 During the period of transition from feudalism 
to capitalism the social relations of work which had prevailed 
within the guild system were opposed and ultimately overrun 
by the wage system. However, painters and sculptors were not 
converted from members of the guild to either wage labourers 
or capitalist employers, as artisans typically were. Instead, the 
rejection of the guilds took a different turn. 
The long road to the art market
The emergence of a concept of the artist distinct from the 
artisan is a vital ingredient of the contested transition from the 
classification of painting and sculpture (and related arts) from 
the mechanical arts to the fine arts and, subsequently, from the 
several specific arts to art in general. Steve Edwards recalls this 
passage in his account of how photography has historically been 
distinguished from art and how, within photography, the docu-
ment has been distinguished from the picture. 
Most of these oppositions have their roots in the distinction 
between the ‘liberal’ and the ‘mechanical arts’ … [and] in a 
protracted struggle to raise the status of … painters [who] sought 
to distinguish themselves from wheelwrights, barrel-makers, and 
others with whom they were frequently classed. To do this they 
15. For a more detailed analysis of the various ways in which art does not conform 
to the capitalist mode of production, see Dave Beech, Art and Value: Art’s Economic 
Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics, Leiden: Brill, 2015.
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insisted that their work was a liberal art and not a lowly artisanal (or 
mechanical) trade.16
The art question pivots around a relationship between art 
and handicraft that prioritizes not only the liberal arts over the 
mechanical arts but also the noble value of amateurism over 
trade. Edwards notes that a ‘decisive turning point in artists’ 
protracted struggle over status occurred with the establishment 
of the Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture in Paris in 
1648’.17 So, let’s look at how this event has been understood in the 
history of art’s economic and normative transformation.
Cynthia and Harrison White, in their influential book on 
the emergence of art’s modern institutions out of the ‘medieval 
painters’ guilds’ via the founding of the Académie Royale, write 
that painters ‘chafed under guild restrictions’ and that the 
Académie Royale ‘was at first merely independent of the guild, 
but soon dominated and then replaced it in power and prestige’ 
before the advent of the ‘critic–dealer system’.18 This compacted 
account remains, in many respects, a useful road map, but each 
section of the narrative needs to be reconsidered according to the 
perspective of the social relations of production. For instance, 
the narrative of succession – guild to academy to art market 
– sacrifices diachronic nuance for synchronic drama. We can 
overcome this, partly, by acknowledging that various academies 
for painters and sculptors existed in parallel with the guilds from 
the fourteenth century onwards and that the Académie Royale 
ran parallel with the guilds for almost 150 years before they were 
both abolished by the revolutionary government.19 
16. Steve Edwards, Photography: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 14.
17. Ibid., p. 15.
18. Cynthia White and Harrison White, Canvases and Careers: Institutional Change in 
the French Painting World, New York: John Wiley, 1993 [1965], p. 5. 
19. The earliest academies of painting were in Florence and Rome. Academies 
which were not physical institutions but a type of meeting also existed in England and 
elsewhere. For an account of the abolition of the guilds by the National Assembly in 1791, 
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Indeed, the academies grew out of the dual system of guild 
and court to bolster the position of painters and sculptors in 
the court, and the royal academy established in the seventeenth 
century formalized and extended the privileges of court painters 
and sculptors. The Renaissance academy was not a teaching 
institution, but the statutes of the Florence Academy of Design 
specify that three members of the academy would be selected 
annually to visit young practitioners in their workshops to give 
friendly advice. Workshop activities not only went on in paral-
lel with the academies but were necessary for its functioning. 
However, from the outset, lectures were a regular feature of 
the academies, initially as a device to raise the status of certain 
arts – specifically painting and sculpture – from the mechanical 
arts to the liberal arts on terms set by feudalism, but also later, 
I would argue, as a method to differentiate the artist within the 
social division of labour from the wage-labourer, artisan, manu-
facturer, shopkeeper and industrial capitalist.
White and White’s procession of painters in three historical 
modes – guild, academy and market – is set up as an episode in a 
linear tale of emancipation from feudal constraints. This mod-
ernist narrative follows a path familiar to historians of econom-
ics, namely the liberal tale of the rise of laissez-faire against 
seemingly obsolete forms of feudal regulation and intervention. 
It is instructive to reread this narrative through the extraordi-
nary efforts of the advocates of the fine arts to designate guild 
artisans as mechanical copyists in contrast with the inspired, 
original and scholarly activities of the academicians. Christian 
Michel points out that the modernist critique of the academy 
‘strongly resembled the critiques levelled by the Académie against 
the guild’.20 Both, we can observe, stressed the mechanical and 
see William Sewell, Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old 
Regime to 1848, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
20. Christian Michel, The Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture: The Birth of the 
71Art’s Anti-cApitAlist ontology
manual limitations of its opponent. So, when White and White 
say the academy ‘emphasized a new conception of the artist: no 
longer an artisan or a low-caste hawker of wares, he was instead 
a learned man, a teacher of the high principles of beauty and 
taste’, we get a glimpse, also, at what was at stake in the modern-
ist rejection of the academy as a place of rote learning, doctrinal 
stiffness and centralized bureaucracy.21
White and White and others argue that art emerges from 
the arts as a result of the transition from patronage to the art 
market. This argument has the advantage of pointing towards 
structural economic changes but the disadvantage of focusing 
on changes in circulation rather than art’s mode of production: 
it blocks the analysis of changes in the social relations of the art-
ist’s studio and its supply chains, the division of labour between 
artists and their assistants, the division of labour between the 
artist, the art dealer and the art tutor, and so forth. While it has 
certainly not gone unnoticed that painters and sculptors in the 
Middle Ages and the Renaissance worked collectively in artisan 
workshops, art historians have tended to focus their attention on 
certain exemplary individuals and often exaggerated the degree 
to which they operated outside the artisan workshop system, and 
abjured the use of assistants and apprentices. 
The border between art and handicraft is forged as a dif-
ferentiation between the guild and the academy, both exclusively 
male provinces, but by the end of the eighteenth century the 
dividing line takes on an emphatically gendered quality. Sir 
Joshua Reynolds, who had been taught to paint by his sister, an 
accomplished watercolourist, led the charge to disallow water-
colour paintings from the annual summer exhibition, alongside 
pictures made of hair, paper cut-outs and other images with a 
French School, 1648–1793, trans. Chris Miller, Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2018, 
p. 200.
21. White and White, Canvases and Careers, p. 6.
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strong whiff both of craft and of femininity. By comparison, 
it is easier to acknowledge the guild master’s dependence on 
apprentices, day-labourers and their household more generally 
than it is to recognize the full cast of workers who contribute 
to the production of art by an individual artist in a studio. This 
misrecognition was built into the academy system.22
The academy was not a self-sufficient body. For instance, the 
Académie Royale appeared for the most part to draw the best 
of the painters and sculptors from the guild. Academies did not 
teach painting or sculpture in any technical sense but restricted 
admission to candidates who could demonstrate facility in one 
of the fine arts through the presentation of a ‘reception piece’. 
‘An apprenticeship in handling a pencil and acquiring a good eye, 
first by copying drawings and engravings and then by drawing 
from three-dimensional forms, was a condition of admission to 
the Académie, but drawing was not taught there.’23 As such, the 
Académie continued to rely on a type of formal or informal ap-
prenticeship as a preliminary stage of education for its students.
Accounts of the passage from the artisan to the artist view the 
historical transformation of the social relations of artistic produc-
tion from the narrow perspective of two individual producers. 
Actually, this transition consists of the geographical dispersal of 
numerous tasks previously conducted within the workshop. Each 
single artisan within the cooperative workshop was capable of 
several jobs that would later become specialisms, namely skilled 
worker, manufacturer of tools, supplier of materials, designer, 
teacher and dealer. Hence, the artisan does not exclusively turn 
into the artist but also into all these other specialisms. The 
22. For the most part, artisan workshops were within or attached to the living quarters 
not only of the ‘master’ and his or her family but to the household in general, including 
apprentices and day labourers. The exclusion of women from full guild membership 
(there are cases of female apprentices and masters but these are an institutionally 
imposed minority) is picked up by the academies which almost completely excluded 
women from their ranks. 
23. Michel, The Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, p. 243.
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passage from the artisan to the artist is accompanied therefore 
by the passage from the artisan to the materials supplier, from 
the artisan to the technician or assistant, from the artisan to the 
teacher or dealer, and so on. That is to say, the division of labour 
within the workshop is converted into a social division of labour 
in society as a whole mediated by market exchange.24 
Focusing for a moment on the spatial aspect of the reorgani-
zation of artistic labour during the transition from feudalism 
to capitalism, we must consider not only the spaces in which 
artistic labour takes place, as a passage from the artisanal 
workshop to the artist’s studio, but more fundamentally as the 
transition from the integration of a range of activities within the 
guild workshop to the spatial dispersal of activities that come 
to take place within and between the studio, gallery, art school, 
museum, fabricators’ workshop and all the supply chains that 
provide their tools, machinery and materials for the production 
and circulation of art. The purchasing of supplies from commer-
cial artisans, and all the other specialisms that developed out of 
this exodus from the workshop, converted the technical division 
24. Marx explains: ‘the numerous analogies and links connecting them, division of 
labour in the interior of a society, and that in the interior of a workshop, differ not only 
in degree, but also in kind. The analogy appears most indisputable where there is an 
invisible bond uniting the various branches of trade. For instance the cattle-breeder 
produces hides, the tanner makes the hides into leather, and the shoemaker, the leather 
into boots. Here the thing produced by each of them is but a step towards the final form, 
which is the product of all their labours combined. There are, besides, all the various 
industries that supply the cattle-breeder, the tanner, and the shoemaker with the means 
of production. Now it is quite possible to imagine, with Adam Smith, that the difference 
between the above social division of labour, and the division in manufacture, is merely 
subjective, exists merely for the observer, who, in a manufacture, can see with one 
glance, all the numerous operations being performed on one spot, while in the instance 
given above, the spreading out of the work over great areas, and the great number of 
people employed in each branch of labour, obscure the connexion. But what is it that 
forms the bond between the independent labours of the cattle-breeder, the tanner, 
and the shoemaker? It is the fact that their respective products are commodities. What, 
on the other hand, characterises division of labour in manufactures? The fact that the 
detail labourer produces no commodities. It is only the common product of all the detail 
labourers that becomes a commodity. Division of labour in society is brought about 
by the purchase and sale of the products of different branches of industry, while the 
connexion between the detail operations in a workshop, is due to the sale of the labour-
power of several workmen to one capitalist, who applies it as combined labour-power.’ 
Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume One, trans. Ben Fowkes, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990 [1867], pp. 474–5. 
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of labour into a social division of labour. Commercial suppliers 
diminished the need for apprentices to complete this work for 
the ‘master’ and therefore consolidated the academic system of 
education for painting and sculpture, which consists of a social 
division of labour between the artist and the art teacher, thereby 
separating the studio from the art school.
The social division of artistic labour at the threshold of 
capitalism redefined the artist as distinct from the artisan by 
the innovation of specialist mediators between the producers of 
artworks and their collectors. Today, we think of the art dealer 
or gallerist as an agent who funnels the artist in the direction of 
the art market, but historically the introduction of the special-
ist seller of works of art took the task of sales away from the 
producers themselves and acted, therefore, as a kind of buffer 
between the artist and the direct encounter with paying custom-
ers. Conventions of courtly patronage had long suppressed the 
economic transaction between patrons and painters, but guild 
painters selling paintings from their workshop had no choice 
but to sell their products to the market. These distinctions were 
seized on by the founders of the academy system. 
The ban on commerce 
The academy distinguished itself from the guild, secured the 
distinction of its members from artisans and asserted the 
distinction of its students from apprentices, which recast the 
painter and sculptor as the product of scholarship rather than 
handicraft. Symptomatic of the entire project is an episode in 
1648 (and again in 1777) when the Académie Royale issued a 
statute proclaiming those who ‘wish to open a shop and trade 
in pictures, drawings, and sculptures by other hands, sell colors, 
gilding, and other accessories of the arts of painting and sculp-
ture … shall be required to seek admission to the Community 
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[Guild] of Painter-Sculptors’.25 This statute is not the ultimate 
source of the idea that art is antagonistic to commerce but it 
was essential to the consolidation of that idea within new social 
institutions that upheld it. It is this statute, and the debates 
and practices that corresponded to it, both within the French 
academy and wherever its model was reiterated abroad, that 
converted the nobility of disparaging commerce as a matter 
of individual character into the basis of a definition of art as 
distinct from handicraft, industry and business.
Since the freemen of the guilds held the exclusive right to own 
a shop, the statute forbidding academicians from opening a shop 
can be read as a victory of the guilds and the admission that the 
academy could not award such a right to its members. In fact, the 
historical transition from the workshop to the academy, which 
recast the fine artist as a scholarly individual, blocked the breadth 
of activities that continued to be practised by artisans. In some 
sense, then, it constituted a palpable reduction of freedom and 
agency for the painter and sculptor. Nevertheless, the ban on com-
merce in the seventeenth-century academy was the precondition 
for the inauguration of the salons – opportunities for its members 
to exhibit to the public and advertise themselves to patrons and 
collectors without opening a shop – and the rise of art dealers, 
which sealed off the scholarly practitioner of the fine arts from 
direct economic transactions. So, even when the statute itself 
had no power to prohibit artists from opening shops, they did not 
on the whole do so, but followed academic precedent in staging 
exhibitions for the public and selling works via dealers and gal-
lerists. In other words, the consequences of the academic ban on 
commerce defined art’s mode of production as antagonistic to the 
market in objective social terms that provided material grounds 
for the command to be perpetuated as an abstract norm.
25. Quoted in Michel, Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture, p. 112.
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The standard narrative of the emergence of the category 
of the artist out of a longer history of handicraft production 
stresses the campaign to elevate an elite minority above the 
mediocre mass of jobbing artisans. Whether it is argued that the 
great painters, sculptors and architects of the Renaissance were 
in fact artists, or whether the word itself is saved for later genera-
tions after the eighteenth century that used the word ‘artist’ 
in the modern sense, the story is the same: the artist emerges 
historically through a process of distinction from the artisan. Yet 
the differentiation of the artist from the artisan has never been 
absolute or asserted with certainty. This contrasts sharply with 
the differentiation of the artisan from all other workers during 
the long period of the guild system. Guilds operated with abso-
lute distinctions that they regulated and enforced. For instance, 
the difference between an individual who had served an appren-
ticeship and another who had not was palpable. Evidence and 
testimony could be presented to determine the facts and resolve 
disputes about the status of a particular individual. 
The status of the artist, on the contrary, and the elevation of 
the fine arts above handicraft, was always relative rather than ab-
solute. This new relative differentiation of quality and status was 
achieved through a discursive campaign against artisan painters 
and sculptors by associating them with nothing more than 
mechanical techniques and menial preparatory tasks, capable of 
copying but not inventing, skilled but not talented, and so forth. 
An example may show how these nuanced vague differences 
were articulated. In the early years of the Académie Royale a 
principled debate arose over the question of whether to privilege 
colour or drawing in academic painting. ‘Colour was associated 
with the manual task of grinding pigments and staining cloths’, 
therefore debates on colour and line were a coded discourse on 
the relationship between the fine arts and handicraft. Colour, 
as a substance, was the province of the artisan, and therefore 
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the academician appeared to have two methods available for 
marking a separation from handicraft with regard to colour. 
Either colour could be relegated to a low status below drawing 
and line, or colour could be assigned a new intellectual signifi-
cance that it did not have for the guilds. Colour was negated by 
elimination or metaphysical elevation.26 
Predictably, the quarrel of colour versus drawing was never 
settled one way or the other, but the pattern was set: the fine 
arts (and subsequently art in general) would be elevated above 
handicraft, and the artist above the artisan, not on the basis 
of palpable evidence or absolute distinctions but through 
judgements of immeasurable qualities, comparisons guided by 
unsecured hierarchies, uncertain border controls of unmapped 
boundaries, the incalculable measurements of incorporeal 
properties and the lawless policing of relative differentiations. 
This is also reflected in the replacement of the numerous specific 
freedoms enjoyed by the guild (the freedom to trade within the 
city limits, the freedom to open a shop, the freedom to take on 
apprentices, and so on) with the unspecified abstract freedom of 
the fine arts (and later art in general). 
The relative lack of determinacy of art’s difference from craft 
and industry is evident in its contested elevation above them. 
This is why art is a category that triggers the demystifying and 
debunking critique of it, and why, at times, it has appeared as if 
the word ‘art’ is an empty signifier and a euphemism for elitism 
and entitlement. At the same time, however, this indeterminacy 
is at the heart of why art is cherished as irreducible to instru-
mental reason, why artistic activity is taken to be anathema 
to alienated labour, and why the artwork is seen to exceed the 
commodity-form. In my analysis, the indeterminacy of the 
category of art is a necessary consequence of the social processes 
26. Charles Harrison, Paul Wood and Jason Gaiger, Art in Theory 1648–1815: An 
Anthology of Changing Ideas, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 17. 
78 thinking art
by which art elevated itself above handicraft, including the 
misrepresentation of the artisan, exaggerations of the freedom 
and originality of the artist, suppressions of the contribution of 
paid and unpaid workers to the production of art, and, crucially, 
the proliferation of intermediary agencies between the artist and 
the market. 
Though not quite converting the relative distinction of the 
fine arts from handicraft into an absolute difference, the taboo 
on commerce in art was one of the ways in which the distinction 
between the artist and artisan was lived out, and became an 
objective correlate of that distinction when it was concretized 
in art’s institutions, economies and pedagogy. The relationship 
between artists and their assistants, fabricators, technicians 
and interns – which has been raised recently within a politics of 
artistic labour – testifies to the continuation of the withdrawal 
from handicraft that was the founding gesture of the academy 
system. It survives in both the perennial anxiety about the 
presence of handicraft in art and the persistent question mark 
over the relationship between the artist and a supporting cast of 
direct and indirect assistants. 
In the history of ideas, ‘the art question’ arises out of the 
failure to determine the shared principles or common features 
of the various fine arts. In social history, this question is marked 
by the long campaign by the academy to undermine handicraft 
and elevate scholarly painters and sculptors above artisans. The 
campaign to lift painting and sculpture out of the mechanical 
arts did not succeed in lodging them firmly within the liberal 
arts. In the face of this failure a new category was coined, the 
fine arts, which classified a small number of specific arts in 
some unspecified place between the mechanical and liberal arts 
within the feudal regime of the arts. When the feudal mode of 
production was superseded by the capitalist mode of production, 
the elevation of art above handicraft survived by reconstituting 
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art’s noble antagonism to commerce (a pre-capitalist version of 
anti-capitalism) as the production of original works indifferent 
to market demand, often expressed from the nineteenth century 
onwards as an opposition to the bourgeoisie, the public, fashion 
and the taste of the wealthy.
Focus on the hostility of art to commerce may thus act as a 
challenge to the standard narrative of the transition from the 
guild to laissez-faire or, in art history, from patronage to the art 
market. There is an overstatement of processes of commodifi-
cation in accounts of art’s passage from feudalism to capitalism. 
When considering the specificity of art, rather than focusing 
on the nature of art objects or processes of canonization, more 
attention must be paid to the social relations of artistic produc-
tion. The hostility to commerce in art, which often appears to be 
ideological or romantic or a taboo, is the real historical precondi-
tion for the formation of art’s characteristic category of labour 
distinct from wage-labour, handicraft, trade and industry. 
4
Art, life and labour:  
Carla Lonzi’s existential 
feminist critique 
GiOVAnnA ZAPPeRi 
Any attempt to give an account of the histories of feminism and 
art in Italy in the second half of the twentieth century inevitably 
stumbles upon the figure of Carla Lonzi (1931–1982), a renowned 
art critic throughout the 1960s, who would later become the 
most emblematic figure of Italian feminism. Lonzi’s intellectual 
and political trajectory is marked by her withdrawal from the art 
world in 1970, as she founded the radical feminist group Rivolta 
Femminile (Feminine Revolt) with Italian artist Carla Accardi and 
African-Italian journalist Elvira Banotti. Her feminism is there-
fore defined by a radical negativity, which expresses itself in her 
refusal of the profession she had successfully carried out for over a 
decade, as well as in her search for alternative ways of writing and 
living in which patriarchal institutions, such as art, could be chal-
lenged. In both her writings and her political practice, the undoing 
of ‘woman’ and the critique of the affective labour traditionally 
performed by women became crucial aspects of the collective 
transformative process she promoted. 
During the 1970s Lonzi elaborated the political and existential 
terms of her withdrawal from the art world and her profession as 
an art critic. Rivolta Femminile was one of the very first feminist 
groups in Italy whose practice was based on separatism and 
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autocoscienza (consciousness-raising). Between 1970 and 1972 
Lonzi wrote a number of texts that marked a turning point for 
the Italian women’s liberation movement on account of their 
unprecedented ability to address issues of sexuality and revolu-
tionary politics, and that called for a cultural revolution based on 
woman’s becoming a subject.1 In particular, the radicalism of her 
1970 pamphlet Sputiamo su Hegel (We Spit on Hegel), with its daring 
title and provocative deconstruction of Hegelian master–slave 
dialectics, was crucial in establishing Lonzi as the most prominent 
feminist thinker of her generation in Italy. 
From 1970 on, the critique of art’s patriarchal structures 
became the basis upon which Lonzi develops a feminist practice 
of withdrawal from the roles and expectations structuring her 
life. In particular, her continuous search for valuable forms of dis-
obedience against the patriarchal organization of life was based 
upon the refusal to comply with the male mechanisms of reputa-
tion and success. Lonzi’s desire to establish non-hierarchical 
relations and communities explicitly countered the patriarchal 
emphasis on the idea that social roles define one’s subjectivity, 
instead positioning the subject within a network of relations. 
In addressing Lonzi’s positions, my aim is to emphasize the 
entwinement between her critique of art as ideology and the anti-
work politics that her withdrawal implied. Lonzi’s understanding 
of the relation between art and life is one of the fundamental 
issues she raised throughout her writings, and more poignantly in 
her late work. In Vai Pure (Now You Can Go), her excruciating 1980 
dialogue with her lifelong partner, the artist Pietro Consagra, 
Lonzi elaborated a feminist critique of art considered as a sum 
of institutions, power relations, forms of sociability and labour 
that structurally oppress women. Throughout her writings, the 
1. See Carla Lonzi, ‘Sputiamo su Hegel’ (1970), in Sputiamo su Hegel, La donna clitoridea 
e la donna vaginale e altri scritti, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1974, pp. 19-61; ‘Let’s 
Spit on Hegel’, trans. G. Bellesia and E. Maclachnan, in P. Jagentowicz Mills, ed., Feminist 
Interpretations of G.F.W. Hegel, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press 1996. 
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relation between art, life and professional activity is developed 
through personal relationships, in a way that directly connects 
life and politics. Lonzi’s existential feminism is rooted in the 
crucial significance of lived relationships for her political practice, 
as much as her perspective on art always takes into account 
personal history, intimacy and emotions. 
Lonzi’s writings from the late 1960s until 1980 provide a 
unique perspective on the political intensity of the conflicts that 
are played out in the private sphere. The awareness of the seizure 
of personal relations within art (and work), upon which social 
interactions are organized, becomes the primary ground for her 
struggle for recognition and social transformation. Her various 
interactions with artists demonstrate art’s structural link with 
male prerogatives and woman’s oppression in a way that pre-
cludes any possible redemption. Whereas by the end of the 1960s 
Lonzi wanted to emphasize the difference between artists and 
workers, as these two figures eventually coincided, she constantly 
appears to be claiming autonomy for herself. One of the most 
striking aspects of her dialogue with Consagra is the ways in 
which the artist seems to be literally confined within the values 
of the art world, while Lonzi embodies a desire for a life beyond 
pre-established rules, habits and systems of value. 
The art–life problem
Carla Lonzi’s shift from art criticism to feminism might appear 
unexpected, if one did not take into account Lonzi’s complex 
process of disengagement from and unravelling of her professional 
identification as an art critic. Her art criticism was marked by 
a self-reflexive position that led her to challenge art criticism’s 
institutional framework and languages. Lonzi objected that art 
criticism had become a patronizing and authoritarian activity, and 
tried to devise innovative ways to write about art, in which she 
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could feel closer to the creative process. Throughout the 1960s she 
tried to experiment with a form of relational writing by turning to 
the artists: she promoted dialogues and increasingly avoided dis-
cussing the art work via formal analysis and aesthetic judgement. 
In 1969 she published Autoritratto (Self-portrait), a book based on 
the principle of montage, consisting of a series of tape-recorded 
conversations with fourteen artists, which she had transcribed 
and then stitched together in a way that ruptures the continuum 
of each dialogue.2 The result is three hundred pages of aleatory 
conversations, interspersed with a number of photographic 
images taken from the participants’ private albums. Lonzi herself 
participates in the conversation, but she poses barely any ques-
tions; nor does she explain the artists’ artworks. She rather speaks 
for herself, in her own voice. Autoritratto is based on the idea that 
the work of art criticism is relational and therefore challenges the 
modernist fiction of a disinterested and neutral aesthetic judge-
ment. Personal history and intersubjective encounters replace the 
social and epistemic structures defining art criticism, as these 
were based on the critic’s detachment and observation. 
Autoritratto already foreshadows Lonzi’s impending with-
drawal from the role and profession in which she had been 
involved since graduating from the University of Florence in 
1956. The dialogic format adopted in the book was a way for her 
to escape the alienation she experienced in the role of the passive 
yet authoritative observer, which was inevitably located outside 
of the creative process. As a matter of fact, art criticism’s repres-
sive function concerned not just the artists, but also the critic 
herself, whose subjectivity and desire had to be contained within 
the fiction of an institutional role: 
2. Carla Lonzi, Autoritratto, Bari: De Donato, 1969. The artists’ names are also 
mentioned on the book’s cover: Accardi, Alviani, Castellani, Consagra, Fabro, Fontana, 
Kounellis, Nigro, Paolini, Pascali, Rotella, Scarpitta, Turcato, Twombly. On the process of 
assembling Autoritratto, see Laura Iamurri, Un margine che sfugge. Carla Lonzi e l’arte in 
Italia, 1955–1968, Macerata: Quodlibet, 2016, pp. 167–213. 
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Instead of being the one who is available and in need, the critic 
becomes a judge and creates therefore a whole hierarchy. And 
throughout this activity that he ends up developing, he actually 
repeals the starting point from which he had started, thus becoming 
a completely phony person.3 
Lonzi’s understanding of art criticism’s activity as decep-
tive recalls the fiction of an unmarked universal perspective, 
even though at the time she didn’t clearly identify it in terms 
of gender. One of the main issues emerging from the book is 
precisely how the dismantling of the function of art criticism 
allowed the opportunity to rethink art beyond the institutional 
framework in which its meaning was secured. As opposed to 
a profession based on the production of ‘futile commentaries’, 
Lonzi is interested in the relation between the art work and the 
‘gestures of life’, or, to put it differently, the possibility ‘to live 
one’s life in a creative manner, instead of obediently comply to 
the models proposed by society’.4 The focus on relationality thus 
became a way for her to connect the creative process to the facts 
of life, as if art could exist outside of the institutional chain of 
roles, habits and obligations.
The critic’s own alienation with respect to both profession 
and life thus becomes the crux of Lonzi’s argument throughout 
the book. While discussing her own estrangement from art 
criticism, she turned to the artists who became a sort of counter-
model for the liberation she was seeking for herself. During 
the 1960s, while she was assembling Autoritratto, Lonzi had 
endorsed the artist’s autonomy and freedom in opposition to 
the institutional role of the critic. In line with modernist ideas 
about art’s autonomy, she considered the artist as an exemplary 
figure of a life beyond work. At the time, Lonzi believed that art 
3. Lonzi, Autoritratto, pp. 47–8. Lonzi always uses the male person when discussing the 
figure of the art critic. All subsequent quotations from Lonzi’s texts are translated by the 
author, unless otherwise indicated. 
4. Ibid., p. 48.
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was the only viable escape from the alienating forces organizing 
human life, and that the artist’s ability to evade identification 
with a role, category or profession was a decisive aspect in her 
understanding of art’s autonomy. The ability to connect directly 
with life rather than with an institutionalized role paradoxically 
posits the artist in antagonism towards the art critic’s ‘repressive 
control over art and artists’. For these reasons, the artist had 
nothing in common with the worker, an idea that Lonzi trans-
lates via the notion of the artist’s ‘authenticity’, as opposed to the 
critic’s ‘phony profession’ and coercive function.5 
Art institutions, including art criticism, try to contain and 
neutralize the artist’s freedom; for this reason artists need 
to move away from the institutions in which their activity is 
distorted, and rather address life as such, as Lonzi claims in a 
passage from Autoritratto: 
The art problem is always a life problem; it’s not a cultural problem. 
Do you see what I mean? It doesn’t concern the university. People are 
tired of playing the public or the apprentice; they want to enter the 
thing, or rather, they feel like they are already in.6 
This notion of art as an activity encompassing all aspects of life, 
and the ensuing refusal of art’s allocated spaces (the museum, 
the gallery, the collector’s private homes) was a crucial aspect 
in the contestation of the modernist legacy in the late 1960s. 
It was within this framework that Lonzi also condemned the 
mechanisms of the selection and evaluation of art, considering 
them to be excessively compromised owing to their association 
with the institution. 
In Autoritratto, Lonzi’s relational practice was the ground 
upon which she accomplished the process of undoing her own 
5. Ibid., pp. 7, 44. On Lonzi’s notion of authenticity in relation to art and feminism, 
see Giovanna Zapperi, ‘The Making of a Feminist Subject: Autonomy, Authenticity and 
Withdrawal’, in Francesco Ventrella and Giovanna Zapperi, eds, Art and Feminism in 
Post-war Italy: The Legacy of Carla Lonzi, London: Bloomsbury 2020, pp. 89–110. 
6. Lonzi, Autoritratto, pp. 203–4. 
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role as a critic, a process that ultimately propelled her to the 
centre of the political turmoil of the time. Yet, the book also 
became a source of disappointment as the artists themselves 
were not ready to follow the same path. In most cases, they 
failed to engage in the various forms of politicized practices and 
radicalism that had blossomed in the wake of 1968, and refused 
to challenge their own artistic vocabulary, which was, broadly 
speaking, very much based on a variety of strategies that aimed 
at destabilizing the modernist legacy from within.7 According 
to Lonzi, the disappointing nature of her undertaking with the 
artists concerned their unwillingness to address their (male) 
privilege in society, with the accompanying consequence that 
they proved incapable of examining their own alienation, namely 
the fact that their lives revolved around the art world’s mecha-
nisms of reputation and success.8 
By the early 1970s Lonzi had become aware of this divide: 
‘The artist’, she writes in her diary, ‘is far too loaded with myth.’9 
Accordingly, during the 1970s Lonzi’s understanding of her 
relation with artists underwent a dramatic overhaul: she felt 
she had been betrayed and victimized by the artists’ imposture, 
while the artist’s freedom at this point had proved to be far too 
7. See Alex Potts’s discussion of Arte Povera artists’ ambivalent strategy towards 
the modernist notion of art’s autonomy and the art–life relation, in Alex Potts, 
‘Disencumbered Objects’, October 124, Spring 2008, pp. 169–89; and Alex Potts, 
‘Autonomy in Post-War Art: Quasi-heroic and Casual’, Oxford Art Journal, vol. 17, no. 1, 
2004, pp. 53–7.
8. All the artists involved in Autoritratto are male with the exception of Carla Accardi, 
with whom Lonzi discovered and embraced the feminist movement in a process that 
is chronicled via Accardi’s interventions in the book. A founding member of Rivolta 
Femminile, Accardi was instrumental in Lonzi’s becoming a feminist, as she would later 
recount in her diary: ‘Rivolta Femminile was born out of two persons, [Carla] and I, 
who had questioned male subjectivity precisely because we had positioned ourselves as 
subjects: [Carla] as an artist, and myself as a consciousness of a different identity.’ Carla 
Lonzi, ‘14 August 1972’, in Taci, anzi parla. Diario di una femminista, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta 
femminile 1978, p. 40. However, contrary to Lonzi, Accardi did not step out of the art 
world and refused to give up her identification as an artist, which ultimately caused the 
end of their friendship in 1973. 
9. Lonzi, ‘12 May 1973’, in Taci, anzi parla, p. 378. For a discussion of Lonzi’s use of the 
term ‘myth’ and its reference to Roland Barthes’s writings, see Francesco Ventrella, ‘Carla 
Lonzi e la disfatta della critica d’arte: registrazione, scrittura e risonanza’, Studi Culturali, 
vol. 12, no. 1 (2015), pp. 83–100. 
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compromised in its entanglement with ideology and became 
therefore politically unacceptable. Lonzi’s feminism is in many 
ways based on her changing ideas about the artist, which pre-
cipitated her withdrawal from both the institutional position she 
had occupied as an art critic and the arena of art as such, which, 
during the 1970s, she came to equate with the quintessence of a 
social structure based on male privilege and woman’s structural 
exclusion. Hence, upon her return to these issues in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, the artist has become first and foremost an 
alienated worker. 
The sexual division of artistic labour
Lonzi’s ambition to redefine art criticism as a practice informed 
by the facts of life turned out to be an inadequate response to 
the transformations that were affecting Italian society by the 
end of the 1960s, and she ultimately decided to opt out. And yet 
Autoritratto foregrounds her specific understanding of politics 
as identified with the existential space of the relations that 
form the fabric of life. During the 1970s she constantly returned 
to some of the issues addressed in the book, most notably to 
the questions of art, life and work. This is perhaps the central 
subject of Lonzi’s last book, Vai pure. Dialogo con Pietro Consagra 
(Now You Can Go: A Dialogue with Pietro Consagra), which also 
marks a return to the conversation format, this time as a one-
to-one dialogue with her partner, the artist Pietro Consagra. 
The book, published in 1980, comprises the transcription of a 
tape-recorded dialogue, which records the crisis of the long-term 
relationship between Lonzi and Consagra.10 The conversation 
10. Carla Lonzi, Vai pure. Dialogo con Pietro Consagra, Milan: Scritti di Rivolta 
Femminile, 1980; Milan: et al., 2011. All subsequent quotations refer to the 2011 edition. 
Carla Lonzi and Pietro Consagra met in the early 1960s and had lived as a couple for 
almost twenty years. Pietro Consagra (1920–2005) counts among the most significant 
Italian artists of his generation, mostly known for his abstract sculptures, his closeness 
to the PCI (Italian Communist Party) and his engagement in post-World War II formalist 
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took place in Lonzi’s Rome apartment and is carried out over 
four days, between late April and early May 1980. 
The discussion revolves around issues of art, work and love. 
Lonzi and Consagra painfully scrutinize how they relate to each 
other and examine, albeit in radically different directions, the 
political significance of what happens in the personal sphere. 
They address topics such as the difference between creative and 
reproductive labour, the male artist’s subjectivity and woman’s 
attempt to be recognized as an autonomous subject. The point 
of contention concerns the divergent manner in which each of 
them understands the terms of their relationship. On one side, 
Consagra seems to be content with his own circumstances, 
with their range of established habits, privileges and obligations, 
which constitute his life and relationship. Lonzi, on the contrary, 
tries to tackle the structural violence of a situation in which she 
feels trapped and disempowered. As she states in the introduc-
tion, the book intends to break the secrecy surrounding the 
heterosexual couple: the decision to disseminate the conversa-
tion was therefore a form of disclosure. 
During the dialogue, Lonzi returns to the meaning of her 
withdrawal from art, and underlines her precarious situation in 
comparison to Consagra’s privileged position as a successfully 
established artist: ‘Well, I just want you to realize this condi-
tion of ours: of you as a cultural figure, and of myself, living at 
the mercy of a world without control, which is the private...’11 
While her activity accords with her life, thus remaining un-
noticed, Consagra’s circumstances are entirely registered by the 
mechanisms of social and cultural approval. For Lonzi, these are 
consistent with patriarchal structures – such as individualism 
and competition between men – from which women are excluded. 
aesthetics in Italy, most notably as part of the artist collective Forma 1, which considered 
itself both Marxist and formalist. 
11. Lonzi, Vai pure, p. 81.
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The discussion revolves around Consagra’s identification as an 
artist – and how this determines every single aspect of his life – as 
opposed to Lonzi’s search for a strategy of disidentification from 
the roles that organize human activity. According to Lonzi, an 
artist’s life is regulated by creative labour in a way that blurs the 
distinction between life and work: one is an artist twenty-four 
hours a day. Artists thus embody the paradigm of the individual 
whose life – relations, affects, time and sexuality – is entirely at 
the service of the affirmation of their creative personality. 
Vai pure is reminiscent of Lonzi’s past disillusion with the 
artists and the experience of Autoritratto. As opposed to what 
she had maintained in the 1960s, now Lonzi clarifies that the 
artist’s autonomy can only exist at the expense of woman’s 
freedom, since it needs to dismiss the relational dimension 
of life and repress it into the private sphere. In analysing the 
conflict between art and life, Lonzi opposes the male artist, as 
the unique protagonist, to the woman’s desire to be recognized 
as an autonomous subject. Vai pure opens up with the deadlock 
between Consagra’s identification as an artist and Lonzi’s refusal 
to fulfil the accompanying tasks required by the creative person-
ality: the affective labour traditionally performed by the artist’s 
wife or lover. Lonzi had withdrawn from all the tasks that, in 
her everyday life, involved her role as an artist’s partner, such as 
attending exhibition openings and other events that punctuate 
the art world’s social calendar. This was a source of frustration 
for Consagra, who affirms his desire for assistance: 
I missed someone by my side during my social life as well, in my 
work, in my worries. … I couldn’t stand the loneliness while I was 
with a woman who didn’t help me when I desperately needed help: 
company and encouragement when I felt lonely, or when I was 
travelling for my exhibitions, or in my studio.12 
12. Ibid., p. 13.
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No wonder that Consagra explicitly qualifies a woman’s role in 
the creative process as subordinate.13 What he considers as his 
legitimate needs are in fact the male prerogatives against which 
Lonzi is struggling, as in her view the artist’s autonomy is now 
based on women’s exclusion and confinement to the role of the 
caring other. 
According to Lonzi, ‘the limited space’14 of art is where 
relations are rendered invisible in favour of the artist’s ‘protago-
nism’: the myth of his originality and coherence, according to 
which artworks can be considered as mere expressions of an 
absolute self. Interestingly, in confronting the power structures 
in which her relationship is entwined, Lonzi constantly refers 
to the modernist ideology of the artist as a cultural hero, as 
well as to the structures of male narcissism that entail women’s 
exclusion.15 This is perhaps the reason why, in Autoritratto, Lonzi 
assembled a number of dialogues that were originally recorded 
separately in a way that creates the fiction of an ongoing, 
collective exchange, as if the artists were actually talking to 
each other. In doing so, Lonzi demonstrates that she no longer 
believed that art is an individual and solitary endeavour, as much 
as she opposed the critic’s exclusive entitlement to assess the art 
work. The book emphasizes instead the idea that the creative 
process is entangled in a multiplicity of relations. 
In keeping with this line of reasoning, Vai pure takes as its 
starting point Lonzi’s awareness of the relational labour she 
performs, as a woman and the partner of an artist, and how 
her activity participates in a creative process from which she is 
virtually excluded. In a way, it can be said that in Autoritratto 
Lonzi sought to reinvent art criticism precisely by turning the 
13. Ibid., p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 49.
15. See Rozsika Parker and Griselda Pollock’s concomitant deconstruction of the 
artist’s masculinity and privilege in Rozika Parker and Griselda Pollock, Old Mistresses: 
Women, Art and Ideology, London: Pandora, 1981; London: Bloomsbury, 2020. 
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critic’s authoritative function into relational labour. This move 
ultimately allowed her to connect with the artists outside of the 
institutional role she wanted to challenge, while at the same time 
producing a network of encounters and dialogues. In the 1960s 
she believed that her endeavour had somehow also allowed her 
to claim creativity for herself – via the relations she was able to 
generate – while by the time of Vai pure she had come to realize 
that, in the field of art, a woman has no other choices than 
remaining silent or speaking a language of self-negation. At best, 
a woman can occupy the role of the listening other, art critic or 
lover, both spectators of someone else’s accomplishments. Lonzi 
draws on her personal experience while suggesting a parallel 
between her role as an art critic and as the artist’s partner, as in 
both cases woman facilitates the creative process thanks to her 
assistance, understanding and support. Alternatively, a woman 
can also try to become an artist herself, therefore having to 
confront the inadequacy of the existing criteria and systems of 
validation. Women artists inevitably stumble upon their need for 
approval from male institutions and artists; therefore they end 
up being trapped in their own alienation as they endorse a social 
role that ultimately oppresses them.16
While discussing the artist’s demand for an unequal relation, 
Lonzi points at the existential dilemma she is facing between the 
contradictory desires for love and for autonomy: 
I don’t know where this way of feeling is taking me, but I cannot 
overturn the priorities between our needs. ... because what I want is 
love for my autonomy, which is not love of my dependence and of my 
service.17
16. Lonzi, ‘3 December 1975’, Taci anzi parla, p. 1174. 
17. Lonzi, Vai pure, p. 9. On the dilemma between love and autonomy in Carla 
Lonzi’s Vai pure, see Lea Melandri, Una visceralità indicibile. La pratica dell’ inconscio nel 
movimento delle donne degli anni settanta, Rome: Franco Angeli, 2000, pp. 43–50.
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Even if the dialogue with Consagra might at times convey the 
kind of recriminations one would expect from a couple on the 
edge of a break-up, its significance lies in its ability to expose the 
constitutive power differential within the heterosexual couple, as 
well as the cultural structures involved in the conflict between 
art and life. Lonzi contests that the relationship is subsumed 
within the creative process, as Consagra only acts for himself, or 
rather for the art work, which literally ‘dictates the agenda’.18 The 
artist’s masculinity wraps itself with the distinction connected to 
his privileged status over women, which entails the fact that the 
personal sphere is appropriated and sublimated in the creative 
process. In other terms, art is inseparable from what Lonzi 
calls ‘male protagonism’, which generates the power imbalance 
she is fighting against. In the modern tradition, this imbalance 
could typically be translated as the division of labour within the 
artist’s studio, as exemplified in the eroticized relation between 
the artist and his model. Sublimation rhymes with domination, 
Lonzi seems to suggest when she underlines that this configura-
tion of the creative process turns women’s work into a symbolic 
function, another way of excluding them from the sphere of 
subjectivity. 
Here, significantly, Lonzi refers to the case of Zelda Fitzgerald 
as an emblematic example of this pernicious apparatus’s destruc-
tive consequences. Zelda Fitzgerald found herself at the mercy 
of a man who instrumentalized their relationship for the sake 
of his own literary production, a fact that eventually culminated 
in her mental distress. Zelda lost her mind because she was 
isolated, disempowered and unable to find the support she would 
have needed for herself, as ‘there were no feminist groups’19 at 
the time. On the contrary, Lonzi can avoid collapsing because 
feminism provides her with the necessary strength to resist the 
18. Lonzi, Vai pure, p. 10. 
19. Ibid., p. 103.
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self-annihilation required by the creative personality. The artist’s 
protagonism requires that women disavow themselves in the 
private sphere, while in the public domain they are expected 
to perform their own sacrifice by acting as muses, sources of 
inspiration and supporting partners, which Lonzi refuses to do. 
Hence she tries to dismantle the function of art as an ideology, 
while at the same time finding herself in the position of having 
to struggle against art’s destructive effects on her life. 
A life beyond work 
Lonzi’s refusal of the affective labour requested by her artist 
partner is predicated upon a practice of ‘deculturation’, a term 
she coined in the early 1970s, as she was trying to conceptualize 
her own withdrawal from her professional activity as a form 
of disidentification.20 This the core of Lonzi’s idea of liberation 
and refers to the process of undoing the roles that determine 
women’s existence. In order to engage with her own desire for 
transformation, womanhood must be collectively undone start-
ing from the roles, stereotypes, gestures and all the categories 
that both oppress and define ‘woman’. In this respect, a practice 
of deculturation corresponds with a process in which women 
dare to abandon what they thought they knew about themselves. 
Refusing the role of ‘woman’ opens up the possibility of imagin-
ing a different becoming, which is no longer based on man’s 
approval. Deculturation is therefore key to Lonzi’s notion of 
the subject as it emerges from a process of unravelling oneself 
in a sort of radical negativity, or, in other words, in the refusal 
to be or to become a woman.21 One of her crucial contributions 
20. See Lonzi, ‘Let’s Spit on Hegel’, p. 288. In the English version the Italian 
deculturizzazione is translated as ‘shedding of culture’. Cf. Sputiamo su Hegel, p. 47. 
21. Following this line of reasoning, Lonzi’s writings could be productively addressed 
within the framework of what Jack (Judith) Haberstam has called a ‘shadow feminism’, 
or an alternative feminist project whose genealogy may be traced back to the 1970s with 
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has consisted precisely in undoing ‘woman’, as both a political 
endeavour and a lived experience.
The figure of the ‘clitoral woman’ that Lonzi envisions in the 
early 1970s suggests precisely the revolt against ‘woman’ as an 
already-available product, which is, in Lonzi’s vocabulary, the 
‘vaginal woman’, whose sexuality is entirely captured within the 
mechanisms of social reproduction.22 These two opposing figures 
need to be understood as political fictions indicating a path 
towards the affirmation of a ‘non-conformist sexual identity’,23 
as the clitoral woman allows for the establishment of a link 
between the refusal of reproductive labour and a radical critique 
of patriarchal institutions such as the heterosexual couple, 
romantic love, the nuclear family, and so on.24 Lonzi identifies 
these social structures as ‘culture’. 
Throughout the 1970s Lonzi would keep on unravelling the 
threads that interweave womanhood with a number of roles and 
tasks encompassing the social as well as the intimate sphere. In 
doing so, she always took her lived experience and the relations 
in which her life was enmeshed as the main concern of her 
political endeavour. The notion of rapporto (relationship) there-
fore emerges as a crucial and recurring keyword in her writings. 
Rapporto can be considered as the nucleus of Lonzi’s feminist 
practice as it foregrounds the relational dimension of subjectivity 
and the political necessity to transform the way we relate to one 
another, especially within the personal sphere.25 In promoting 
dialogues and relationality, Lonzi sought to generate a process 
figures such as Monique Wittig and Valerie Solanas. See Judith (Jack) Halberstam, The 
Queer Art of Failure, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2011, pp. 4, 123–45.
22. See Carla Lonzi, ‘La donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale’ (1971), in Sputiamo su 
Hegel, pp. 102–3. 
23. Carla Lonzi, ‘Itinerario di riflessioni’, in M.G. Chinese, C. Lonzi, M. Lonzi and A. 
Jaquinta, È già politica, Milano: Scritti di Rivolta femminile, 1977, p. 22.
24. Liliana Ellena, ‘Carla Lonzi e il neo-femminismo degli anni ’70: disfare la cultura, 
disfare la politica’, in L. Conte, V. Fiorino and V. Martini, eds, Carla Lonzi: la duplice 
radicalità, Pisa: ETS, 2011, pp. 136–7.
25. Maria Luisa Boccia, L’ io in rivolta. Pensiero e vissuto in Carla Lonzi, Milano: La 
Tartaruga, 1990, p. 119.
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of mutual recognition in which a new subjectivity can unfold, 
as opposed to the notion of the subject as an autonomous and 
universal individual inherited from the modernist tradition. In 
opposition to a life based on the artist’s distinction and privilege, 
Lonzi proposes the radical alternative of a non-instrumental 
relationship, where being together can be something like a 
‘means without an end’.26 
Lonzi’s conversation with Consagra is an attempt to change the 
relations that perpetuate the roles oppressing women. Against the 
patriarchal organization and seizure of life, Lonzi counters her 
desire for a society based on a collective and participatory being 
together, liberated from the conditioning of social approval. This 
is a central aspect in the conflict opposing her to Consagra, as 
what she is striving for is not a mere egalitarian utopia. In Lonzi’s 
terms, the meaning of rapporto refers to the very possibility of 
living otherwise, of a life that is able to resist the mechanism of 
valorization and capture typical of the artist’s existence. 
The problem of the irreconcilable conflict between rapporto 
and art is the main issue addressed in the fourth and last day 
of the dialogue comprising Vai pure. Lonzi and Consagra meet 
again after two weeks have passed since their last recording. The 
general tone of the discussion has now shifted from the polemi-
cal mood that had prevailed in the previous chapters, towards a 
certain fatigue prompted by the shared feeling that the couple 
have now reached a point of no return. Consagra is willing to 
admit, for example, that yes, in his view, ‘human relations are 
only possible if they are connected to this commitment to the 
object’, whereas Lonzi reaffirms her perception that his identifi-
cation as an artist and his work in general hinder the relation.27 
Consagra, in turn, now acknowledges that ‘work is a bit against 
26. Claire Fontaine, ‘We are all Clitoridian Women: Some Notes on Carla Lonzi’s 
Legacy’, e-flux journal 47, September 2013. 
27. Lonzi, Vai pure, p. 115.
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human relations’, and that ‘art is the symbol of a type of work 
that requires us to participate in a myth.28 While recapitulating 
the reasons for their crisis, he says: ‘Our disagreement arises 
from the pleasure that you want to have in a relation – because 
you create a relation that tends to this, and everyone enjoys it – 
and what I propose in exchange, which is not pleasant to you.’29 
However, for Lonzi, Consagra’s proposal is not just unpleasant, 
it is ‘unliveable’, precisely because she seeks to live a life that 
is something different from work, which her partner is unable 
to understand. For Lonzi ‘art grows and disseminates to the 
detriment of human relations’,30 inasmuch as these are inevitably 
instrumentalized within the logic of the artwork. Lonzi laments 
the fact that their relationship is predicated upon the primacy of 
Consagra’s work in a way that invades all aspects of their life as a 
couple, as she argues in the book’s final pages: 
You must understand that our whole life is structured by work, all 
of it, that we are never together for ourselves. It’s just a pause, a rest 
from work. The vital, conscious and active moment, the promised 
land is work... You don’t have a schedule, you don’t have a job, you 
don’t have obligations, but you create a more constraining situation 
than if you had a job and a boss.31 
Vai pure ends with a farewell that gives the book its title (‘you 
can go’ is Lonzi’s concluding remark addressed to Consagra) 
and with the unresolved dilemma of life and work, a dilemma 
that had occupied Lonzi’s thinking ever since she had started to 
contest her role as an art critic. The book’s final passage shows 
the extent to which life’s subordination to the logic of work has 
emptied the relationship of any independent meaning, whereas 
Lonzi strives for a relation that can exist beyond the obligations 
and habits that make an artist’s life. Her disagreement indicates 
28. Ibid., p. 116.
29. Ibid., p. 117.
30. Ibid., p. 121. 
31. Ibid., p. 131. 
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the possibility of living a life where relations are not disciplined 
within the logic of work, which implicitly, and inevitably, sug-
gests capitalist productivity. 
In this respect, Vai pure also returns not just to some of the 
issues she had raised as an art critic, but also to her early femi-
nist writings, in particular the first Manifesto of Rivolta Femminile, 
written in the spring of 1970. Several passages of the manifesto 
discuss the critique of reproductive labour within the framework 
of an anti-work politics that emphasize women’s hidden and 
under-recognized labour, while at the same time claiming 
unproductivity’s independent value. For Rivolta Femminile, the 
refusal of work32 translates a political strategy of withdrawal 
from social expectations:
We identify in unpaid domestic work the help that allows both 
private and state capitalism to survive. ... We detest the mechanism 
of competitiveness and the blackmail exercised in the work by the 
hegemony of efficiency. We want to put our working capacity at the 
disposal of a society that is immune to this. ... Attributing value to 
‘unproductive’ moments is an extension of life proposed by woman.33
These paragraphs resonate with the transnational ‘wages 
against housework’ campaign, which gained momentum in 
Italy in the early 1970s, thanks to the writings and activism of 
a number of women who articulated a feminist discourse that 
was otherwise very remote from Rivolta Femminile’s positions.34 
Rivolta Femminile’s and Lonzi’s ideas can therefore be discussed 
32. The expression ‘refusal of work’, especially in the Italian context, might refer to 
the autonomous Marxist tradition of Operaismo (or Workerism). However, Carla Lonzi, 
who was a member of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) during her youth, was vocal 
in criticizing Marxist politics. On Carla Lonzi’s formative years, see Iamurri, Un margine 
che sfugge, pp. 26–34. On Italian Operaismo and its legacy, see Steve Wright, Storming 
Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism, London: Pluto, 
2017; Sylvère Lotringer and Christian Marazzi, eds, Autonomia: Post-political Politics, New 
York: Semiotexte, 2007.
33. Rivolta Femminile, ‘Manifesto of Rivolta Femminile’ (1970), in Paola Bono and 
Sandra Kemp, eds, Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, p. 39.
34. See Maud Anne Bracke, ‘Between the Transnational and the Local: Mapping 
the Trajectories and Contexts of the Wages for Housework Campaign in 1970s Italian 
Feminism’, Women’s History Review, vol. 2, no. 4, 2013, pp. 625–42.
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in the wider framework of the refusal of what Silvia Federici 
called the ‘labour of love’, namely the relational and affective 
labour women perform in their everyday lives.35 According 
to Federici, wages against housework are the first step of the 
struggle against woman’s social role, and thus against work 
itself.36 The demand for wages renders reproductive labour 
visible, which is the condition to start struggling against it. 
In denying housework the status of labour, capitalism has 
transformed it into an act of love and has identified women with 
the tasks they have to accomplish. Federici challenges woman’s 
assimilation with reproductive labour, as well as the very notion 
that love can be nothing else than work. In a similar way, Lonzi 
also counters the idea that woman’s work is unproductive and 
at the same time opposes the perspective of a life reduced to 
work. However, contrary to Federici, she is not interested in 
analysing woman’s subjection within the Marxist framework of 
class relations, because in her view identifying women with class 
would put them back within a structure that actively operates 
towards their exclusion.37 
In keeping with her existential understanding of woman’s 
oppression, Lonzi rather aims at overturning woman’s associa-
tion with unproductivity and transforming it into a political 
programme. Throughout Vai pure, the manifesto’s critique of 
reproductive labour and its anti-work politics becomes the crux 
of Lonzi’s argument against Consagra’s exclusive focus on the 
artwork. Hence, the artist emerges as an alienated individual 
whose existence is based on the perfect coincidence between 
what he is and what he does, thus becoming a paradigmatic 
35. See Silvia Federici, ‘Wages against Housework’ (1975), in S. Federici, Revolution 
at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle, Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 
2012, pp. 15–22. On the feminist refusal of work from a Marxist-feminist perspective in 
Italy, see Kathi Weeks, The Problem with Work: Feminist, Marxism, Anti-work Politics and 
Postwork Imaginaries, Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2011.
36. Federici, ‘Wages against Housework’, p. 19. 
37. This is one of the main points addressed in ‘Let’s Spit on Hegel’, where Lonzi 
deconstructs the Marxist–Hegelian understanding of revolutionary politics.
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figure of contemporary labour, self-absorbed and competitive. 
Lonzi’s desire to be loved for her autonomy instead of her service 
offers instead a radical alternative to the idea that relationships 
operate within the logics of production. 
Lonzi’s ideas about the artist’s masculinity and the function 
of art as ideology can be productively addressed within the 
broader critique of art that has been at the centre of much of 
feminist art history and criticism since the 1970s. Feminist art 
historians of her generation in the Anglo-American context 
– such as Linda Nochlin or Carol Duncan – pointed out the 
material conditions that have excluded women from artistic 
production, indicating within the sexual division of artistic 
labour a crucial aspect of art’s ideological apparatus.38 However, 
what differentiates Lonzi’s position is not just the fact that she 
abandoned art (i.e. she never became a ‘feminist art critic’, as did, 
for instance, Lucy Lippard), but also that her critique is the result 
of a mediation with her lived experience and, more importantly, 
with the kind of transformative relations with which she tried 
to experiment, be it in the art world, in the feminist group or 
in the intimacy of a love relationship. While reflecting upon the 
political significance of women’s relational labour, Lonzi was 
particularly interested in stressing the performative role women 
play within the theatre of male culture. This aspect is crucial 
to my understanding of Lonzi’s positioning against art as the 
basis upon which she imagines and embodies a new feminist 
subjectivity. 
The dialogue with Consagra remains somehow held in 
suspension, as there is no possible resolution of the dilemma 
between art and life that had occupied Lonzi ever since as-
sembling Autoritratto. Lonzi’s trajectory and radical search for 
38. See Linda Nochlin, ‘Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?’ (1971), in 
Women, Art, and Power, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, pp. 145–78; Carol Duncan, 
‘Virility and Domination in Early 20th Century Vanguard Painting’, Artforum, December 
1973, pp. 30–39. 
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alternative modes of living leave us with a set of open questions 
with no easy answers. Her political and existential project is 
certainly fated to remain utopian, as it appears entangled in a 
number of contradictions. Needless to say, Lonzi’s anti-work 
politics was made possible by her relative privilege of being 
able to avoid work, even though this made the conflict between 
dependence and autonomy even more inextricable. One could 
also wonder how the conflicts that are played out within the 
heterosexual bourgeois couple, no matter how exemplary of 
a cultural structure, can be transposed to society at large. 
However, in opposing life to art, and thus to work, Carla Lonzi 
expresses a desire for a life liberated from the power relations 
that organize social interactions. Her ability to correlate life and 
politics can still be relevant today, as the barriers between the 
personal and the productive spheres are increasingly dissolving, 
and feminist movements around the globe keep on experiment-
ing and imagining new ways of living and being together. 
5
Night cleaning at the bank: 
Sanja Iveković’s screen tests 
for invisible women
kLARA keMP-WeLCH 
In 2016, Erste Group Bank AG opened a new headquarters – Erste 
Campus – in the Quartier Belvedere District in Vienna, designed 
by Henke Schreieck architects. CEO Andreas Treichl (named 
Euromoney’s ‘Banker of the Year’ 2019) has explained that he had 
wanted to do away with conventional office spaces and to move 
everyone into a single building to make everything very ‘open’. 
Erste Campus was to be a space ‘to feel good about’; a space for 
‘team building’ where ‘staff, customers and everyone who wishes 
to shape the future with us can come together’ to produce an 
‘inspiring and exhilarating workplace, promoting communication 
between individuals and teams and strengthening team cohesion’. 
The bank’s website describes the Campus as ‘a new working envi-
ronment for banking’: an ‘office concept of new corporate culture’.1 
The upbeat tone of this blurb is in line with the wider vision for 
the Quartier Belvedere itself. As the Erste Group site explains: 
investors in this district will be providing a way of living and 
working here never experienced before: workers in the firms 
I am very grateful to Sanja Iveković for kindly sharing with me a copy of the film and 
some of the documentation associated with its making, as well as for permitting me to 
reproduce the stills included here. 
1. ‘Office concept for a new corporate culture’. See www.erstegroup.com/en/about-us/
erste-campus.
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establishing themselves in this district will not immediately head for 
home at the end of the working day, but will stay on in the Quartier 
Belvedere together with their colleagues, with residents and with 
travellers and bring the day to a positive close.2 
Both the new district and Erste Campus, then, champion a new 
approach to the corporate workplace, symptomatic of the drive 
to deliver new working environments supporting greater ‘flex-
ibility’, increasing worker commitment, productivity and profits; 
a Euro-banking experiment in learning from the successes of 
Googleplex, Santa Clara. 
The insistence on glass throughout the Erste Campus is 
symptomatic of corporate architecture’s conceptual attachment 
to transparency. In interview, Michael Werner (head of Real 
Estate Investment and Operations, Erste Group AG) describes 
transparency as ‘one of our core values: when you look into the 
process, you know what happens’. He explains: 
the promise of transparency should also be exemplified by the 
office building; so it’s important that you can look into the interior 
from the outside. We don’t hide from the client; financial services 
providers handling money always seem to be doing something in 
secret or underground, where nobody has access. Here you can look 
directly into the building.
Nevertheless, such a working environment brings challenges: 
Transparency is not an easy topic; sometimes it is very difficult 
for people. Working in an open space with a clean desk means full 
transparency … we need a specific working environment in order to 
be really efficient or creative. 
Asked about why he had felt the need to produce a ‘mood book’ 
for the project, Werner explains: 
The process of developing corporate headquarters does not imply 
translating the corporate identity of the company into physical 
space. Instead, it is to understand the brand attitude and to 
2. ‘Erste Campus Surroundings’. See www.erstegroup.com/en/about-us/erste-campus.
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transform it into a brand atmosphere. Ideally, the brand should not 
be too visible to the user or a visitor to the Campus – instead, they 
should feel it. 
He goes on: 
we wanted to convey how Erste thinks about certain issues, how 
we see things, how we want clients to see us and our work. This is 
related to our advisor work and how we treat both customers and 
employees, and how we want to conduct ourselves in daily business.3 
The Erste Group is ‘among the largest financial service provid-
ers in Central and Eastern Europe’,4 with 47,000 employees, 
and core markets in Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Serbia and Slovakia, as well as secondary markets in 
Bosnia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Slovenia.5 
Boris Marte, head of the company’s Innovation Centre (Erste 
HUB) stresses the particular relevance of the historic site for the 
location of the headquarters: 
We constructed our venue on the former site of the ‘Südbahnhof’, 
the city’s southern railway station… In the 1960s and 70s, hundreds 
of thousands of people from communist Eastern Europe arrived at 
this train station to look for something like freedom … in the 1970s, 
hundreds of thousands of Jews from the Soviet Union also arrived 
here and then travelled on to Israel … the Südbahnhof had its history 
as an important hub at a time when the iron curtain still existed. 
This was the only train station where people moved back and forth 
between the East and the Southeast. Building a company that is 
strongly represented in those countries in that very place carries a 
certain message.6 
The ‘message’ is presumably intended to be a reminder of 
Vienna’s role as a way station for its former socialist neighbours, 
but the demolition of the massive structure and the construction 
3. ‘Who’s cleaning all this? Interviews by Sanja Iveković’, in Pierre Bal-Blanc and Kathrin 
Rhomberg, eds, The Canaletto View, Köln: Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, 2020, 
p. 94.
4. www.erstegroup.com/en/home.
5. See ‘Our Markets’, ibid..
6. ‘Who’s cleaning all this?’, p. 94.
of the new business district also mark a significant shift in priori-
ties. If the site once orchestrated the flow of people across borders, 
it is now primarily designed in as a hub for the flow of capital. 
The bank’s commitment to ‘giving back’ to the former East is 
better evidenced by its philanthropic wing, the ERSTE Founda-
tion, which has been the main plug for the funding gap left 
in the region’s emerging contemporary art world after George 
Soros pulled his money out of the 1990s’ network of Centres 
for Contemporary Art. The Foundation is devoted to three core 
areas: ‘social innovation, European cohesion and democracy 
and contemporary culture’ and has engaged in a wide range of 
cultural initiatives: the founding of the Kontakt Collection – the 
Erste Group and ERSTE Foundation art collection – dedicated 
to modern and contemporary art from the region; the funding 
of the Tranzit – a ‘network of autonomous initiatives in con-
temporary art in Austria, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic 
and Hungary’; and the sponsoring of the Igor Zabel Award for 
Culture and Theory, among others.7 The Foundation also pub-
lishes online interviews and stories on topics such as the educa-
tion of Roma children and segregation in Slovak schools, pharma 
pollution in Croatia, Bosnia’s failure to house its displaced, 
Poland’s collision course with the EU, the plight of refugees in 
7. Other initiatives include the 2019 ‘Tipping Point’ talks (the first of which was by 
Francis Fukuyama, another by Felvine Sarr on ‘How Can We Realise a Holistic Concept of 
Prosperity for the Many and Not the Few?’), and funding an annual lecture in Judenplatz 
in Vienna on Europe Day 2019, kicking off with Timothy Snyder.
camps on the Bosnian–Croatian border, the youth of Kosovo, and 
the emptying of Bulgaria’s Vidin, ‘the world capital of population 
decline’.8 The Foundation, then, is committed to engaging with 
a wide range of human rights and equality issues relevant to the 
post-socialist context. 
When Erste Group came to consider how they would deploy 
art as part of the Campus, they were keen to avoid using it 
as a generic form of corporate interior design (large format, 
abstract painting, global photography). The Campus ‘Mood Book’ 
explicitly makes the point that ‘there is no law stating that the 
walls of corporate headquarters have to be adorned with art. 
We only display art where we believe it has relevance and can 
be an inspiration for all Erste Campus users and visitors.’ In 
commissioning artwork for its new campus, the Group opted 
for new work by artists from central and eastern Europe which 
‘required the artists not only to take into account the context of 
the geopolitical area in which Erste Group operates, but also to 
make reference in the projects to the character and location of 
the Erste Campus building on the former site of the Südbahnhof 
railway station’.9 ‘Art in Architecture’, as the project came to be 
called, was a collaboration with Kathrin Rhomberg, head of the 
Kontakt collection. The curator and co-commissioner, Pierre 
8. See Angel Petrov, ‘Where did everyone go?’, 11 May 2020, www.erstestiftung.org/
en/where-did-everyone-go.
9. ‘Art in Architecture’. See www.erstegroup.com/en/about-us/erste-campus.
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Bal-Blanc, explained that the project was about ‘rethinking the 
relationship between art and capital, and examining the com-
promises imposed when the viewpoints of users, bankers and 
employers who cross paths at the site of this financial enterprise 
converge or contradict one another’. He added that ‘Any initia-
tive developed on private terrain has its blind spot, a repressed 
consciousness that reveals itself once the exhibit is finished … 
exposing the vitality of contradictions that revitalize this bank.’10 
Many of the statements by Erste representatives cited in 
this brief introduction to the Campus and its ambitions were 
gathered by Croatian artist Sanja Iveković as part of her ‘field 
research’ for a film piece entitled The Invisible Women of the 
Erste Campus, which she wrote and directed, and installed on 
Campus as part of the ‘Art in Architecture’ commission. The 
floor area of Erste Campus is vast, standing at 165,000 m2. When 
Iveković asked Marte how many cleaners he thought there are 
on Campus, he replied: ‘I guess between 100 and 150’. Iveković 
countered gently: ‘That’s what I thought, too, but there are only 
58.’ She explained: ‘As a feminist I’m interested in the situation 
and the conditions under which women are working here. When 
I was invited to do a project and saw the big building, the first 
question that came to my mind was, who’s cleaning all this? 
Thus, my project is about the cleaning ladies.’11 With reference 
to the nature of the ‘feeling’ Erste representatives wanted to 
convey through the Campus design, Iveković noted: ‘you stressed 
you wanted to see everybody and also everybody to be seen, to 
be able to talk to everyone and communicate with them. The 
project I’m working on – talking about communication and 
10. Pierre Bal-Blanc, ‘Private Foundations, Innovating Conformity’, Switch on Paper 
International, trans. Maya Dalinsky, 2019, www.switchonpaper.com/wp-content/
uploads/2019/06/Private-foundations-Innovating-Conformity.pdf.
11. Andreas Treichl comments: ‘I thought they would be less invisible than they are. 
They are not invisible to me because I start to work very early in the morning.’ ‘Who’s 
cleaning all this? Interviews by Sanja Iveković’, p. 94.
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everybody who is employed here – is pursuing the same goal.’12 
The Invisible Women of the Erste Campus set out to test the 
Group’s corporate commitment to ‘transparency’ by making sure 
that the women who clean the building were made visible to 
everyone in the building. The film, made collaboratively with the 
cleaners, is an ode to their invisible labour. It is played on a series 
of monitors in the Elevator areas of Levels 0–9 in Building A–F.13 
The film opens in the dark; there is light drizzle and the roar of 
traffic as the camera pans around a series of curved, glass- fronted 
office blocks, their lights dimmed. The view shifts to the entrance 
to one of the blocks, and we hear early-morning bird song. It is 
still dark outside, when women in jeans and jackets begin to walk 
through the large glass doors and into the lobby. As they enter, we 
hear a rollcall of names: Angela, Angelika, Zolti, Elvira, Marijana, 
Sofia, Gordana, Dragana, Milka, Balta, Lidia, Migreta, and more. 
The camera jumps to a long service corridor with red pipes 
overhead and then to an empty locker room, with narrow benches 
and neat rows of practical shoes and trainers; their owners have 
changed into uniforms and are beginning their shifts. Women in 
white T-shirts and navy-and-white striped aprons are in a store-
room, loading grey plastic trays with colour-coded cloths. They 
go about this work silently, each focused on the routine. Having 
loaded up with cleaning supplies, they stack the grey plastic trays 
and attach carry straps before heading back up the corridor. As 
the cleaning team heads out, a team of kitchen staff pass by, 
wearing plastic hair coverings and wheeling metal trolleys ranged 
with trays and catering equipment. 
The screen fades to a blinding white and a middle-aged woman 
with pleasant features and dark hair tucked behind her ears is 
12. Kathrin Rhomberg and Pierre Bal-Blanc, ‘Sanja Iveković, ‘The Invisible Women 
of Erste Campus’, 2016, ‘Film Project, Elevator areas, Level 0–9, Building A–F’, www.
erstegroup.com/en/about-us/erste-campus/sanja-ivekovic.
13. It now also exists as a single channel film installation, and it is this version of the 
film to which I have had access, and on which my essay focuses.
shown close up against a plain background, smiling lightly. Un-
expectedly, she recites three lines of a poem in her native language. 
The shot of her face fades out and we read the English intertitle: 
‘I came from the South / Wherever I go / the moss keeps following 
me’. In the background, the sound of objects clattering about 
continues like a chorus of labour. Another woman takes her turn, 
and says her piece: she is also middle-aged, this time blonde, with 
earrings, smiling, in a deep Slavonic accent, slightly perspiring. 
She wears the same uniform. The intertitle conveys a pleasurable 
state of rest: ‘When Sunday comes / I lie down in the shade / Of my 
family tree’, though this is tinged with melancholy and a sense of 
isolation in the final line, which reads: ‘I am the branch that broke 
off’. As we try to appreciate the poetry, though, there is a deafening 
drone of hoovering, unpleasantly insistent and in stark contrast 
with the state of calm conveyed by the poem. 
An exterior view of the building reveals uniformed cleaners 
working on every floor, as the sunrise is reflected in the glass 
stories of the curved complex. There are hundreds of work-
stations in the open-plan design, each with its own cleaning 
challenges. The cleaning is full body work and the women 
perform a wide range of tasks: wheeling trolleys, hoovering, 
dusting. They reach across round tables to wipe them; lean down 
to clean underneath desks, pulling out chairs with one hand and 
directing the hoover with the other; wipe down every imaginable 
surface – tables, chairs, backs of chairs, cupboards coffee tables, 
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photocopiers, toilets (seats, backs of seats, under the rims, 
around the pedestals), sinks, taps, mirrors; unload dishwashers, 
stack crockery on shelves; change bin-liners. Women in white 
T-shirts in blue plastic disposable aprons and black gloves work 
on a conveyer belt in the kitchens of the canteen, sorting plates, 
trays, cups, scraping remains of food into bins; it is a hive of 
relentless activity. On the other side of the dishwasher, more 
women sort clean crockery into piles and take it away. The work 
is monotonous and made relentless by the fact it is a conveyer 
belt that just keeps going. Some men in orange aprons work 
in the adjacent space, perhaps as kitchen porters. Many of the 
spaces being cleaned are hybrid and auxiliary spaces rather than 
workspaces per se: common rooms for the white-collar workers, 
resting places with low tables and newspapers. Tables are set up 
for the morning’s meetings, coffee cups and bottled waters at the 
ready, comfortable tasteful office chairs as inviting as the view of 
the city in the morning sunshine beyond. The women wield all 
manner of swivel-mops and products, from pink cleaning fluid 
to surgical gloves. They wipe with sweeping movements to and 
fro, round and round, polishing until everything gleams. Time 
sheets are filled out to show that the toilets have been cleaned. 
As the cleaning progresses, the sun rises and it is daytime: the 
white collar workers and clients begin to arrive. As they do, the 
cleaning women polish the glass turn-style doors. 
The camera plays silent witness to this mass of strip-lit activity. 
Waste and dirt are glimpsed only fleetingly, in the process of being 
disappeared. The camera angles focus on the manual dexterity of 
the women and the minutiae of their expert movements. Their 
often graceful, dance-like movements appear choreographed to 
flow with the architecture: scenes are shot from below as they 
make their way down the generous staircases, mopping as they 
go. The micro-Niemeyerian curves of the white lobby are com-
plemented by the aerodynamic metal swathe of a welcome desk, 
adorned with a series of vases of fresh red gladioli. Other spaces 
are also dotted with potted plants and ostentatious corporate 
flower arrangements (doubtless procured through a series of 
subcontractors). A plethora of internal design features and lighting 
fixtures vie for our attention: the ceilings are dotted with a galaxy 
of LED lights, there are columns, circular floating walls, and the 
passage between the similar but different spaces seems endless. 
The camera seems to mock all these efforts at taste, more inter-
ested in the masses of surfaces to be cleaned. At one point in the 
film a woman is shown hoovering a characteristically expansive 
space (Executive Meeting Area, Level 12). In the background we 
see a projected photo of a tall, naked, balding man – Zagreb artist 
Tomislav Gotovac, in his video piece Watch on the Rhine (1994), 
made during the Yugoslav wars, which involved him spending 
hours looking across the city of Zagreb, standing sentry as a 
‘mosque guard’ on the roof of the Croatian Association of Artists 
(once used as a mosque by the Muslim community in the 1940s). 
The contemporary cleaner goes about her work as though the 
image were not there, ignoring the naked man looking past her, 
his gaze directed above and away, to the city beyond. The passage 
of the camera through the building is accompanied by a percus-
sion of swish-swashing and clicking as mops make endless loops 
of polished concrete floors, while hoovers drone and dishes clatter, 
all pervaded by a quiet electronic buzz. It is an entirely artificial 
working environment and much of the cleaners’ labour takes place 
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in windowless concrete and metal service areas, in contrast to the 
abundance of wood and glass in the office spaces. At the end of 
their shift, Iveković’s subjects put their cleaning cloths into two 
large washer dryers: pink and yellow cloths on the right, blue and 
green cloths on the left. Presumably the different cloths are for 
different jobs, though one senses Iveković may also be drawing an 
artistic analogy here too: their labour, like hers, is involved with 
aesthetic choices, though in very different ways. The loading of the 
machines reminds us of those that will come on in the next shift, 
and begin by unloading these same, washed cloths, to restart the 
whole daily cycle once more. 
The workers are paid to invisibly erase the traces of other 
workers and to make a prestigious glass-fronted building look 
as good as new. The situation echoes that staged so well in Jeff 
Wall’s photograph Morning Cleaning Mies van der Rohe Foundation, 
Barcelona (1999), in which a person of colour is seen mopping the 
floor of the iconic glass building, while a classical nude sculpture 
flaunts its idealized white form in the courtyard behind. Sympto-
matically, perhaps, the Tate website’s interpretation of the piece 
initially focuses on the formal composition of the images and 
appears to shrink from the term ‘cleaner’, referring to the worker, 
instead, as first an ‘attendant’ and then as a ‘custodian’: 
The minimally-furnished space is seen in the bright light of early 
morning. In the foreground, a gleaming steel pillar divides the 
composition vertically almost in half. Beyond the pillar, across an 
expanse of dark carpet, an attendant is in the process of cleaning a 
glass-panelled wall. The morning sun illuminates the clear and crisp 
lines of the building’s architecture, while producing pronounced 
shadows on a deeply veined onyx wall to the left. On the panels the 
custodian has prepared for cleaning, streaming water adds a random 
design onto the surface of the symmetrically-patterned glass, which 
partially obscures a courtyard where a sculpture of a female nude by 
Georg Kolbe (1877–1947) stands by a pond.14 
14. See Alice Sanger, ‘Morning Cleaning, Mies van der Rohe Foundation, Barcelona, 
Whilst the Mies building’s formal rigour conveys a sense of 
simplicity and luxuriates in the purity of materials, the cleaner’s 
labour points to the effort entailed in maintaining an illusion 
of ‘less’ as ‘more’. Wall has noted that ‘Cleaning is mysterious 
… since it is the labour that erases itself if it is successful.’ He 
observes: ‘[These] buildings require an especially scrupulous level 
of maintenance. In more traditional spaces a little dirt and grime 
is not such a shocking contrast to the whole concept. It can even 
become patina, but these Miesian buildings resist patina as much 
as they can.’15
Throughout Iveković’s film, the scenes of labour are interrupt-
ed by close-up shots of the women. The camera lingers on their 
faces for up to a minute, producing an effect reminiscent of Andy 
Warhol’s famous series of ‘screen tests’. Warhol famously claimed 
that ‘screen magnetism is something secret. If you could figure 
out what it is and how you make it, you’d have a really good 
product to sell. But you can’t even tell if someone has it until you 
actually see them up there on the screen. You have to give screen 
tests to find out.’16 Many, if not all, of the Erste Campus cleaning 
1999’, 2010,www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/wall-morning-cleaning-mies-van-der-rohe- 
foundation-barcelona-t12294. 
15. Ibid. Wall explained: ‘The man in the picture is the real cleaner. The picture is 
documentary in the sense that that’s exactly what he would be doing at that moment of 
the day. It’s what I call “near documentary”. Although I arranged the picture and worked 
in collaboration with the cleaner, the picture resembles very closely what a snapshot 
made at that moment would show’. Cited in Sanger, after Craig Burnett, Jeff Wall, 
London: Tate Publishing, 2005, p. 90. 
16. Andy Warhol, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol: From A to B and Back Again, New 
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women seem magnetic to me. As we watch them subject them-
selves to the scrutiny of the camera under bright white light, 
their faces demonstrate a diversity of central, eastern and south-
ern European ‘types’, from blonde and blue-eyed with wide faces 
and high cheekbones to others with darker complexions and 
glossy black hair. Some are young, some are older, likely already 
grandmothers. We wonder whether the younger ones will spend 
their whole working lives in similar roles. If Warhol claimed ‘I 
only wanted to find great people and let them be themselves … 
and I’d film them for a certain length of time and that would be 
the movie’,17 Iveković’s individual women come together to form a 
chorus, rallying around the words of a feminist poet. 
For Iveković’s women are not silent like Warhol’s sitters, 
though neither are the words they speak entirely their own. They 
speak the words of another but in their own languages, and they 
have chosen their own lines to recite, selected from the poetry of 
Aida Bagić, translated from Croatian into their native tongues, a 
few lines each. Listening, one is struck by the different qualities 
of their voices and the diversity of sounds that make up the 
various languages. We may recognize some as Slavonic; others 
may feel less familiar. The group of women Iveković worked with 
were Bosnian, Croatian, Kosovan, Polish, Romanian, Serbian and 
Turkish. Some of them recite like schoolgirls, some like budding 
actresses; some of the women recite clearly and confidently, 
others are more shy, a little embarrassed and not used to the 
attention of the camera, but they all get through their lines and 
look relieved and perhaps even a little proud. All seem pleased to 
come to the end of their lines, and many smile. Their selections 
of text seem highly personal and make the viewer wonder about 
their life stories and how it came to be that they are working 
York: Harvest Books, 1975, cited in www.openculture.com/2018/09/watch-andy-warhols-
screen-tests-of-three-female-muses.html.
17. Warhol, cited in Geralyn Huxley, ‘About Andy Warhol’s Screen Texts’, www.
warholscreentest.com/about.php?renter=.
at cleaning the bank, in Vienna. Each has been encouraged to 
choose lines to which she felt connected to in some way. 
Some of the lines of poetry seem to hark back to harder 
times: ‘Loss of memory is not a disorder / It is a remedy / 
Against memories of the moment / when everything started to 
go downhill / If I cannot remember it’. Many are day-to-day, 
yet somehow indicative of small satisfactions, and a sense that 
things are in order: ‘I leave the house before dawn / The city is 
quiet / the bread is baked’; ‘I get up at half past four / trams are 
not crowded / so I sleep in the warm’; ‘I have a small garden / 
Weeding takes my full attention / Each blade of grass is unique’; 
‘I get up before dawn / And I watch clouds people and / bottled 
messages go by / Then I look at the palm of / my hand and I see 
/ It will be alright’. They offer practical advice for getting by: ‘My 
mother tells me / Don’t spent that much time / inside your head 
/ You’re better off outside. In the fresh air / My mother is a wise 
woman’. The irony of this advice, in view of the indoor chemical 
nature of the cleaning work is clear. Several lines address the 
nature of female labour: ‘A woman’s work is / never done / As 
soon as I finish / it feels as if I haven’t even started’; ‘They say a 
woman holds / three corners of the house / But I clean all four’; 
perhaps in the voice of a man – ‘Women can do it / I can do it 
too / I can do all kinds of things / But I don’t have to, so I won’t’. 
Others refer to the experience of waiting for the mail: ‘I wave 
to the postmen / But they do not know me / Because I am not 
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from here / I am from there / I came with the wind / And with 
wind I will go’; ‘I’ve been waiting for a letter / for months now / 
The postman later said to me / I didn’t know it was you’. The last 
line cited is ‘I didn’t know it was you’, perhaps echoing the sense 
in which the women themselves are not known, not recognized, 
‘invisible’ as Iveković’s title implies. 
Distance from home is a key theme: ‘My life would be so 
easy / If I had rain in one hand / and the sun in the other / Then 
I wouldn’t need to go anywhere’.18 A number of core lines are 
repeated like a refrain, having been selected more than once. 
Notably these are those that relate to the experience of displace-
ment: ‘I am not from here / I am from there / I came with the wind 
/ With the wind I will go’, as well as to an ethic of perseverance. 
Several of the women, particularly those who are older, their eyes 
sadder, more browbeaten than their younger, more optimistic 
colleagues, repeat the lines ‘Fall down, get up. / Fall down again. 
/ Get up. / Fall down. / Falling comes easy if you / practice every 
day’. The younger women tend to be the ones who chose the more 
romantic lines; the older ones those more melancholic, though the 
question of falling down, getting up and falling down again, might 
also be a call to action, along the lines of Samuel Beckett’s mantra 
‘No matter. Try again. Fail Again. Fail Better’ from Worstward Ho! 
It is a topic Iveković has addressed herself in the past, notably in 
a video performance entitled Practice Makes a Master (1982). Here, 
a woman in a black evening dress is shown standing rather stiffly 
on the stage before the camera, hooded with a white plastic bag. 
Suddenly her body jolts and she collapses to the ground. Some 
time passes. She lies immobile. Then, she gets up, and stands on 
18. ‘Then we wouldn’t need to go anywhere’ echoes a line from Adam Chodzko’s film 
The Pickers (2009) in which Romanian strawberry pickers in Kent speculate what would 
happen if the British economy collapsed and if the British had to come to Romania to 
make a living: ‘Then we wouldn’t need to go anywhere.’ ‘I would like that’, said one of the 
pickers, wistfully, ‘Yes… then they would know what it is to be away from home.’ See Klara 
Kemp-Welch, ‘“The Romanians are Coming”: Labour Migration and the Politics of the 
Observational Documentary’, Third Text, 2020. doi.org/10.1080/09528822.2020.1765601.
the stage again. Her body jolts as though she had been shot dead, 
and she collapses again. The action is repeated, on a loop. Women 
fall, pick themselves up, fall again, get up again. In another major 
collaborative work, Women’s House (2009), Iveković worked with 
women from a shelter, who had left violent relationships to rebuild 
their lives, and made plaster casts of their faces, which were later 
transformed into an austere mausoleum in a circle of cast faces, 
installed on plinths. Its owner’s stories were recorded beneath 
each mask. The stories of these women and their children make 
sad reading. While every story is different, the dynamics of the 
violent relationships described in each are fundamentally the 
same, and it is clear that domestic violence afflicts all nationali-
ties and age groups: Maria, 51, Portuguese, married, one child; 
Renee, 35, Luxembourger, married, three children; Fatima, 24, 
Cap Verdese, married… the list goes on. As Maria Hlavajova has 
argued, Iveković’s embrace of new forms of collaborative practice 
like these seeks, as the artist has herself put it, ‘not just to illustrate 
the political thesis, thus making it clear to those who already 
know it, but to include art into the political praxis, form new ideas 
and spread them into society’. 19
Nevertheless, as Manuela Bojadzijev and Serhat Karakayali 
have argued, it is essential to be mindful of the degree to which, 
‘particularly among leftists … expressions of solidarity with 
19. Maria Hlavajova, ‘In Short: Thoughts behind the Exhibition’, in Sanja Iveković. 
Urgent Matters, exh. cat., Eindhoven: Van Abbemuseum; Utrecht: BAK, 2009, p. 12.
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the mostly migrant “others” not only leave one’s “own” position 
unquestioned, but also victimise the “poor others” and deny them 
their own capacity for political action’.20 And questions should 
therefore be posed by ‘all those who’, like them, ‘no longer believe 
the struggles of migration to be a sideshow of history’: ‘if and 
when migrants cross borders … they … are already (and then, in 
a new way) a part of national and global social relations, which 
they also themselves transform’. They insist that ‘the subjectivity 
of migrants is not reducible to their role as labour-power’. 21 This, 
it seems to me, is what Iveković strives to demonstrate when 
she invites the cleaners to select and recite poetry, crucially, 
translated into their own languages; rather than reduce her 
collaborators to vital statistics, as was, perhaps inevitably, in part 
the case in the documentary afterlife of the Woman House project. 
While the lines of poetry may be relatable, in some cases, to the 
women’s experience of labour, to cleaning, they are not reducible 
in this sense: they also allude to the past and future, to longing, to 
dreams, and to the shared experience of migration, which remains 
so central to the nature and experience of European reality today, 
both irrespective of and yet also precisely because of the changed 
circumstances and new economic and social inequalities acceler-
ated by 1989 and the ‘transition’ to post-socialism. 
Even before Covid-19, Françoise Vergès had written that we lived 
in ‘an age in which concerns are growing for clean art, clean water, 
clean houses, clean bodies, clean minds and green space’. This was, 
she argued, ‘an extension of New Age ideology of the 1970s’ and of 
a market whose ‘aim is personal efficiency and a maximization of 
physical and mental power’. She wrote of ‘new borders that have 
been drawn between cleanliness and dirtiness’, explaining how the 
20. Isabell Lorey, ‘Becoming Common: Precarization as Political Constituting’, e-flux 
journal 17, June–August 2010, pp. 4–5. 
21. Manuela Bojadzijev and Serhat Karakayali, ‘Recuperating the Sideshows of 
Capitalism: The Autonomy of Migration Today’, e-flux journal 17, June–August 2010, pp. 
3–4. 
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performing body of the neoliberal white male was fundamentally 
undergirded by the ‘invisible body ... female and a person of color’, 
whose exhaustion, in turn, remains ‘the consequence of the 
historical logic of extractivism that built primitive accumulation 
and capital – extracting labor from racialised bodies’; concluding 
that ‘invisibility of the cleaning jobs of women of color creates 
the visibility of clean homes and public spaces’. Thus, she argues, 
cleaning, today, is part of a longer, historical ‘economy of exhaus-
tion’. Cleaning women, she noted, ‘speak of the very little time 
they sleep … of the long hours devoted to their commutes, and of 
the work they have to do once they return home’.22 The very same 
point was already made explicit in the 1975 film Night Cleaners 
(Part 1, 90 mins) by the Berwick Street Film Collective, devoted to 
raising recognition of the labour of cleaners and documenting the 
campaign for their unionization, in which a series of women are 
memorably asked ‘Do you get any sleep?’, and recount, in matter-
of-fact tones, as though surprised that anyone is even interested 
to know, how they try to snatch an average of an hour and a half 
per might, between putting their babies to bed and heading out for 
their night shifts. As Siona Wilson, among others, has outlined, 
the night cleaners’ campaign ‘challenged a deeper set of expulsions 
within the organized left’ and ‘sought to define a feminist politics 
that went beyond the confines of middle-class women’s experience 
to include working-class and immigrant women’.23
Iveković follows in the footsteps of this earlier feminist project, 
when she invites a representative from the trade union VIDA, part 
of the Austrian Trade Union Federation (Ursula Woditscha) to 
speak with the cleaning women at Erste Campus and to explain 
Austrian laws about workers’ council’s with them. The notes from 
the conversation record that the women earned the minimum 
22. Françoise Vergès, ‘Capitalocene, Waste, Race, and Gender’, e-flux journal 100, May 
2019, p. 10. 
23. Siona Wilson, Art Labor, Sex Politics: Feminist Effects in 1970s British Art and 
Performance, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015, ch. 1 n8.
120 thinking art
rate of €8.36 and that they had been working in the new building 
since it opened approximately some five months before. Woditscha 
explained to the women why a work council is important, explain-
ing: ‘If everyone gets together and gets organized, you can improve 
things.’ She says: ‘people like you who tell us where the problems 
lie, what worries you, which fears you have and which help you 
need.’24 She tells them that ‘the council can help raise all sorts 
of issues with the bosses’, ranging from the quality of cleaning 
products or the efficiency of machines, to trying to negotiate more 
suitable working hours for staff with childcare responsibilities, 
to ensuring that if the boss wants to reduce the number of staff 
the council can help decide who is best placed to find a new job 
and to be laid off, and so on. She explains that a council can be 
formed in around two months and talks about the procedure and 
membership rules, discussing issues around self-organization and 
how to select and elect a representative. She lingers for a while on 
the importance of issues around language and communication in 
an organization like hers. It is important, she says, that those sent 
to negotiate on the cleaners’ behalf with the bosses speak good 
German, otherwise they will not be taken seriously. Her union, 
she says, is committed to communicating with the cleaners and to 
trying to understand their concerns, to overcome the inevitable 
language barriers faced by a time-poor group of women speaking 
many different home languages with differing levels of German 
proficiency.
When the women were invited to ask questions, one asked 
about access to healthcare, explaining that they had been told 
that they had access to Erste healthcare but had not met any 
representatives about it: ‘Somewhere it is written that we have a 
doctor at the Erste Group, but we have never seen this person.’ 
24. Ursula Woditschka, in ‘Meeting Ursula Woditschka, VIDA with the Cleaning 
Ladies, Fri. May 20th’, unpublished transcript of meeting kindly shared with me by the 
artist. Sanja Iveković archive, ref. Clea0317.
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Woditscha points out that as the cleaning is subcontracted, the 
women are technically employees of another company, in this 
case one called Mundo, rather than Erste directly, and that this 
may have implications for their access to healthcare. While there 
are around 4,500 Erste employees working on campus, cleaning 
has of course been contracted out, part of a massive commercial 
cleaning service market, which sees employers take less risk, 
employees take lower wages, and middlemen take the lion’s share 
of the benefits. As Helma Lutz has argued: ‘Employers like to see 
their domestic workers as service providers; it is largely a form of 
exculpatory rhetoric which conveniently diverts the debate away 
from relations of power and dependence, since the (academically) 
educated upper-middle class clients will usually know that they 
are not party to a legally safeguarded service-provider contract.’25 
One of the outcomes of Iveković’s field research into the workers’ 
conditions was a direct result of the Q&A between the union 
representative and the cleaners. On conclusion of the project, the 
women gained access to the health centre on the Erste campus, 
despite their status as indirect employees.26 
In filming cleaners on a campus that set out to make itself a 
model for a new form of ‘corporate culture’, Iveković highlighted 
the interdependence of so-called ‘immaterial’ and ‘material’ 
workers, foregrounding ongoing modes of taking the latter for 
granted. Keti Chukhrov observes that the ‘class gap within the 
“class” of immaterial workers is enormous’ as ‘the bulk of im-
material labour workers make no use whatsoever of their higher 
education and are working outside their specialization’. Moreover, 
she argues compellingly against the contemporary art-world 
myth that ‘“revolutionary” vocabulary and “proletarian” poetics 
are predominantly employed in the discourse of contemporary 
25. Helma Lutz, The New Maids: Transnational Women and the Care Economy, London: 
Zed Books, 2011, cited in Françoise Vergès, ‘Capitalocene, Waste, Race, and Gender’, 
e-flux journal 100, May 2019, p. 8.
26. ‘Who’s cleaning all this? Interviews by Sanja Iveković’, p. 94.
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criticism and the creative industries, and rarely emerge in the 
realm of unprestigious material labour’. In view of these and other 
problematic assumptions, she notes that
it is interesting that the work of Western artists investigating the 
routine industrial, poorly paid labour is always conspicuously 
marked by the impossibility of a shared cultural space constructed 
by a pan-European middle class that includes material labour 
workers and representatives of non-prestigious professions. 
She continues: 
In the social space of developed countries, physical labour is 
invisible; and if it comes into view, it is seen as something hovering 
between the exotic and the obscene. … Material labour testifies 
to the fatal division between routine, mechanical labour, and the 
intellectual-creative and cultural space of middle-class life and 
activity. 
Chukhrov argues for the need to continue to retain a sense of 
the possibility of non-exploitation and non-commodification, 
of the ‘potential of the general without a segregation between 
material and immaterial labour – without an anthropological 
division of people into two races of producers’.27 
Iveković attempts to overcome such a division in the final scene 
of her film, building a common bridge with the subjects of her 
documentary, on the platform of their shared experience as post-
socialist women. After the cleaners have finished their working 
day, the camera shows a heavy steel door gently closing, perhaps 
in reference to the iconic cinematic moment of the factory doors 
opening and the workers flooding out. Then, unexpectedly, a 
music box starts up. It plays a tinny version of ‘The Internationale’ 
and the camera tracks a tall young blonde woman melancholically 
walking down a service corridor winding it up as she goes, as she 
27. Keti Chukhrov, ‘Towards the Space of the General: On Labor beyond Materiality 
and Immateriality’, trans. Ainsley Morse, e-flux journal 20, November 2010, pp. 4, 7. 
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walks slowly down a corridor.28 The camera shifts to a close-up 
of an older woman’s face. She wears pearl earrings and a far-away 
look in her eye. Her look suggests that she remembers all too well. 
Other women’s faces, of all ages, gathered in the room, together 
with the artist, listening to the tune together, are scrutinized, in 
turn, some together, some along. Everyone looks deadly serious 
and no one is laughing. They clearly get the point being made 
here. Almost all are from former socialist countries, like the artist 
herself. Some begin to nod along, others looks upset, even on 
the verge of tears, their tough exteriors threatening to crumble. 
There is clearly an irony in their collective situation; they are 
living the failure of the dream. The screen goes black. The music 
box music gets slower and slower. The camera pans back to the 
empty corridor, its red pipes beginning to look suspiciously like 
involuntary monuments to the promise of the socialist past. 
Suddenly red seems to be everywhere: one of the floors is painted 
red in its entirety. Above ground, though, the camera returns to 
the flashy neoliberal present. All the signage is in English, despite 
the bank’s headquarters being in Vienna, and the pompously 
named ‘Grand Hall’ is beginning to fill up. The city symphony, or 
at least its campus microcosm, is starting over. The cleaning is 
done, the white collar staff are arriving to take over, and it is time 
for the invisible cleaners to disappear back to their invisible lives. 
The next part of the day on campus is not about them. As the 
section of the website introducing the merits of ‘Erste Group as an 
Employer’ proclaims: ‘Earning money can have a deeper meaning’ 
– though, technically, the cleaners are not Erste group employees. 
28. I am grateful to Beata Hock for pointing out that the piece is a reprise of a work 
by the Hungarian artist Laszlo Lakner, who had made an experimental video of himself 
playing ‘The Internationale’ on a wind-up music box, bought from a fleamarket while on 
a DAAD scholarship in 1974 in West Berlin (entitled Memory 3). Lakner went on to repeat 
the work in colour in 2004, this time calling it Was It a Dream? Both films – Memory 3, 
b/w, digitalized 16 mm film, 52 sec.; Was It a Dream? (Memory 3), colour, digitalized video, 
57 sec. – were included in the 2018 exhibition Left Performance Histories: Recollecting 









In what follows, I want to argue that philosophy is a necessary 
part of artistic practice.1 I will concentrate on an analysis of 
artistic practice, because I am at odds with the dominant 
aesthetic tradition which takes the appearance of a product, the 
aesthetic object, for granted, and concentrates on the aesthetic 
experience. Instead I want to turn attention to an analysis of 
artistic practice as such. I want to show that artistic practice is 
neither a form of production, nor of work – if you allow Hannah 
Arendt’s distinctions – nor is it a kind of performance. And I 
would like to distinguish artistic practice from other forms of 
practice, notably aesthetic practice, with which it is often meshed, 
especially in praxeological approaches. 
Almost every form of practice contains some aesthetic 
element, but art is more than that. It is not only that we need 
a better explanation for the specificity of artistic practice in 
general – because it is a research lacuna. The main reason 
to concentrate on what artistic practice is, or can be, when 
reconsidered, is a political one: artistic practice has a political 
significance, independent of its potential products or traces, for it 
1. This essay is based on my book, Notate for eine künftige Kunst, Berlin: Merve, 2016.
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is an experimental field of self-determination, a training ground 
for autonomy.
My title might suggest that I want to conquer all philosophy 
with art. This is not what is meant. I am talking of an aspect 
of the philosophy of art. And my aim is not to argue for an 
aestheticization of philosophy (as some have read Adorno’s title, 
Aesthetic Theory), but to show that philosophy – the engineering 
of concepts, as Gilles Deleuze once defined it – needs to become 
part of artistic practice in order to save art from a particular 
contemporary paradigm, which, to my eyes, reduces art to 
applied art history or aestheticized sociology. The aim is also, in 
turn, to change the practice of philosophy (of art and aesthetics).
The verb ‘arting’ here needs explanation. In German, and 
I think in English, too, a verb form is missing for the noun 
‘art’/Kunst. We sometimes speak of ‘practising’ or ‘making’ or 
‘producing’ art. I was dissatisfied with this and coined in German 
the verb kunsten. In English, this would be ‘to art’: the practice 
of arting, the infinitive becoming of art. Alexander García 
Düttmann has translated Adorno’s expression Entkunstung not 
as ‘de-aestheticization’ but as ‘de-arting’.2 So, just as there is 
Entkunstung – de-arting – a moving out of the realm of art, there 
can be the contrary movement – Kunsten, arting. Arting means 
to transform something outside the art world into something 
artistic. Now, what is artistic?
Three philosophical approaches have tried to explain such a 
movement. Dickie’s institutional theory would say that something 
becomes a work of art once it is in art institutions. But chairs, 
toilets and people are in there, and they are not artworks. Danto’s 
approach is to say that it is an object plus interpretation. And 
Adorno utters the requirement that something aesthetic becomes 
an artwork through interpretation, comment and criticism. 
2. Alexander García Düttmann, ‘De-arting’, in Peter Osborne, ed., From an Aesthetic 
Point of View: Philosophy, Art and the Senses, London: Serpent’s Tail, 2000, pp. 71–87.
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Aesthetic versus artistic practice
But all of these focus on the reception of an aesthetic object, on 
aesthetic experience, and neglect the productive aspect. How do 
you give an account for what artists do? What do they do? At first 
glance, things seem simple: when an artist works, she produces 
a work of art. But is it really work? Hannah Arendt says: work 
is reproduction. But is it production? Is the core of what artists 
do the production of aesthetic objects – comparable to jewellery, 
interior design or fine cooking? Is it a manufactory production of 
investment products? Products destined for consumption? Or for 
aesthetic contemplation? 
It is necessary to differentiate here between aesthetic and 
artistic practices. Aesthetics is concerned with the reflection 
on modes of perception, including objects, representations and 
aesthetic judgements. What are aesthetic practices? It is not just 
the practices of receiving – of seeing, listening, experiencing, 
interpreting a work, a meal, a view.
Aesthetic practices are all those where attention is paid to the 
way we perceive things. They form a reflection on perceptual 
processes and prepare aesthetic judgements (judgements of 
taste). However, aesthetic practices are not concerned primarily 
with these judgements, but first and foremost with evoking and 
experiencing aesthetic qualities.
Baking cakes, tasting wine, visiting places of interest, 
designing gardens, cutting hair, applying make-up and making 
coffee – these are all aesthetic practices. They are not necessarily 
professional activities, such as designing fashion, decorating 
houses, erecting graves, making tattoos. Their purpose, as an 
aesthetic activity, is not to make money or to gain social esteem. 
All aesthetic activities, amateur and professional, be it painting 
and music or pottery and gardening, are not primarily intended 
for reception. It is not about feeling pleasure or gaining social 
distinction. One performs an aesthetic practice not to achieve 
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such an effect, because it is not replaceable by other practices 
that will have the same effect (as by taking drugs or by im-
mersive illusion). But it is an end in itself: to focus attention on 
modes of perception.
For most aesthetic practices, this quest – to focus attention 
on modes of perception – is the decisive element. We play piano 
in order to play piano, not to listen to the sound produced by 
the piano. I cook because I love to cook, not just to feed myself. I 
paint because I like to paint, not to stir interpretation. Aesthetic 
activities are carried out to bring out aesthetic qualities on an 
object or in a situation. The goal of the practice is the activity 
itself, in which the spontaneous element of the activity becomes 
manifest: to carry it out. Bringing out a floral arrangement with 
style, impressive harmony, beautiful form, these are spontaneous 
aesthetic achievements. It is attributable to me, precisely because 
I didn’t know exactly what it would be like, but I had to reflect 
on how to do it.
Aesthetic practices are related to a specific vision of the de-
pendence of aesthetic factors on the production of non-aesthetic 
qualities. Aesthetic effects are triggered by qualities that are 
not in themselves aesthetic (in the sense of carrying a certain 
type of perceptual judgement): shape, colour, sound, volume. 
Now, even if spontaneity is at the centre, there are two ways 
of ‘carrying out’: one based on know-how, the other on trying 
something out. The arrangement of flowers or the interpretation 
of a musical composition aims at the repetition and variation of 
already known combinations of non-aesthetic qualities (flowers, 
notes). Many aesthetic practices are sufficient in this repetition-
variation, also cooking.
Artistic practice (also the art of cooking), however, goes 
beyond repeated production, based on know-how, on imitation 
and exercise, in so far as it is characterized by the vision of an 
initially hypothetical aesthetic effect that could be triggered by a 
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combination of new, possible and feasible types of non-aesthetic 
qualities. In other words, artistic practice is based on the project 
of a hypothetical combination of non-aesthetic qualities. It is 
based on trying-out, on experimental approaches.
Nick Zangwill calls this an ‘aesthetic insight’.3 It is true that 
all works of art contain, in whatever dose, aesthetic qualities, 
and are therefore also based on such aesthetic insights. But the 
same goes for creative processes in design, in Hollywood and 
Bollywood film. Aesthetic insights keep the culture industry 
alive. They are not specific to arting.
Therefore it is important to draw a sharp distinction. 
Aesthetic qualities (beautiful, elegant, ugly) are not the only – or 
perhaps even the decisive – qualities of works of art. In contrast 
to everyday objects, which are formally finished and shaped to 
be functional, works of art are assessed as ‘daring, impudent, 
irreverent, witty and intelligent’ (these are the expressions with 
which Danto marks out the qualities by which Duchamp’s 
Fountain differs from a urinal).4 These attributions of quali-
ties address a vision of possibilities and not actual aesthetic 
quality. Artistic and aesthetic criteria are therefore not identical. 
Aesthetic quality is a (more or less) directly perceptible quality of 
a work of art: a successful form, a shocking colour, a dissonant 
sound. On the other hand, artistic quality, such as wit and 
originality, is a relational quality and implies a comparison with 
other events. Aesthetic qualities are perceptible. Artistic qualities 
are not directly perceptible.
The qualification of something as ‘daring, impudent, irrever-
ent, witty and intelligent’ distinguishes the understanding that 
precedes the realization, that which guides the project, by means 
3. Nick Zangwill, Aesthetic Creation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 (2007), pp. 
42–3.
4. Arthur C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, 
Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1981, pp. 93–4. Cf. Zangwill, 
Aesthetic Creation, p. 66.
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of epithets of epistemic knowledge. Artistic criteria are epistemic; 
they single something out in relation to a conceptual set. Artistic 
doing is therefore not exhausted in the production of aesthetic 
qualities. The kind of understanding that is needed to ‘make 
art’ is not only the kind of understanding on which possible new 
ways of encouraging aesthetic qualities are based. An ‘aesthetic 
insight’ is then just not enough. Rather, what is sought, one 
might say, is an artistic vision. In an artistic vision, aesthetic 
insight is a necessary but certainly not sufficient condition, since 
works of art cannot be distinguished from other things, or at 
least not exclusively, by aesthetic qualities. From Duchamp and 
Warhol to Appropriation Art and Institutional Critique, this has 
been fully demonstrated.
An artistic realization is only indirectly dependent on the 
organization of our senses. Just because I draw, paint, make 
a film, rhyme, write a book, dance or play the piano does not 
mean that I ‘make’ art. Nor is it because I conjugate or combine 
material in a reflexive constellation that I make art.5 Because the 
same activities also appear in contexts that have nothing artistic 
about them (waste separation plants, documentaries, video 
games, television news). Activities of this kind, in the sense of a 
combination of the material and the organization of the senses 
for de novo-produced non-aesthetic arrangements, can certainly 
be involved in the creation of art, but they are not, or no longer, 
the hallmarks of an artistic activity. Artist activity has emanci-
pated itself from aesthetic practices.
What is artistic is how something is made, not how some-
thing is something, and above all it is the transformation of 
the practice. But the ‘transformation of practice’ is not in itself 
a characterization of art, because, firstly, this transformation 
must convince us that it brings about an ambitious qualitative 
5. This is how Dieter Mersch defines artistic practice. Dieter Mersch, Epistemologien 
des Ästhetischen, Zürich: Diaphanes 2015, p. 171. 
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renovation (mere whim – for example, the decision to no longer 
paint with hands, but with feet – is not enough), and secondly, 
the artistic transformation of practice is closely linked to the 
transformation of public space, which is always characterized by 
the presence of random, uninvolved people. The transformation 
of a practice in public space would be a suitable qualification for 
artistic activity if it also aims at a transformation of the public 
space. Art is not the business of a community of conspirators; 
nor of an institution from the path of which nothing can deviate. 
On the contrary, it engages in free reception, in experiment-
ing with the possibilities of judgement: only the possibility of 
judging through an (anonymous) public potentially confers the 
status of art on an event. Whether on the basis of a connoisseur’s 
knowledge, or on the basis of aesthetic experience, or on the 
basis of non-aesthetic reception (shock, intuition), or as a spon-
taneous expression of pleasure and desire: there is art only in 
the public space, in the confrontation with a given public, as the 
creation of a public debate about something, as the reconfigura-
tion of the space of appearance. This is why it is right to stress 
that the passage between an aesthetic object and a work of art is 
marked by representation or exhibition.
Juliane Rebentisch takes an opposing view.6 For her, a work 
of art is essentially the reflexive transformation of an object 
through an experience. This transformation is uncontrollable, 
according to her, notably because experience refers to appear-
ance, and therefore to the independence of works with regard 
to their performers. In appearance, objects open themselves to 
the process of transformation into art and give rise to all kinds 
of interpretative and imaginative acts by subjects. These are 
performed as aesthetic judgements.7
6. Juliane Rebentisch, Theorien der Gegenwartskunst zur Einführung, Hamburg: Junius 
Verlag, 2013, p. 49. 
7. Ibid., pp. 51, 55.
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But it is not only thanks to the institution, nor only thanks to 
experience or interpretation, that works of art exist in the first 
place (be it only as ‘candidates for appreciation’). Art’s objects or 
situations are not simply given, but are mostly formed and need 
to be reinvented. The experience of artworks is not directed at 
the same set of open objects every Sunday, yet again, but needs 
to expose itself to something that has no name yet.
Arting
Is art, then, the production of things we can’t identify, as Adorno 
once proposed? ‘To make art’, we said, is to accomplish an artistic 
activity. But is it really a ‘doing’ or ‘making’? Does the accomplish-
ment imply that I then produce art or that I produce an artwork? 
No, strictly speaking the making itself does not characterize the 
artistic activity, because studio assistants or production techni-
cians can be entrusted with the task without them becoming 
artists for all that. As long as they only produce what others have 
imagined, the work is not attributed to them, even if they are 
ultimately admired for the qualities they have added to it. On 
closer inspection, an artist is not the one who makes art. No one 
becomes an artist by perfectly copying. Even the perfect execution 
of the unique, such as can be achieved by highly skilled assistants 
or technicians, does not make anyone an artist. The public, the 
spectators, are often part of the production of the artwork – in 
interactive or relational aesthetic formats or conceptual art, for 
instance. What elevates an artist above the group of performers 
and manufacturers is her idea of something to be made, coupled 
with the development of a new way of making it. It is not just a 
new way with regard to another artwork, but to art.
What is aimed at in arting is above all a spontaneous realiza-
tion, a new mode of becoming. To art does not mean to make or 
produce anything. It means to carry out a reinvention of itself. 
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Art has a specific history, not identical with cultural history, 
because it is constantly reinventing itself. Art must therefore 
be sought outside its conceptual and social institutions. It is a 
dynamic of negation; and for this very reason there is art, but 
not ‘the art’ – only plural and agonal approaches. The quarrel 
about what art will become is at the centre of the concept of art.
The originality of their conceptual approach to art seems 
therefore to be a requirement for artistic practices. Originality 
is a relative criterion. It is a sufficient, but perhaps not the only, 
condition for works of art. I don’t want to be misunderstood on 
this point. Furthermore, originality here does not mean ‘same 
but different’. Artistic creativity gives rise to ideas or objects or 
events of a new kind.8 Artistically relevant originality is genre 
novelty: it goes beyond the mere novelty of an aspect or numeri-
cal difference and ultimately aims at a conceptual shift. For only 
what could not have emerged until now within an artistic field, 
and in accordance with the generative rules in force there, can be 
considered original from an artistic point of view: another way 
of speaking, and not just a new phrase. It will be something that 
will surprise, or even surpass, all those who are familiar with 
the generative rules in force, or who have sufficient information 
about contemporary art.9 
The decisive element is a conceptual leap that elevates what is 
sought, or what ought to be done, out of its concept and opens 
a gap for what was hitherto excluded from a categorical point 
of view. With the conceptual leap, artistic processes should be 
analysed as the objectified negations of their constitutive rules, 
norms and conventions, of the institutions that frame them 
and of the purposes that serve as a point of reference. Every 
8. For an act or process to be considered creative, it must not be the accidental or 
mechanical production of a result. See Berys Gaut, ‘Creativity and Imagination’, in Berys 
Gaut and Paisley Livingston, The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 151.
9. Cf. Margaret A. Boden, ‘What is Creativity?’, in Dimensions of Creativity, Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 1996, p. 76.
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minuscule negation contributes to the transformation of the 
concept of the artwork, and ultimately the concept of art.
Such conceptual leaps stem from philosophical experimenta-
tion. They offer the possibility of apprehending something 
singular in contrast to a scheme of perception whose inadequacy 
is proven. If art is above all oriented towards the novelty of the 
genre, it is not because it celebrates novelty, but because the 
originary, the new genre is singular, unique – because what is 
(still) unique today is, at the same time, of the future.10 
If the main point of orientation of artistic activity is not 
contemporaneity, but initiality, inexistence, futurity, then 
philosophical experimentation needs to be part of it. Philosophy 
of art should no longer be directed towards finished works of 
art that are open to interpretation – as is the case under the 
dominant theories of aesthetic experience – but towards activi-
ties that make a difference in their claim to originality; that is, 
to the exercise of art. This becoming of art – arting – must be 
separated from work, from making, from action, but also from 
performance and interpretation, in so far as these are strictly 
subject to rules, institutions and result.
Compared with the maxims of economic innovation, the 
radically new is the negation or metamorphosis of the constitu-
ent rules. The radically new is not a new element in a class; it 
is new as a conglomerate without classes. As a conceptual leap, 
it relates to what it stands out from, and moreover it does so by 
testing new bases, rules and modes of implementation that are 
non-deductible from what was known as valid before. It is in the 
process, not in the product, that radical imagination is revealed.
Arting as a process refers to the (self-)creative action that 
can be delimited in relation to the systematic ‘findings’ of the 
10. ‘Die Form und der Gehalt jedes Kunstwerkes ist, denn man sie in höchster 
Genauigkeit faßt, stets etwas Einmaliges und Erstmaliges.’ Walter Benjamin, ‘Zur 
Ästhetik: Fragmente vermischten Inhalts’, in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 6, Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp. 1968, p. 125.
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researcher, the invention of the engineer, to natural evolution, to 
the professional creativity of designers, hairdressers and cooks. 
It is not an act which one knows firmly how to perform, but 
always a trial-and-error approach in the field of the unknown. 
Arting does not comply with external prescriptions, not even the 
imperative of productivity, because it is a confrontation with the 
possibility of failure and the condition of this possibility, with 
the risk of the realization. Arting differs from pictorial, plastic or 
musical practice, from repetition or improvisation because, like 
play, it is completed in accomplishment. It differs from play in 
that it does not suppose or implement concrete rules, but always 
begins by establishing them. Of the other forms of professional 
creativity in which one seeks the relatively new (from virtuoso 
performance, fashion for the new season, the engineer’s inven-
tions), arting is distinguished by the absence of any requirement 
of adequacy.
Aesthetic practices that have to satisfy claims of adequacy 
for their inventions limit themselves to the comprehensible 
transformation of a few rules in order to remain recognizable 
and attributable. Art is not subject to this in the same way. For 
what is new in art goes off the rails of established concepts, 
patterns of perception and forms of action. Art therefore also 
requires a suspension of self-understanding. This suspension can 
result in reality becoming alien, in something other than reality 
affecting the senses, or in something happening and manifesting 
itself below the threshold of attention and even perception. The 
negation of the subject’s techniques, the change of form of the 
real and the metamorphosis of the constitutive rules can be 
conceived as intrinsic artistic acts. 
Arting, then, is not the sum of or generic term for painting, 
sculpture, dance, music, theatre, writing and video-making. 
There is not only individual arts and individual art objects, but 
also arting as an art form. 
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Futurity and autonomy
Thought in more global terms, artistic realization – by isolating, 
mobilizing and modularizing the qualities of events – makes 
something act that does not yet count in the order of reality. 
At the same time as it probes the possibilities of a becoming 
reality, it probes the presuppositions of irreality. For arting, 
an art collective must engage in a process of derealization and 
probe the presuppositions and the influenceability of events. 
The art-specific testing of temporal possibilities begins with the 
process of detachment with regard to belonging, with regard 
to fixed structures of cause and effect, with regard to devices 
of attention, with regard to fields of occurrence that extend or 
contract a present.
Arting thus detaches itself from its subjectivity, from its culture, 
from its tradition, from its place in time. Artistic disidentifications 
dissolve the fixations of relationships that obsessively make us 
see something as something, something in something, sequences 
of aspects, sequences of meaning. Ways of arting are originary 
when they allow, collectively, a new imaginary; that is to say, 
when they invent effects beyond reality. The realization of art 
is arting: the exhibition of a realization, an outreach toward 
futurity.
As Cornelius Castoriadis has shown, reality only exists on the 
basis of a radical imagination that brings out patterns, figures 
and concepts.11 This does not happen precisely in the neo-feudal 
temples of art and their fixation on the global now.12 It is by 
11. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society: Creativity and Autonomy 
in the Socio-Historical World, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997 (1975).
12. Contemporary art, according to Peter Osborne, is post-conceptual, transcategorial, 
intermedial; it finds its identity through international art spaces. International 
exhibitions such as biennials subject works of art to a narrative of globalism. Osborne 
is optimistic about the potential of resistance in contemporary art and its relation to 
futurity: ‘At its best, contemporary art models experimental practices of negation that 
puncture horizons of expectation.’ Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not at All: Philosophy of 
Contemporary Art, London and New York: Verso, 2013, p. 211.
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freeing arting from its intertwining with the strategies of the 
media-technological present, or even with the contemporary 
defining contemporary art, that we arrive at future art. What 
is needed is therefore a philosophical critique of contemporan-
eity. This step from contemporary to future art requires arting 
philosophy.
Autonomous thought, action and perception can only exist 
in connection with the unreal from which the real arises. 
Consequently, arting also implies a process of empowerment im-
manent to art: a critique of the foundations and rules of the art 
practised so far, based on the unconditional creation of figures/
forms/images, in the name of a future of art. This process of 
arting, immanent to art, is an element of a more global work of 
autonomization.
Art is a free realization. A philosophy of art that achieves this 
is therefore an integral part of artistic practice.
7
The situational diagram:  
on rendering the de/recomposition  
of context and form 
in contemporary art
JALeH MAnsOOR
The smooth switching of surpluses of capital and labour from 
one region to another create[s] a pattern of compensatory 
oscillations within the whole. 
David Harvey, The Limits to Capital1 
Line can no more escape the present tense of its entry into the 
world than it can escape into oil paint’s secret hiding place of 
erasure and concealment. This fundamental condition can bring 
it, therefore, much closer to the viewer’s own situation than can 
the image. 
Norman Bryson2
What does ‘context’ mean for art history, a discipline founded 
in the nationalisms of the nineteenth century, wherein place, 
time and style have triangulated to form a coherent heuristic 
frame at different historical moments: after 1945, after 1973 and 
again now? And how do we find the terms to describe prevailing 
tendencies in contemporary art among the numerous scattered 
and apparently unrelated trends encountered at art fairs and 
biennials, and in established museums and institutions of the 
bourgeois public sphere, as Jürgen Habermas called it, although 
1. David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, London and New York: Verso, 2007, p. 428. 
2. Norman Bryson, ‘A Walk for a Walk’s Sake’, in Catherine de Zegher and Avis 
Newman, eds, The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and Act, Gesture and Art. Selected from the 
Tate Collection, London: Tate Gallery and New York: Drawing Center, 2003, pp. 149–58.
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what ‘bourgeois’ means under global capital is shifting as rapidly 
as the term ‘context’? These two questions appear unrelated until 
a pattern begins to emerge suggesting the dependence of one 
question on the other. The diagram is one (aesthetic) operation 
within which the questions converge, or are shown to be already 
entwined. Already operative in the historical avant-gardes of the 
interwar period (Brancusi, Duchamp, Picabia), this modality of 
graphic practice has risen to dominance over the last sixty years: 
Piero Manzoni, Vincenzo Agnetti, Barry Flanagan, Hans Haacke, 
Marcel Broodthaers, Dorothea Rockburne, Richard Hamilton, 
Agnes Denes, Nancy Holt, Lee Lozano, Anna Maria Maiolino, 
Richard Tuttle, Mark Lombardi, Gabriel Orozco, Ellen Gallagher, 
William Kentridge, Kara Walker, Cristobal Lehyt, Julie Mehretu, 
Daniel Zeller and Nobuya Hoki.3
Running more fundamentally, perhaps, than even the ques-
tion of art-historical ‘method’, the question of context presses on 
criticism given that art practices have shown the degree to which 
the ‘de-’ and ‘reterritorialization’ of the world have affected the 
basic availability of forms of representation, such as drawing, 
to cohere and to make sense – to show and to tell about this 
‘world’.4 And so one sees the rise of the diagram or indexical 
functions of line. Line is tasked to convey data, information, 
rather than to establish contour, divide a figure from ground, 
and present the rudiments of representation, its historical func-
tion. That the basic tools of representation are shown to fail in 
the wake of world changes that exceed their own representability 
3. See Pamela Lee, ‘Some Kinds of Duration: The Temporality of Drawing as Process 
Art’, in After Image: Drawing Through Process, organized by Cornelia H. Butler for an 
exhibit at the Los Angeles Museum of Contemporary Art, April–August 1999, Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 1999; Jordan Kantor and Igor Zabel, Vitamin D: New 
Perspectives in Drawing, London: Phaidon, 2005; de Zegher and Newman, The Stage of 
Drawing; Briony Fer, The Infinite Line: Remaking Art After Modernism, New Haven CT and 
London: Yale University Press, 2004.
4. For a discussion of the ‘deterritorialization’ or disarticulation and reorganization of 
space and time in relation to the specific configuration of capitalist integration, see David 
Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, and The 
Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
142 thinking art
by the old forms as we recognize them is already an extreme 
symptom of the need for new forms and new terms. Art and 
rarified cultural production presciently symptomatize the yet 
inarticulable seismic shifts that occur first in the economic 
sphere, then begin to resonate throughout the social field. It does 
so by means of appropriating/reappropriating the very devices, 
such as of the diagram, which traditionally belong to forms of 
rationalization foundational to what was once known as the 
‘base’ in relation to a ‘superstructure’.5 Circular as the description 
of this process may seem, artistic production is one place along 
a circuit of cause and effect to locate an aetiology of the real 
movement of time and the metabolic exchange with resources, 
value and social reproduction.
The diagram is often appropriated as a form of cognitive 
mapping. It displaces drawing as it had been understood in the 
history of European art. Drawing had been the cornerstone 
of representation, breaking the visual plenum into figure and 
ground, then guaranteeing the integrity of a depicted body 
against the envelope of space. Long understood to be a corner-
stone of skill, the capacity to produce and manipulate linear 
form had also by the opening of the twentieth century come 
to be a vehicle of expressive capacity, notably in the Viennese 
and central European context with its debt to Romanticism. As 
Molly Nesbit convincingly argues in Their Common Sense, the 
Du champian readymade – Krauss’s ‘theoretical object’ – is a 
function of industrial design.6 Nesbit notes that Duchamp’s gen-
5. Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1988; Walter Benjamin. ‘One Way Street’ and ‘The Work of Art in the 
Age of its Technological Reproducibility’, in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings: Volume 1: 
1913–1926, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Cambridge MA and London: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 1996, pp. 444–88, and Selected Writings, Volume 3: 
1935–1938, ed. Howard Eiland and Michael Jennings, Cambridge MA and London: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, pp. 101–34,.
6. Molly Nesbit, Their Common Sense, London: Black Dog, 2000. See also Molly Nesbit, 
‘The Language of Industry’, in The Definitely Unfinished Marcel Duchamp, ed. Thierry 
de Duve, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 1992. For an example of how this 
diagrammatic operation establishes itself in twentieth-century art practices and comes 
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eration was the first to be taught mandatory drawing-for-design 
in the French public-school system, ostensibly to train engineers 
and factory workers alike. Be that as it may, the diagram’s special 
affordance doubly reintroduced the difficult relation between 
the metabolic of production and the libidinal economy of art.7 
Its capacity to express the singular dialectic of movement among 
terms on both a diachronic register, or that of historicity, and 
the stasis structuring and determining the process by which any 
subjective grasp on the totality of modernity could be made. It 
maps the process of subjectivization. More to the point, it maps 
the process of subjectivization as one bound up with, but not 
identical to, reification, anticipating Rancière’s claims in Reading 
Capital about the subject’s circuitous and mediated relation to 
production, to its object the commodity, and ultimately to the 
value form and abstraction of the market.
The avant-gardes of the early twentieth century demonstrate 
no shortage of clairvoyance, not least with relation to the 
deterritorialization of ‘context’, once the bedrock of ‘art history’, 
and the shift to the boundless and borderless economy of the 
diagram. Futurism, Dada and the assorted hybrids generated of 
their mutual encounters seem to have acted as a form of dialecti-
cal research and development for the era post-dating them, 
which is to say our current moment. Another way to formulate 
the thought would be to borrow a term from Jeremy Gilbert’s 
preface to Maurizio Lazzarato’s analysis of the Duchampian 
readymade as avatar to non-value productive managerial labour 
and say that they, the avant-gardes, have pre-cognized it their 
future and our present.8
to be paradigmatic in late-twentieth-century art of the so-called ‘social turn’, see Jaleh 
Mansoor, ‘Cristóbal Lehyt’s Concrete Abstraction: Un-Mapping the “Global South”’, in 
Cristóbal Lehyt, America’s Society, New York, Spring 2014. 
7. This usage of the term ‘affordance’ and ‘affords’ comes from Caroline Levine, Forms: 
Whole, Rhythm, Hierarchy, Network, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.
8. Jeremy Gilbert, ‘Experimental Politics: Its Background and Some Implications’, 
Preface to Maurizio Lazzarato, Experimental Politics: Work, Welfare, and Creativity in the 
Neoliberal Age, ed. Jeremy Gilbert, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2017, p. xxxv. 
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From the 1960s on, that the chart and diagram increasingly 
overtake the image in many contemporary practices is a strong 
symptom of seismic changes on the register of the real. Art, espe-
cially when it is most autonomous, prefigures and symptomatizes 
changes in the field of the real before they are symbolized and 
formalized in discourse.
However, diagrammatic thinking was mobilized in art well 
before the 1960s. It has long been noted with reference to 
constructivism and other practices of the early twentieth century 
that while ‘the diagrammatic line is drawn from the realm of 
science and technical drawing … the final work has elements of 
notation. The works do not “represent the world” if that is taken 
to be the model used in figurative art, but they contain allusions 
to the world in which they were produced by the currency of as-
sociations, materials, methods.’9 Less elaborated, perhaps, is the 
degree to which the shift reverberates through the century and, 
replacing figuration, renders perceptible otherwise un figurable 
and invisible shifts in the mediation between the real and its 
reception, or between the base and the superstructure. The key 
here is the shift in the register within which line is expected to 
deliver meaning. Replacing contour and mimesis with notation, 
this transition at the heart of basic visual practice signals a more 
profound relation to the de- and recomposition of content and 
meaning at a fundamental level, perhaps not unlike the transi-
tion the image underwent in the wake of technological reproduc-
ibility, as famously described by Benjamin. It is the gambit of this 
essay that the in/coherence of context rides in on the question of 
the diagram in late capitalist modernity. 
The single factor binding these avant-gardes was their obses-
sive preoccupation with the mass subject, with the everyman and 
9. Briony Fer, David Batchelor and Paul Wood, Realism, Rationalism, Surrealism: Art 
Between the Wars, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1993, p. 108. On the dominance 
of industrial design and commercial drawing as the matrix of the French and American 
avant-gardes, most notably Duchamp’s practice, see Nesbit, ‘The Language of Industry’.
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‘his’ entry qua mass subject onto the arena of history, consciously 
or otherwise. Hal Foster concludes this aetiology with a question 
that I have returned to since reading his Prosthetic Gods in 2008, 
at the beginning of the last major round of capitalist crisis: 
‘could it be that Futurism is not as aberrant as it appears? Could 
it be that the very stake of high modernism at this time involves 
wagers with reification and death?’10 Might this wager take the 
form and operational mode of a diagram? My claim here is that 
Picabia, before even Duchamp – although I am not interested in 
origin myths or property claims to originality – displaces both 
icon and symbol, both picture and word (the cornerstones of 
mimesis in pictorial representation and poetics respectively), for 
the movement of the diagram as it charts relations of desire and 
inscribes a social dynamic. 
Picabia and Duchamp
The diagram is an index of the movements of an economy articu-
lated and thwarted by a libidinal economy coursing like a river 
below words and pictures, in Francis Picabia’s Universal Prostitution 
(1916–17) and Duchamp’s Tu m’ (1918). Duchamp was at this time 
working closely with Picabia, whose Girl Born without a Mother 
(1917) and his and Marcel Duchamp’s respective L.H.O.O.Q.s (both 
completed in 1919), and finally Picabia’s Jeune Fille (Mécanomorph) 
of 1920 – together, a handful works – constitute a point of entry 
into the constellation of terms: reification, subjectivization, 
abstraction-by-value-form. Duchamp’s Tu m’ showcases a range of 
the artist’s experiments with the readymade and related strategies 
of contingency presented indexically through cast shadows of 
well-known readymades such as the bicycle wheel.
Girl Born without a Mother of 1917 and Jeune Fille (Mécano-
morph) of 1920 would seem on the face of things to literalize the 
10. Hal Foster, ‘Prosthetic Gods’, Prosthetic Gods, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004, p. 149.
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condition of being a subject within capitalism as occluded subju-
gation to capital at the molecular level of the constitution of the 
self. The first represents machine parts against an undifferenti-
ated gold ground. Switching out figure and ground relations in a 
way suggestive of mechanisms theorized by psychoanalysis under 
the rubric of displacement, the ground of the image denotes 
money. Gold, from the early Renaissance to the early modern 
period of Western art, had been a way to reflect the wealth of 
the patron. Money, then, is the matrix of the ‘figure’ against it, 
the machine or ‘girl’ born ‘without a mother’, of non-biological 
origins where the maternal body is replaced by the metonymic 
cipher of the factory floor. Automata and the inhuman have 
prevailed. Jeune Fille, in support of Girl, is a portrait in so far as 
the object figured fills the frame in a genre convention set by 
Raphael in his Portrait of Baldissare Castigleone of 1510. A generic 
industrial representation of machine parts fills the frame, rising 
vertically to the wall and picture plane to summon the reflexivity 
of the pictorial work. But the thing shown is just that, a random 
thing. Under it, the words ‘For-Ever’ float as though to guarantee 
the presence of this strange portrait-thing, but of course, having 
learned the lessons of language from cubism, the words anchor 
only the flatness of the picture place and the unreality of the 
thing. And yet that thing figures forth the modern individual 
and its strangely evacuated promissory note of being present to 
itself, which it can never rise to meet.11 A diagram connecting 
visual information as well as things, words, textures and con-
cepts, Picabia’s other great work, purchased by Marcel Duchamp 
and bequeathed to Yale University Art Gallery, Universal 
Prostitution, repeats those machine part forms. One stands left of 
field, depicted in perfect modelling and chiaroscuro; others are 
strewn over the visual surface. Words issue from the machine 
11. See Giorgio Agamben, Man Without Content, Stanford CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1999.
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and cross like goods on the factory belt, sliding horizontally in 
tension against the iconography of a machine part that echoes 
the vertical rise of the frame. What appears to be a chord or wire 
stretches from the main machine part to the other. While the 
parts are represented in three dimensions, as though capable 
of occupying three-dimensional space, they do so in a vacuum, 
against a flat and undifferentiated void. Its flatness is once again 
ratified by the words that cross the surface.
Picabia’s strange diagram, in other words, might be under-
stood more as a demonstration of the social relations redistribut-
ing the meaning of identity and property in modernity, namely 
reification, than the machine parts – objects – fetishized by 
Russian and Italian Futurisms in the latter’s performance of the 
total calcification of the senses under the regime of equivalence 
and the value form. 
Building on the work of Althusser and others who interrogate 
capitalism’s autonomy from and indifference to human interest 
in their rereading of Capital, Rancière offers a theory of the 
subject within capitalism as both a vehicle to capital’s structural 
self-replication and an interruption to a social structure neces-
sary to capitalism: ‘what determines the relation between the 
effects is the cause (social relations of production) insofar as it 
is absent.’ Here, Rancière gives the requisite nod to the ‘hidden 
abode of production’ as Marx called it. Here, however, he 
introduces it as absent cause. This absent cause is not labour as a 
subject as such. Rather, it is the non-identity of abstract labour in 
relationship to concrete labour. ‘This absent cause is not labour 
as a subject, it is the identity of abstract labour and concrete 
labour inasmuch as its generalization expresses the structure of a 
certain mode of production, the capitalist mode of production.12 
12. Jacques Rancière, ‘Critique and Science in Capital ’, in Louis Althusser, Étienne 
Balibar, Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey and Jacques Rancière, Reading Capital: The 
Complete Edition, London and New York: Verso, 2016, p. 108. 
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In other words, there is no object of analysis. Rather, there is 
only a set of relations among the worker, his or her capacity for 
work and the work expressed in products he or she is part of 
making. There is no particular site or identity in the capitalist 
mode of production from which capital is generated; surplus 
capital is a function of relations. There is no empirically verifi-
able positive identity. 
Capital itself is a diagrammatic function. Capitalism is a relation-
ship among movements and transitions. 
This gap, between the labourer as a person, his or her labour-
power, and the labour time expended in the commodity, operates 
as the site of generalization of labour. It is a kind of glitch 
structured around absence which generates social relations or-
ganized in relation to it. As such it expresses the capitalist mode 
of production as a structure of absence and difference, of social 
relations organized around a gap between concrete and abstract 
labour. This absent cause is not work, but the way in which 
labour-power, objectified and metricized and anonymous, the 
key to profit, enters the social field disguised as the individual, 
presented socially in an anthropomorphic register that conflates 
the bearer of concrete labour with her or his labour-bearing 
capacity (the source of value). The social field misses the fact 
that the abstract measure of labour and its point of sale on the 
market – where it becomes at once abstracted and realized – is 
not the same thing as the labourer, situated as s/he is in a daily 
life determined by relations with others. The labour abstracted 
and exchanged/realized suspends the personal and collective 
experience of the bearer of labour-power, replacing it with a 
‘second nature’ naturalized thus by the process of exchange itself, 
in which the experiential is evacuated in the interest of deriving 
value.13 Rancière explains this glitch in the perception of labour-
13. See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, ‘ The Formal Characteristics of Second Nature’, Selva, 
https://selvajournal.org/the-formal-characteristics-of-second-nature.
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power, caught in an interval where the person or bearer of 
labour-power becomes equated with the profit-bearing capacity 
of labour-power to the occlusion of the other qualities and 
trajectory of the human: ‘The inversion of the inner structural 
determinations appears as a fundamental characteristic of the 
process. It is this law that determines the development of its 
forms.’14 In short, Rancière here provides a theory of reification 
that nuances that of Georg Lukács.
Picabia picks up the diagram as a formal device in L.H.O.O.Q. 
(1919), a dialogic response to Duchamp’s base materialist work 
of the same title in the same year, in which a reproduction of 
the Mona Lisa is decorated with a beard and goatee, the letters 
of the title crossing the lower register, to be spoken swiftly 
to generate what would sound, in French, like ‘she has a hot 
ass’ – interrupting its sanctity in the pantheon of Western art 
with crass humour and a whiff of denigrated and denigrating 
desire, mostly to shock the middles class. Picabia’s version is 
exponentially more disturbing, and radical. It imagines the figure 
as a diagram or a kind of map: the words bas, haut, fragile and à 
domicile establish four points of reference or coordinates, while 
the thick curvilinear form comprising this semblance of and 
refusal of a figure bends, winds and twists from among them 
over the surface. It resembles a diagram of movement of the kind 
Jacques Lacan would draw to figure the subject as a function 
of an opaque movement among moments or stations, which he 
called the real, imaginary and symbolic. 
The list of artistic practices that mobilize the turn from 
contour to diagram crosses the century, from 1915 to 2016. We 
could tendentiously situate these practices as so many cultural 
instances marking the elaboration and development of the purely 
aesthetic appropriation of the diagram as a heuristic device. 
14. Rancière, ‘Critique and Science in Capital ’, p. 126. 
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But this unfolding of a cultural development, in turn, could be 
shown to track a parallel, double movement of culture nested in 
and against the movement brought about by the disintegration 
of the capitalist mode of production and the reintegration of 
global resources and demographics. While it would be impos-
sible to map the one (the internal telos of the diagram) onto 
the other (the historicity of capitalist subsumption), a pattern 
nonetheless emerges. In the absence of any causal correlation, 
the transformation of line nevertheless marks the progress of 
capitalist immiseration and the transitional points between 
moments of progress. It is as though the deterritorialization of 
line somehow recorded, indexically, the de- and recomposition 
of cognitive mapping ‘in line’ with ‘globalization’, itself another 
name for capitalism. In what follows, I isolate one such practice 
and attempt to read it as an index of real abstraction.
Manzoni: reiteration and elaboration of the avant-garde
In the mid-twentieth century, Manzoni’s Linea (1959) radicalized 
the modernist preoccupation – from Duchamp to Adorno to 
Cage – with the ascetic reduction of artistic process, particularly 
the transformation of drawing, formerly conceived and practised 
as a means to demonstrate skill, into other modalities of agency. 
Each presentation of ‘line’ consists of a cardboard tube, a scroll 
of paper with a black line drawn down it, and a simple printed 
and autographed label, which contains a brief description of the 
work: the artist’s name, the date it was created and its length. 
This work about the very possibility of line thinks through the 
vanishing conditions of mark-making within predetermined 
systems enforced by disciplinary everyday life in mimetic inscrip-
tion to value-productive labour on the factory floor. In other 
words, the work of art demonstrates the way in which discipli-
nary labour comes inevitably to limit historically established 
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forms of culture believed to transcend lowly matters of economic 
determination. Linea dialectically, and negatively, foregrounds 
the problem from the point of view of the artist, who, while far 
from the worker in terms of class identification, was expected to 
deliver consciousness within and against the dictatorial deter-
minations managed by the capitalist logic of value. Manufacture 
and authorship alike came to be reticulated exclusively to the 
same form of general equivalence, irrespective of the numerous 
qualitative differences among types of workers. The Linee posit 
‘self-reflexivity’ – that linchpin of modernism – in terms of 
manufacture, and the vanishing possibility of artistic agency in 
an era accelerated in the interest of abstracted value. 
As ever, Adorno is adept at translating the issue of subsump-
tion back into cultural terms; hegemonic liberal culture mediates 
the same processes, legitimating them. ‘Bourgeois society is ruled 
by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reduc-
ing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything 
which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, 
is illusion; modern positivism consigns it to poetry.’15 And yet 
the social relations generated of the extraction of surplus value, 
itself the effect of a chain structured by the process of value 
extraction, is itself already a multiplicity, a complex that cannot 
be resolved into any empirically stable terms. Already in 1929, 
writing for the Frankfurter Zeitung, Siegfried Kracauer observed 
the way in which the operations of the modern factory cannot 
be pinned down other than through a diagram: ‘The commercial 
director of a modern factory explains business to me before my 
tour of the inspection. … He points to diagrams whose colourful 
lines illustrate the whole operation.’ And yet this whole opera-
tion moves along a pivotal absence: ‘Thanks to the intellectual 
labour invested in the equipment, its handmaidens are spared 
15. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 
Edmund Jephcott, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 4.
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the possession of knowledge; if attendance at commercial college 
were not compulsory, they would need to know nothing at all. 
The mysteries of the firm are a closed book to them.’16 It is not 
simply that workers do not know the totality of the process 
in which they are implicated, from inception to profit; it is as 
though they must not know. 
Mimicking these relational conditions structured by the 
capitalist mode of production in which value has no certain 
content or origin outside of a network of relations, Manzoni 
‘made’ the Linea on an assembly line in a factory in Milan. He 
sat on a conveyor belt holding an ink-stained brush while a 
mechanical wheel fed a scroll of paper touching his brush to 
produce a line. His passive mark, vacated of any kind of skilled 
or emotive presence, folds deskilled manual labour into the 
privileged space of presence: the artist’s mark. The line’s fore-
closure of any expressive, sensual, libidinal content (the role of 
line from surrealism through expressionism, having been lately 
liberated from its instrumental role in mimetic representation), 
set into tension with exaggerated packaging, implies the work’s 
embedded dependence on an anonymous subject, the worker/
maker whose substantive trace generates the parameters of the 
very product that doubles back to cancel that presence. Indeed, 
something is missing. We could call this an object lesson in the 
preconditions of the commodity fetish that makes things of 
people and ascribes agency to things, but there’s a little more and 
a little less to it than this. The resulting work emerges in the gap 
among the machine, the artist-worker, the packaging that offers 
for sale this hidden labour and the market that affirms it as an 
artwork through the function of a signature. 
The agent’s (artist, standing for worker) trace is recorded and 
enables the accumulation of canisters and cans, of labels and 
16. Siegfried Kracauer, ‘Short Break for Ventilation’ (1929), in The Salaried Masses: Duty 
and Distraction in Weimar Germany, London: Verso, 1998, pp. 40–42.
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the many frames of the market. One is confronted with cascad-
ing frames, en abyme: label, can, pedestal, museum, so many 
containers, so many forms, but the content seems to withdraw 
as though by a negative will of its own. This use of modern-
ist hermetic withdrawal nevertheless yields to a frustrated 
acknowledgement of the active erasure, rather than ontological 
withdrawal, of both content and agency. Manzoni shifts register 
from Heidegger back to Marx: not this, but other than this, 
entangled in this, constituting it and composed of it is a function 
of particular labour conditions, specifically a relationship to skill 
that makes of the grapheme an empty placeholder for value. The 
Linee doubly withhold the corporeal trace: by folding into the 
industrial procedure and through its packaging. It thus paradoxi-
cally shores up the corporeal trace, designating its absence as 
absence, marking it as other.
Abstraction
Rancière notes that within the contingent social relations 
structured around absence, or a glitch between the labourer and 
labour-power, and between abstract labour in general and con-
crete labour expressed finally expressed in surplus value, reality 
becomes ‘speculative’.17 It becomes a function of the movement 
of the contingent relations among social agents and objects that 
might be charted along a diagram. Returning now to the larger 
problem of abstraction and the diagram, what is ‘real abstraction’ 
if not just another term for reification, signalled by the ontologi-
cal shifts in everyday life brought about by the triumvirate of 
wage, anonymous labour and the commodity?18 How do these 
ontological shifts move in time? The terms ‘financialization’, 
17. Rancière, ‘Critique and Science in Capital ’, p. 112.
18. See Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics 
(1923), trans. Rodney Livingstone, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1968. 
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‘post-Fordism’, even ‘post-modernism’ suggest a sequence, 
however accurate or erroneous each may be. They describe a 
succession of developments in the political-economic reality 
felt and suffered by workers, masses and multitudes all over the 
world, one by any other name, one that generates a condition 
frequently evoked as ‘neoliberalism’. What is neoliberalism? In A 
Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey argues that the term 
describes the result of a succession of events in the consolidation 
of the relationship between the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund), the World Bank, the WTO (World Trade Organization) 
and Wall Street. 
The process of neoliberalization has entailed much creative 
destruction not only of prior institutional frameworks and powers 
(even challenging traditional forms of state sovereignty) but also 
divisions of labour, social relations, welfare provisions, technological 
mixes, ways of life and thought, reproductive activities, attachments 
to the land and habits of heart.19 
Against the narrative according to which a succession of 
state and institutional alliances policed the globe into so-called 
‘neoliberalism’, many note that the far reach of capitalism is 
structurally inevitable, the logical outcome of capitalism’s cycles 
of accumulation necessitating greater territories to be mined 
for labour and resources. Recent theories (which return to older 
theories such as those of Rosa Luxemburg, Georg Lukács and 
others) of crisis capitalism challenge Harvey’s account by point-
ing to the basic structural condition of capitalism, namely the 
need to keep ahead of its inherent tendency of falling profits.20 
And this very tendency is at the heart of the immiseration 
necessary for generating profits, unless capital can absorb re-
sources and sources of labour into its machinery to abet its own 
19. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005, p. 3. 
20. Anwar Shaikh, Capitalism: Competition, Conflict, Crisis, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016. 
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structural entropy, thereby returning to accounts of capitalism 
at odds with Harvey’s approach to causality. Paul Mattick’s thesis 
in Business as Usual, for instance, acts as a corrective to Harvey 
in its insistence on structure over the unfolding of secondary 
political negotiations among global bodies of governance and 
regulation. But the question is not what Marxian luminary is 
better than the other, but rather the lacunae that open up in 
how each tries to describe and periodize emergent conditions 
impossible to figure. 
The problem is posed on the largest scale of a historical grand 
narrative. With Jameson’s ‘Always totalize!’ in mind, I am relying 
as much on the work of David Harvey as on Giovanni Arrighi, 
Robert Brenner and others, who have proposed ways of thinking 
historical causality after the complications wrought by the forces 
of globalization and, above all, financialization, which have 
come to determine communications networks and to reshape 
what we mean by time, place and cause.21 For Harvey, Arrighi, 
Brenner and others (despite numerous differences), the oil crisis 
of 1973 was a signal moment for strategies on the part of First 
World nations to keep profits high, strategies that we now 
refer to in the unexamined shorthand of ‘globalization’: cheap 
labour in the underdeveloped world, moving from Fordist to 
post-Fordist production techniques, emphasizing supply chains 
over production on the factory floor in the interest of exacting 
profits more efficiently (to bear the expense of labour less), not to 
mention new rounds of primitive accumulation exacted by the 
IMF during the new economy of the Thatcher–Reagan years in 
the wake of stagnating growth caused by the crisis. We need to 
describe and trace – through the aetiology provided by cultural 
production – this hornet’s nest of complex determinations 
wrought by capitalist forms of valorization predicated on the 
21. As detailed in the introduction to my Marshall Plan Modernism: Italian Postwar 
Abstraction and the Beginnings of Autonomia, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016.
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mass movement of people across the planet. What Harvey would 
call ‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ – enforced 
by the creative destruction and reconsolidation of everyday life 
under the dictates of advanced capital – change the very notions 
of context and causality. 
Enter ‘the post-medium condition’.22
The recurrence of the question of displacement may beg the 
question of the very meaning of placement. It might be said that 
in an institutional and professional order, itself born of the cold 
war, in which specialization is prized, art practices become the 
last underdetermined (or, in contrast, over-coded) space to enable 
the exploration of problem sets saturating so many aspects 
of everyday life as to be otherwise impossible to contain in a 
circumscribed field of study. From Adorno to Said, the structural 
condition of diaspora is frequently understood to be, however 
violent, one of the given processes of collective transformation 
born of modernity. And yet within the historicity of modernity, it 
might be noted that forms of violent displacement are accelerat-
ing in intensity and frequency. Diaspora is a form of mass social 
reorganization across nation-states and continents necessitated 
by the acceleration of capitalism’s creative destruction, as it 
periodically restructures in the interest of resource mining, on 
the one hand, and, on the other hand, ever more efficient ways of 
extracting surplus value from labour. 
The shifting relationship between labour and capital, 
required by capitalism’s peripatetic need for pools of surplus 
labour, has redrawn the coordinates of time and space for 
much of the world’s population. 1945 and 1973 are both crucial 
dates that mark fundamental changes in the basic meanings of 
context, origin and causality. Changing empirical and historical 
22. Rosalind Krauss, Voyage on the North Sea: Essays on the Postmedium Condition, 
London: Thames & Hudson, 2000. See also Rosalind Krauss, Perpetual Inventory, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013. 
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conditions begin to demand scholarly inquiry, including the 
humanities, to explore the basic coordinates that subtend clas-
sical forms of analysis, of which context, understood as a stable 
place and time, is fundamental.
The paradox, or dialectical involution, here is that while 
context (defined as the time and place in which a work is pro-
duced) continues to be one of social history of art’s most basic 
certainties, it also becomes one of its primary questions. What 
constitutes a stable time and place – that is, a context – in the 
wake of the deracination and reconstitution of its perception 
necessarily governed by networked communication, intimately 
bound up with financialization, which has made ‘the bank’ (a set 
of operations) across the globe more causally active in a life than 
s/he who is experiencing this ‘life’? Agency and the formation of 
subjectivity have been pressing matters of concern over the last 
several decades in the wake of theories critical of determina-
tion (post-structuralism) and yet context has remained a stable 
category.
Context itself, the basic matrix of time and space fundamental 
to cultural coherence, must be redefined, given the fact that it 
has been already restructured by capitalism, thereby restructur-
ing lines of causality.23 The urgent need to find coherence again 
in response to the movement of history wherein capital has 
redrawn the lines of time and space rides in on the diagram 
because of its singular capacity to respond to both real abstrac-
tion and reification in late modernity. 
The number of works that turn away from representational 
logic and expressive drives toward the operational capacity of 
the diagram – by Duchamp and Picabia but also within Russian/
Soviet and Italian Futurism – mark 1915–20 as a generative 
23. See David Harvey on the relationship between deterritorialization brought about 
by financialization and the problem of causality: https://thenextrecession.wordpress.
com/2015/04/02/david-harvey-on-monocauses-multicauses-and-metaphors.
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time in rethinking the very parameters of articulation through 
linearity. We could tendentiously situate these practices as so 
many cultural instances marking the elaboration and develop-
ment of the purely aesthetic appropriation of the diagram as a 
heuristic device. But this unfolding of a cultural development, in 
turn, could be shown to track a parallel, double movement where 
the capitalist mode of production integrates itself into forms of 
aesthetic praxis but, reciprocally, these new forms in turn afford 
ways of describing the radical reordering of the world by capital. 
While it would be impossible to map the one (the genealogy 
of the diagram) onto the other (the historicity of capitalist 
reintegration of global markets), a pattern common to both 
inquiries (aesthetics and the social field) nonetheless emerges. In 
the absence of any causal correlation, the transformation of line 
nevertheless marks the progress of capitalist immiseration and 






‘How are we to understand the concept of artistic form today?’ 
and ‘What are its relations to social form?’1 In particular, if we 
understand social form to be immanent to artistic form, how 
is this immanence to be reflectively constructed, expressed and 
interpreted at this particular historical moment? And if it is 
‘the unresolved antagonisms of reality’ that ‘return in artworks 
as immanent problems of their form’,2 what do the problems of 
form in contemporary art have to tell us about the unresolved 
antagonisms of our reality today?
The movement of contemporary art
In approaching these questions, a fundamental difficulty appears 
at the outset: in contemporary art the very category of form 
appears problematic.3 Indeed, the concept of form marks one of 
1. An earlier version of parts of this text was presented as a public lecture at Chelsea 
College of Arts, University of the Arts London (12 January 2017), to the conference ‘Crisis 
as Form: Revisions to the History of the Present’, University of Applied Arts Vienna 
(27 January 2017) and at Yale University School of Art (2 October 2017). I am grateful to 
Helmut Draxler for the invitation to the Vienna conference.
2. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, Minneapolis: 
Minnesota University Press, 1997 (1970), p. 6. 
3. Contemporary art, that is, in the critical historical sense which that phrase has 
come to acquire over the last twenty-five years or so, which may be projected back, 
interpretatively, broadly speaking, to artistic transformations of the late 1950s. See Peter 
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the main difficulties of contemporary art practice and criticism 
alike: namely, how to give general social and historical signifi-
cance (and hence, in the classical terminology, ‘universality’) 
to increasingly ‘individual’ – highly individuated – works? The 
difficulty is twofold. It derives from the fact that contemporary 
art is a field of generically artistic practices that developed via its 
Euro–North American heartlands in reaction against both (i) the 
formal critical norms of medium-specific modernisms and their 
transformative reproduction and extension of the old, Renais-
sance ‘system of the arts’, and (ii) the residual cultural authority 
of all other received aesthetic forms and universals – residual, 
that is, from the standpoint of the thesis of the ten dentially 
increasing nominalism or individuality of works of art in liberal 
(now neoliberal) capitalist societies.4 This nominalism – inherent 
in the social logic of autonomous art, and exacerbated in artistic 
resistance to the reduction of form to the cultural technology of 
‘formats’5 – has been intensified, or raised to a higher power, by 
the dissolution of the boundaries between the arts. In reaction, 
the countervailing forces of new, increasingly socialized artistic 
forms, characteristic of the last three decades, have been pro-
voked.6 In this respect, the field of contemporary art as a field of 
generically artistic practices exhibits a double and contradictory 
movement of the attempted dissolution and the reflective, expanded 
restitution of artistic form. The problematicity of form, then, 
Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All: Philosophy of Contemporary Art, London and New York: 
Verso, 2013, pp. 18–22.
4. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, pp. 42, 199–202, 219–22. This tendency has now, of 
course, been geopolitically generalized via the ‘globalization’ of the Western art system, 
irrespective of the particular ‘varieties’ of capitalist societies into which this system of 
institutions intrudes. This is the respect in which transnational art institutions are at the 
vanguard of the geopolitical spread of ‘neoliberalized’ forms of capitalism, irrespective of 
the ideological content of the particular works they exhibit. 
5. See David Joselit, After Art, Princeton NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2013. Joselit treats this reduction positivistically, rather than critically, thereby exiting the 
field of art criticism.
6. These successive social, political and activist ‘turns’ since the 1990s repeat the 
structures of various anti-institutional artistic practices that can be traced back to 
the 1960s. The difference primarily lies in the more general, institutionally recognized 
prevalence of the more recent variants.
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manifests itself historically, primarily, as an attempted dissolu-
tion and reflective expansion of artistic form itself.
This double movement re-enacts the problematic character 
of social form in late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century 
capitalism that is a product of the contradictory structure of 
capitalistic individuality as such, in both its promise (the freedom 
of the individual as a ‘self-possessing’ subject of exchange 
relations – call it consumer sovereignty) and its reality (the lack of 
self-possession, or dispossession, manifest in the asocial same-
ness of the indifference of the system of exchange to the individ-
uals who make it up – call it alienation and the debt society). In 
this respect, we might say, contemporary art is a mimesis of the 
broken ‘promise of happiness’ not merely of art but of capitalism 
itself.7 Art is the agent of the secret discontent of capitalist societies 
with their own rules, we might say.8 In its contradictory dissolu-
tion and reflective expansion of artistic form, contemporary art 
reflects the contradictory structure of capitalistic sociality as a 
mediated dissolution – a constant dissolution and transformed 
reinstatement – of the social itself. This is a reinstatement of 
the social at the level of form alone – commodity form, money, 
capital and the state – alienated from its constitutive relations 
between individuals. This is the Polanyian dimension of capital-
ism, recently analytically revived by the German sociologist and 
critical theorist Wolfgang Streeck: a cannibalistic capitalism that 
erodes its own anthropological and social conditions by eroding 
the living sociality of the social as such. It is a contradictory 
structure that has been intensified by the political-economic 
strategies of neoliberalism since the end of the 1970s, in which 
Hayek’s Road to Serfdom belatedly prevailed over Polanyi’s The 
7. On art’s breaking of what Stendhal saw as its ‘promise of happiness’, see Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 311. 
8. Cf. Benjamin on Baudelaire as the ‘agent of a secret discontent of his class with 
its own rule’, in Walter Benjamin, Addendum to ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire’, in Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism, London and 
New York: Verso, 1989, p. 104.
162 thinking art
Great Transformation; although that hegemony currently appears 
to be crumbling, at least to some extent.9
In the Euro–North American context, which dominated 
international artworld debates at the time, at the height of the 
reaction against Greenberg’s modernist formalism in the second 
half of the 1960s, the double movement of the attempted dissolu-
tion and the reflective expansion of artistic form, constituting 
the field of contemporary art more widely, went under the 
general heading of ‘post-formalism’. This was not just a reaction 
in the field of criticism, and of art practices tied directly to it, but 
involved a wider sense of what, in his 1967 book Beyond Modern 
Sculpture, Jack Burnham called ‘form exhaustion’.10 Burnham 
attributed this to the effect on art of science and technology, but 
it was equally the effect of the social power of the individualism 
that drove the cultural transformations of the 1960s in those 
‘consumer societies’ that benefited from the post-World War 
II boom. Robert Smithson diagnosed the paradoxical reaction 
of galleries and museums to this situation in terms of an ‘ava-
lanche’ of new (yet merely nominal) categories.11 This categorial 
nominalism produced ‘curation’ in its contemporary sense, as 
a practice of temporary sense-making via exhibition-making, 
rather than the care of a collection over a prolonged period of 
         9. Wolfgang Streeck, How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System, London and 
New York: Verso, 2016; F.A. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, London and New York: Routledge, 
2001 (1944); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins 
of our Time, Boston MA: Beacon Press, 2002 (1944). Intriguingly, recent disputes over 
neoliberalism and the meaning of contemporary capitalism have defaulted to a replay 
of a dispute between two Austrian economic historians of the 1940s, on the cusp of 
the post-war reconstruction of Western capitalist societies. For the revival of Polanyian 
analyses, see Nancy Fraser, ‘Marketization, Social Protection, Emancipation: Toward a 
Neo-Polanyian Conception of Capitalist Crisis’, in Craig Calhoun and Georgi Derlugian, 
eds, Business as Usual: The Roots of the Global Financial Meltdown, New York: NYU Press, 
2011, pp. 137–58, and ‘A Triple Movement? Parsing the Politics of Crisis after Polanyi’, New 
Left Review 81 (May–June 2013), pp. 119–32.
10. Jack Burnham, Beyond Modern Sculpture: The Effects of Science and Technology on 
the Sculpture of This Century, New York: George Braziller, 1967, pp. 167–81.
11. Robert Smithson, ‘What is a Museum? A Conversation between Allan Kaprow and 
Robert Smithson’ (1967), in Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1996, p. 40. Cf. Peter Osborne, Anywhere or Not At All, ch. 4.
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time. ‘Curation’ in this sense has become central to art institu-
tions since it gives partial and temporary social and historical 
meaning to highly individualized works via new relational 
configurations. 
‘Form exhaustion’, Burnham argued, had led to ‘The Rise of 
Phenomenalism’ and a consequent critical transition from ‘pure 
form’ to what he called ‘pure experience’. This corresponded to a 
shift of focus, at the level of the work, away from form towards 
a preoccupation with materials (and their often industrially 
produced technical properties), along with an opening of works 
onto their own incompletions – often through serialism, but 
more generally through any means for introducing time into the 
constitution of the work, especially performance, along with a 
growing sense of the constitutive role of context. This led to a 
certain immaterialism, associated with the conceptual dimension 
of works and a corresponding uncertainty as to how to locate the 
boundaries or limits of individual works. This was summed up 
in 1969 by Victor Burgin in the concept of ‘situational aesthetics’, 
in an article published in the same issue of Studio International as 
the first part of Joseph Kosuth’s more notorious ‘Art and Philoso-
phy’ – thereby inaugurating the double trajectory of anglophone 
conceptual art: relational and linguistic (post-formalist and 
neo-formalist).12 The former led to the contextual and relational 
art of the 1980s and 1990s; the latter to various conceptual 
formalisms, including the mimetic neo-conceptualisms of the 
1990s and early 2000s.13 
However, as a merely abstract negation, unable to connect 
itself immanently to the multiple determinacies of its prolif-
erating objects, post-formalism did not last long as a critical 
12. Victor Burgin, ‘Situational Aesthetics’, Studio International, vol. 178, no. 915 (October 
1969), pp. 118–21; Joseph Kosuth, ‘Art and Philosophy: Part 1’, ibid., pp. 134–7. 
13. These historicist neo-conceptualisms (of, for example, in the UK, Simon Paterson, 
Gavin Turk, Martin Creed and, most reductively, Jonathan Monk) should be distinguished, 
in principle, from the most general postconceptual character of contemporary art. 
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category; less time even than its successor, postmodernism. 
Nonetheless, the impulse of post-formalism acquired a more 
enduring, more determinate legacy (different from the critical 
pluralism that had morphed into the early Hal Foster’s ‘critical 
postmodernism’) through the idea of the ‘expansion of art’: the 
expansion of art to infinity, through the expansion to infinity 
of the field of possible artistic materials.14 This idea should be 
distinguished in principle from Rosalind Krauss’s concept of 
the ‘expanded field’, with which it is often conflated, in which 
Krauss exchanged Greenberg’s aesthetic formalism for the 
theoretical formalism (or theoreticism) of a general semiotics 
applied directly to the artistic field.15 For the expansion of the 
‘field’ – understood by Krauss in a restricted semiotic manner, 
as the expansion of the field of significant differences through 
which artistic meaning is produced – was actually more 
fundamentally the breaking down – and thereby expansion to 
infinity – of the borders of the work itself, through the inclusion 
of new materials: not simply by breaking down the borders 
between the different arts, but more fundamentally the borders 
between art and non-art, or what, with slightly more paradoxical 
ontological nuance, Adorno called the borders between art and 
‘the empirical’ (der Empirie).
However, rather than consummating the dissolution of form, 
the ‘expansion of art’ found its critical and curatorial correlate 
in the motif of ‘becoming form’, emblematically in the phrase 
‘When Attitudes Become Form’, from the opening to the subtitle 
of Harald Szeeman’s famous exhibition (its main title was Live 
14. In Western Europe in the late 1960s this idea was mainly associated with Joseph 
Beuys and a group of artists centred on the triangle Vienna–Cologne–Düsseldorf, 
promoted by the journal Interfunctionen. See Friedrich W. Heubach, ‘Interfunctionen, 
1968–1975’, in Gloria Moure, ed., Behind the Facts: Interfunctionen, 1968–1975, Barcelona: 
Ediciones Polígrafa, 2004, pp. 48–59. For the Eastern European story, see Klara Kemp-
Welch, Networking the Block: Experimental Art in Eastern Europe, 1965–1981, Cambridge 
MA and London: MIT Press, 2018.
15. Rosalind E. Krauss, ‘Sculpture in the Expanded Field’ (1979), in The Originality of the 
Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 1985, 
pp. 276–90.
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in Your Head) at the Kunsthalle, Berne, 1969. Symptomatically, 
this was the phrase by which the exhibition subsequently 
became generally known. (The full subtitle was ‘When Attitudes 
Become Form [Works – Concepts – Processes – Situations – 
Information]’, and that list is obviously important in giving the 
exhibition some critical determinacy.) In the wake of the recent 
revisionist historiography of the exhibitions of the 1960s, this 
motif of ‘becoming form’ has been revived and repeated anew 
in ever more expansive critical contexts.16 In the last twenty 
years, ‘latitudes’ have become form, along with ‘history’ and 
even ‘living’ itself.17 More prosaically, in 2013 Elena Filipovic 
suggested that with the rise of the artist-curator, ‘Exhibitions 
Become Form’ – borrowing her title from a review of the Venice 
remake of Attitudes – although of course exhibitions don’t need 
an artist-curator to do that; and they have in any case been ‘form’ 
from the outset of the contemporary conception of curation.18 
The basic movement of contemporary art, then, has involved 
an expansion of the concept of art through its dissolution into 
and reflective absorption of fields of – not just previously, but 
enduringly – non-art materials and practices. This correspond-
ingly expanded the extension of ‘artistic form’, while requiring 
the work’s simultaneous preservation of the non-art status of 
16. It is significant that when Szeeman’s show was restaged at the Prada Foundation in 
Venice in 2013, not only had the main title of the original disappeared (Live in Your Head 
was too counterculturally 1960s perhaps), but the rest of the subtitle has disappeared 
too, thereby eliminating the extremes of the conceptual constellation across which the 
exhibition had been constructed, and which provided it with its internal dynamism.
17. How Latitudes Become Form: Art in a Global Age (2003) was an exhibition in the 
Walker Center, Minneapolis, held in the wake of the 2000 Global Conceptualism show; 
History Becomes Form (2010) sums up Boris Groys’s analysis of Moscow Conceptualism; 
Nato Thompson’s Living as Form (2012) is the slogan of an art activism of the everyday.
18. When Exhibitions Become Form: The Rise of the Artist-Curator is now a series 
edited by Filipovic for Mousse Magazine. This ‘curator-artist’-centric conception of 
form-production appears as a disavowal of the critical recognition that the location of 
the principle of form-determination cannot be found in the subjectivity of the artist, but 
is rather distributed across the process of artistic production as a whole and condensed 
into the structural logic or coherence of the work itself. Transposing the old myth of the 
artist as the subjective origin of creative form onto the curator appears here as a doubly 
reactionary move. For a broader approach to exhibitions, see the Exhibition Histories 
series of books published by the journal Afterall, 2010–20. 
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certain of its new elements within their formal integration. 
For the criticality of this integration depends on the ontological 
double-coding of these elements, as at once inside and outside 
the work, in a manner paradigmatically exemplified by collage. 
It is this kind of double-coding constituting the critical status of 
the work, their contradictory structure, and the developmental 
dynamic they impart to the concept of art that suggests dialecti-
cal logic as a philosophical key to the comprehension of the 
concept of artistic form.19 At the same time, a new question 
arises: namely, what, if anything, delimits this expansion of the 
concept of artistic form, at the level of the individual work, if the 
range of possible artistic materials is in principle infinite? 
Before we consider this, though, we need to backtrack a little 
to the traditional, ‘hylomorphic’ concept of form, which the self-
expansion of art since the 1960s effectively destroyed as a viable 
model for the philosophical comprehension of art, in both its 
objective (Aristotelian) and subjective (Kantian) variants; along 
with the Simondonian nominalist alternative that is taken by 
some as the best option for their replacement as a philosophical 
account of the process of artistic creation.
Hylomorphism and its nominalist critique
Derived etymologically from the Greek hylé (wood or matter) 
and morphé (shape or form), but coined only in the nineteenth 
century, the term ‘hylomorphism’ indicates that it is matter to 
which form is opposed in the traditional Aristotlean concep-
tion, in a manner derived via generalizing abstraction from the 
19. ‘Objective logic’, Hegel argued, ‘most directly replaces ontology’, although ‘it 
comprises within itself also the rest of metaphysics’. Subjective logic, on the other hand, 
the logic of the concept, takes up the determinations presented in the objective logic 
‘in themselves according to their particular content’, and expounds them as ‘something 
subjective, freely self-subsisting, self-determining’. Thus was ontology transformed by 
Hegel’s dialectical logic into the first historical ontology: a historical ontology of spirit 
(Geist). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. George Di Giovanni, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 42.
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sculptural activity of shaping wood. Hylomorphism is the philo-
sophical theory that being is a combination of form and matter 
within which matter is potential (indeterminate, unchanging and 
infinite) and form is actual and substantial: giving determinacy 
to matter, in each instance. Hence the ontological prioritization 
of form over ‘mere’ matter. Matter is denigrated as homogeneous 
and shapeless; form is lauded as meaning-giving. In particular, 
on this familiar conception, matter is essentially indifferent to 
the forms by which it is shaped.20 
The problem with this view, as now-canonically pointed out 
in Gilbert Simondon’s critique of hylomorphism (crudely put) is 
that it is an inadequate account of individuation, since it reduces 
individuals to no more than particular instances of general forms, 
or particulars, rather than individuating them ontologically. In 
Simendon’s well-known example, the pouring of concrete into a 
mould, form is hylomorphically understood to reside exclusively 
in the mould, and to be imposed externally upon an indifferent 
matter. In contrast, Simendon sought an account of individu-
ation (physical, biological, psychic and collective) as a monistic 
process of the emergence of individuals out of ‘pre-individual’ 
processes of being, which leave their mark within individuals in a 
residual transindividuality. Hence the idea that all individuals are 
transindividuals. Yet only individuals are actual; this a nominalist 
ontology. Matter is thus understood as an active material agent 
with no need of an external form to impose itself from without.21 
As presented by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus:
Simondon exposes the technological insufficiency of the matter–
form model, in that it assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed 
homogeneous. It is the idea of the law that assures the model’s 
20. See Aristotle, Metaphysics; Physics, Book II, ch. 7. The debates regarding 
the ontological consistency, or otherwise, of the definitions of form in Aristotle’s 
metaphysics and physics do not bear on the basic hylomorphic structure of the concept.
21. See Gilbert Simondon, L’ individual et sa genèse physico-biologique, Paris: PUF, 
1964, ch. 1; Muriel Combes, Gilbert Simondon and the Philosophy of the Transindividual, 
Cambridge MA and London: MIT Press, 2013.
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coherence, since laws are what submit matter to this or that form, 
and conversely, realize in matter a given property deduced from the 
form. … Simondon demonstrates that the hylomorphic model leaves 
many things, active and affective, by the wayside. On the one hand, 
to the formed or formable matter we must add an entire energetic 
materiality in movement, carrying singularities or haecceities that 
are already like implicit forms that are topological, rather than 
geometrical, and that combine with processes of deformation. 
… On the other hand, to the essential properties of the matter 
[deriving from the formal essences] we must add variable intensive 
affects, now resulting from the operation, now on the contrary 
making it possible… At any rate, it is a question of surrendering … 
[to the material], following where it leads by connecting operations 
to a materiality, instead of imposing a form upon a matter: what one 
addresses is less a matter submitted to the laws than a materiality 
possessing a nomos [law]. …
In short, what Simondon criticizes the hylomorphic model for 
is taking form and matter to be two terms defined separately, like 
the end of two half-chains whose connection can no longer be 
seen, like a simple relation of moulding behind which there is a 
perpetually variable, continuous modulation that it is no longer 
possible to grasp. The critique of the hylomorphic schema is based 
on ‘the existence, between form and matter, of a zone of medium 
and intermediary dimension’, of energetic, molecular dimension 
– a space unto itself that deploys its materiality through matter, a 
number unto itself that propels its traits through form.22 
It is easy to see the appeal of such an ontology of individu-
ation as a philosophical foundation for the nominalism of a 
contemporary art in which each work is imagined as individual 
to the point of singularity. Matter replaces form as the active 
principle. It only requires the additional equation of activity with 
agency to arrive at the monistic premiss of ‘new materialism’. 
But is such a ‘flat’ naturalist ontology sufficiently differentiated 
to comprehend anything as deeply social and historical, as 
well as formally intricate, as works of contemporary art? The 
22. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schitzophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 
pp. 408–9.
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problem lies in the unreflected character of the opposition 
between form and matter shared by hylomorphism and its critics 
alike. For Hegel, on the other hand, while form is central to the 
comprehension of any process of determination, and as such it is 
a general condition of intelligibility, it is not simply opposed to 
matter, but more importantly also to ‘content’. Indeed, the latter 
appears as the result of conceptual reflection of the dialectics of 
the form–matter relation.
A dialectical philosophy of form
In Hegel’s Science of Logic the concept of form is developed, from 
its most general meaning to more concrete ones, through a series 
of three dialectical oppositions – form and non-form (form as 
essence); form and matter; and form and content – while also 
bringing a range of other logical concepts into play along the way.
1. Form as essence, or, form and non-form
To form belongs in general everything determinate; it is a form 
determination in so far as it is something posited and consequently 
distinct from that of which it is the form… 
… the form determinations of essence, as determinatenesses of 
reflection, are, in their more precise determinateness … identity and 
difference. The latter partly as diversity, partly as opposition.23
In this respect, the concept of form does indeed gain its initial 
determinacy through its difference from something formless 
(‘that of which it is the form’). However, equally, the formless-
ness of its opposite is only determined as formless through its 
corresponding reflective opposition to form. At that point, it has 
become determined as ‘matter’.
23. Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 448–9.
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2. Form and matter
‘Matter [does not “precede” form, but rather] is determined as 
formless identity’, Hegel argues; that is, it is ‘determined as 
undetermined’ by its relation to form. As the first name for ‘that 
of which the form is the form’, we could say that matter is a kind 
of negative form. ‘Matter is a sheer abstraction’;24 as is the concept 
of form itself in its hylomorphic understanding. However, in this 
abstract identity with form, in having been formed (through its 
opposition to form), matter becomes content.
3. Form and content
Content, for Hegel, is the name for the unity of form and matter: 
‘the identical element in form and matter’; ‘content is [therefore] 
determinate in its own self ’.25 There is, then, a reproduction 
of form’s opposition to matter, within content, such that the 
determinateness of form is ‘indifference of content’. Dialectically, 
there is thus a doubling of each concept here: form and content.
4. Dialectical doubling of form
Regarding the antithesis of form and content it is essential to 
remember that the content is not formless, but that it has the form 
within itself just as much as the form is something external to it. 
We have here the doubling of form: on the one hand, as inwardly 
reflected, it is the content; on the other hand, as not reflected 
inwardly, it is the external existence, that is indifferent to the 
content. What is here present in-itself is the absolute relationship 
of form and content, i.e. the reciprocal overturning [Umschlagen] 
of one into the other, so that ‘content’ is nothing but the reciprocal 
overturning of form into content, and ‘form’ nothing but overturning 
of content into form.26 
24. Ibid., pp. 447–50.
25. Ibid., p. 455.
26. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting and H.S. 
Harris, Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hacking, 1991, # 133, p. 202. For form as a reflection 
determination of content, cf. Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being: Hegel’s False 
and His Genuine Ontology, trans. David Fernbach, London: Merlin Press, 1978, pp. 93–4.
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There is thus a primacy of ‘content’ over ‘matter’ in the dialecti-
cal determination of form. Content is developed form. Further-
more, where content is historical, it relies on a historically given 
state not of matter in general, but of determinate materials.
5. Dialectical doubling of content as developed, self-moving form 
[The] content is the developed form, i.e. both the externality and 
opposition of independent existences, and their identical relation, 
within which alone these distinct existences are what they are.
‘Developed’ form is thus a self-moving form: 
self-movement of the form is activity [Tätigkeit], activation 
[Betätigung] of the thing [Sache] as the real ground, which sublates 
itself into actuality, and the activation of the contingent actuality, 
i.e. of the conditions: their inward reflection and their self-sublation 
into … the actuality of the thing/matter [Sache].27
We thus end up with a concept of form as the self-moving 
activity of things (Sachen), sublating the content of ‘developed 
form’. Or, as Adorno put it in Aesthetic Theory with regard to the 
historical character of art: ‘the law of movement is the law of 
form’.28
Whereas in Hegel the concept of form is dialectically multi-
faceted, being constructed in a development running through 
a series of reflected oppositional pairings, in the critique of 
hylomorphism associated with Simondon and propounded 
by Deleuze and Guattari it is the simple Aristotelian concept 
of form that is the target, constructed exclusively through its 
opposition to ‘matter’, without reference to content. Thus when 
Deleuze and Guattari write of ‘less a matter submitted to the 
laws than a materiality possessing a nomos/law’, they appear 
not to be escaping ‘form’, but rather to be implicitly invoking 
27. Hegel, ibid., # 147, p. 220.
28. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 3.
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the dialectical concept of content, as the unity of form and 
matter, through which a higher-level opposition to form is then 
reproduced. And when they write of ‘the existence, between form 
and matter, of a zone of medium and intermediary dimension’, 
they appear themselves to be precisely ‘taking form and matter 
to be two terms defined separately’ – the main problem with the 
hylomorphic model. 
In this regard, Hegel does not just move beyond the abstract 
opposition of form and matter in the hylomorphic model, but 
dialectically incorporates the undialectical critique of hylo-
morphism into his concept of form. This is not to suggest that 
there are no conceptual problems remaining here, posed by the 
historical development of artistic form, but it does relocate the 
philosophical terrain on which they are to be pursued. This is the 
terrain of Adorno’s immanent critique of the dialectical short-
comings of Hegel’s own philosophy of art, in which a particular 
idealist metaphysics undialectically overdetermines the notion 
of artistic content.29 For in Hegel’s concept of art as the sensuous 
semblance of the idea, a predetermined metaphysical ‘content’ 
drives the deduction of its sensuous forms of appearance, despite 
their dialectical difference from it. However, with regard to social 
form, it is precisely the metaphysical idealism of this depiction 
of the process of form-determination that makes Hegel’s logic 
appropriate for the presentation of the social form of value, in 
Marx’s Capital, wherein social universality appears, precisely, only 
in ‘alienated’ and illusorily self-sufficient, ideal forms: commodity, 
money, capital. It is this illusorily self-sufficient ideality that makes 
capitalistic social form structurally homologous to the ontological 
status of the autonomous artwork.
However, if Hegel’s (broadly thematic) conception of 
artistic content betrays the deeper dialectical character of the 
29. See Aesthetic Theory, pp. 352ff.
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form–content distinction in his logic, Adorno’s own presentation 
of artistic form is itself betrayed by a lingering aestheticism, 
marked by his widespread use of the phrase ‘aesthetic form’ 
(ästhetische Form), when the philosophical context of his own 
text demands rather the continued use of his phrase ‘artistic 
form’ (kunsterlich Form) – and this, despite Adorno’s recognition 
of the fact that ‘Kant’s aesthetics had no emphatic concept of the 
artwork and relegated it to the level of a sublimated means of 
pleasure’, a ‘castrated hedonism, desire without desire’.30 Ironi-
cally, it is the lingering confusion spread by the use of the term 
‘aesthetic’ as synonymous to ‘art’ (first noted but then disavowed 
by Hegel at the outset of the Introduction to his Lectures on 
Beautiful Art) that vitiates a number of formulations in Adorno’s 
Aesthetic Theory. In Adorno, Hegel thus comes to act as a Trojan 
Horse for the maintenance of a residual Kantian aestheticism 
that is nonetheless formally disavowed. This is a consequence of 
the conflation of the enduring importance of the subjective me-
diation of the artwork with a Kantian use of the term ‘aesthetic’.
The philosophical moves required to update the Hegel–
Adorno problematic are thus (i) the replacement of Hegel’s 
understanding of the ‘content’ of art with Adorno’s more con-
cretely historical conception of content as a relationship between 
artistic materials and techniques, within a more fully dialecticized 
account of form–content relations;31 (ii) the de-aestheticization 
or conceptual expansion of Adorno’s conception of artistic form, 
rendering it consistent with his own concepts of technique and 
artistic materials; and hence (iii) a greater sense of the ways in 
which the artwork internally mediates art-institutional forms, 
as well as the most general social forms of commodity, money, 
30. Aesthetic Theory, pp. 253, 11.
31. Cf. Walter Benjamin’s remark that technique is ‘the point at which the unfruitful 
antithesis of form and content can be surpassed’. ‘The Author as Producer’ (1934), in 
Selected Writings, Volume 2: 1927–1934, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary 
Smith, Cambridge MA and London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999, 
p. 777.
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capital and the state, along with other historically received and 
contested cultural forms, such as gender, race and sexuality.
In Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, following one 
line of thought in Nietzsche, the problematic of form is displaced 
altogether, in favour of a discourse on forces that appears in a 
historicized manner in relation to art, as follows: 
If there is a modern age … [t]he essential relation is no longer 
matter-forms (or substances-attributes); neither is it the continuous 
development of form and the continuous variation of matter. It is 
now a direct relation material-forces. A material is a molecularized 
matter, which must accordingly ‘harness’ forces of the Cosmos. 
There is no longer a matter that finds its corresponding principle of 
intelligibility. It is now a question of elaborating a material charged 
with harnessing forces of a different order: the visible material must 
capture nonvisible forces. … The forces to be captured are … the 
forces of an immaterial, nonformal and energetic Cosmos. … This 
is the postromantic turning point: the essential thing is no longer 
forms and matters, or themes, but forces, densities and intensities. 
… The problem is … now a problem of consistency or consolidation: 
how to consolidate the material, make it consistent, so that it can 
harness unthinkable, invisible, nonsonorous forces?32
Consistency is indeed the problem – but neither the 
Nietzschean nor the Simondonian framework can offer more 
than a positivistic response to this issue. For this generalized 
cosmology of forces is indifferent to the immanent art/non-art 
relation, which is at the centre of the ‘life’ of contemporary art 
in its negotiation of the problem of form. The problematically 
differentiating, self-enclosing function of artistic form is instead 
replaced by Deleuze and Guattari by general concepts of capture 
and territorialization. Yet in a specifically artistic context, the 
problem of ‘consistency or consolidation’ – which for them 
32. A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 342–3. For a recent Simondonian development of this 
trajectory, with reference to musical performance, see Paulo de Assis, ‘Transduction 
and Ensembles of Transducers: Relaying Flows of Intensities’, in Michael Schwab, ed., 
Transpositions: Aesthetico-Epistemic Operators in Artistic Research, Leuven: Orpheus 
Institute, Ghent/Leuven University Press, 2018, pp. 245–65.
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replaces the problem of form, as a variant of the problem of 
unity – appears from an alternative perspective to be, once again, 
precisely the problem of form itself, in the guise of the problem 
of the organization of a work into coherence. 
Articulation, organization and coherence, or, 
the self-limiting self-suspension of the real
Alongside ‘articulation’, ‘coherence’ (Stimmigkeit) is the main 
category of form in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory. ‘Coherence’ names 
the problem of form from the standpoint of the consistency of 
the whole.33 ‘Articulation’ (Artikulation) is the name of the same 
problem viewed from the practical standpoint of organizing the 
elements of the work into a unity. Organization (Organisation), 
‘the relation of elements to each other’ is what ‘constitutes 
form’. Form may thus be summarized as ‘the quintessence of all 
elements of logicality, or more broadly, coherence [Stimmigkeit] 
in artworks’.34 Indeed, it is not going too far to suggest that for 
Adorno, art is form.
As little as art is to be defined by any other element, it is simply 
identical with form. Every other element can be negated in the 
concept of form…
[Form is thus] the distinguishing aspect of art… [it is] that in 
artworks by which they become artworks.
Art has precisely the same chance of survival as does form, no 
better.35 
The reason for this is that it is through the artefact’s form or 
coherence that ‘each and every successful work separates itself 
from the merely existing’. In separating itself from the merely 
33. Stimmigkeit was rendered as ‘consistency’ in the first English translation of Aesthetic 
Theory; ‘coherence’ in the second. Coherence one might say, following Quine, is simply 
consistency at the level of the whole. 
34. Aesthetic Theory, pp. 143, 140.
35. Ibid., pp. 140, 144, 141.
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existing, ‘art opposes the empirical [der Empirie] through the 
element [Moment] of form’ and thereby constitutes its ‘autonomy’ 
at the level of the work itself. In so doing form appears as ‘the 
law of the transfiguration of the existing, counter to which it 
represents freedom’.36
However, this separation/opposition/transfiguration is not 
understood to be the act of some transcendental aesthetic 
subjectivity, but is rather an ‘objective’ quality of the work. And 
it is with reference to this objective quality that Adorno uses the 
term ‘aesthetic’. In this regard, in form, the work is said to ‘free 
itself from being simply a product of subjectivity’. ‘In artworks, 
form is aesthetic essentially insofar as it is an objective deter-
mination [objective Bestimmung].’ Appearance, though, remains 
ineliminable from the reference to aesthetic: 
aesthetic form is the objective organization within each artwork of 
what appears as bindingly eloquent.37
So, how does the relationship between the expansion of 
materials and formal limitation appear, in that ‘law of move-
ment’ or self-development of art that is for Adorno, at the highest 
level, art’s ‘law of form’? In the first place:
Form inevitably limits what is formed, for otherwise its concept 
would lose its specific difference to what is formed. … the artistic 
labour of forming is always a process of selecting, trimming, 
renouncing. Without rejection there is no form…38
This is what leads to the vitalist reaction against form. In this 
respect, ‘the expansion of available materials’ (which Adorno 
believed had ‘been much overestimated by those external to it’) 
‘is offset by the renunciation demanded of the artist by … the 
condition of the [particular] material’ selected.
36. Ibid., pp. 142, 5, 143, emphases added.
37. Ibid., pp. 142–3.
38. Ibid., p. 144.
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Every innovative expansion of the material into the unknown, going 
beyond the material’s given condition, is to a large extent a function 
of the material and its critique, which is defined by the material 
itself.39
Selection of artistic materials is thus the determining factor 
here. In accordance with ‘the Hegelian argument against Kant’: 
‘The moment a limit is posited, it is overstepped and that against 
which the limit was established is absorbed.’ Conversely, as a 
‘posited unity’, form ‘constantly suspends itself [suspendiert sie] as 
such: essential to it is that it interrupts itself through its other [its 
materials] just as the essence of its coherence is that it does not 
[ultimately] cohere’.40 Otherwise it would as reconciled to, and 
hence become affirmative of, actuality.
The question of the delimitation of the expansion of the 
concept of artistic form is thus not, after all, a question of the 
extent of the expansion of artistic materials, or the existence of 
some a priori limit to the extent of that expansion. The expansion 
is in principle infinite for art as such, already, but not of course 
for any particular individual work. The question is rather that of 
the modes of the self-limiting suspension of the ‘empirical reality’ 
of a portion of what exists, performed by individual works, 
closing this portion off from its functional context, organizing or 
reorganizing it, and positing it as an object of artistic reflection; 
then, in part, suspending that suspension. This is a self-limiting 
suspension which – in so far as ‘the mediation of form and 
content demands that we recognize aesthetic [=artistic] form as 
sedimented [sedimentierter] content’41 – requires social form as its 
immanent ‘content’. Here, at the level of social form, the expan-
sion to infinity of possible artistic materials, which makes every 
selection of artistic materials into an act of freedom, mimics the 
39. Ibid., p. 148.
40. Ibid., pp. 5 and 143, emphasis added.
41. Ibid., p. 5.
178 thinking art
self-positing structure of infinity of the accumulation of capital 
(infinite productivity). Just as the subject-like quality of the 
autonomous artwork as a self-determining form (an object that 
presents itself as behaving like a subject) mimics both the fantasy 
of the freedom of the self-possessing bourgeois individual and 
the actuality of the ‘automatic subject’ of capital alike. And it 
does so, not directly, or immediately, but, in each case, via the 
alienated form of its own mediated objectivity; mimicking the 
alienated universality of the objective structures of the social 
forms of value and culture – commodity, money, capital, state, 
gender, race, sexuality…
In so far as sociality appears as form, it has only an alienated 
objectivity.
The issue here is thus less the ‘sociological’ one of the inter-
nality of autonomous art to the structures of capitalist societies, 
via its commodity form (the contradictory art commodity); still 
less any relationship of artistic representation to capitalism, at a 
thematic level; and far more the internality of the structures and 
processes of capitalist societies to autonomous art, qua autono-
mous; that is, not in its dependent or heteronomous dimension 
(as is usually supposed), but in its very autonomy itself. 
Crisis as form
It is within this structural historical immanence that ‘crisis’ 
appears as form: as a particular historical instantiation of the 
contradictory social form of art’s autonomy, pushed to the point 
of a seemingly irresolvable antagonism or antinomy. For crisis, in 
so far as it is becoming ‘permanent’, is a new form of capitalistic 
sociality as such. It is part of the core of the concept of crisis, as 
a moment of decision within a transitional process (at its limit, 
in its medical origin, a transitional process within illness from 
life to death), that it cannot be permanent. What is increasingly 
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referred to as ‘permanent crisis’, then, is no longer technically 
a crisis, but a new and terrible form of social reproduction – a 
form of social reproduction grounded in the temporality of 
systemic disjunction that is part of the temporal form of histori-
cal contemporaneity produced by the ‘globalization’ of capital.42 
Capitalist crisis is always a crisis in the consistency or coherence 
of the social itself. Contemporary art, in the critical sense of that 
term, is the art of such a situation.
In brief, then, crisis is a new general form of the social. It 
is expressed by that crisis of art that takes the form of a crisis 
of form. Crisis of form is the primary form-determination of 
contemporary art. Each individual work participates in that 
expression to the extent to which it enacts, or mediates, the 
problem of form as the problem of the self-limiting suspension of 
the real. 
42. Cf. Peter Osborne, ‘A Sudden Topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the Politics of Crisis’, 







Black Atlantis:  
the plantationocene 
AYesHA HAMeeD  
 
This is my first evening at Walker’s, once a sugar plantation and 
now a dairy. It is dusk.1 
I step outside of the flat, climb the slightly mossy stairs and 
turn right into the purpling light. To my left are horse stables, 
behind me is the house and in front of me are fields of grass. 
For Mark Fisher
1. Research for this work was made possible by a travel grant awarded by the Canada 
Council for the Arts to attend residencies at Alice Yard (Trinidad) and Fresh Milk 
(Barbados). 
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The sound of the frogs begins at dusk and it gets louder. The 
paved drive I am walking on ends at the field, and I turn right 
onto a dirt path. The grass is long on either side of the path. 
When I reach a lone tree to my left, the path dips down a small 
hill and continues to a line of trees in the distance. To the right 
is the South and there are some twinkling lights in the distance. 
A small bat swoops over my head. 
Underneath the alien and screechy whir of the frogs there is a 
silence. A black dog runs up to me from the big house and then 
turns around and goes back, looking back at me as if trying to 
get me to follow it. I walk away from it and into the long grass 
and listen. 
The frogs get louder. The sky turns black.
*
Another beginning: it is half past two and I’ve been waiting in 
the parking lot outside Harrison’s Cave for about thirty minutes. 
Tour buses and hired taxis efficiently pull in and out of the parking 
spaces, loading and unloading their American passengers. 
Two men are chatting beside me, one of them offers the other 
one a lift and they walk over to a brightly painted bus. I figure I 
have twenty minutes more to wait. 
I hear a loud noise and look up from my book to see a diesel-
powered minibus hurtling through the lot like a getaway car for 
a heist. It abruptly stops at a hasty angle near the bus stop where 
I am sitting. The sign on the bus just says ‘City’. People climb out 
quickly with the diesel engine rumbling. 
As I climb the stairs the bus speeds up again so fast I trip onto 
a seat. I pull myself up holding out my two Barbadian dollars 
to the driver with an apologetic ‘excuse me’ and the man in the 
passenger seat waves impatiently at me to sit down. 
I look out of the window as the bus hurtles down dirt roads 
hewn through fields of cane speckled with sun and dust. We 
screech to another stop and the engine grumbles and roars. 
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Outside are the fields of cane, and men and women waiting 
on the side of the road.
*
What is the relationship between climate change and plantation 
economies? This is an exploration of many things – the begin-
nings of a fourth chapter of an ongoing performance called 
Black Atlantis, visiting the heartland of one of the three stops of 
the triangular trade, and taking seriously Donna Haraway’s and 
Anna Tsing’s use of the term ‘Plantationocene’, which connects 
the development of a plantation form of production to the begin-
ning of the geological era that we are currently in.2 
The ‘Plantationocene’ is a placeholder for the relationship 
between agriculture and this era, called the Anthropocene. But 
the kind of agriculture they are thinking about is the violent 
replacement of diverse farming tactics, of forests and of pastures, 
by the factory-like extractive structure of plantations – the 
cultivation of single crops like sugar and cotton for export, 
produced by enslaved and indentured labouring bodies forcibly 
transported across vast distances. Plantations eradicate the 
diversity of what is cultivated, devastating the land, violently 
exploiting and expropriating the bodies working on the land and 
destroying any possible autonomy for self-sustenance for those 
living in these areas. 
[we use the term] Plantationocene for the devastating 
transformation of diverse kinds of human-tended farms, pastures, 
and forests into extractive and enclosed plantations, relying on 
slave labor and other forms of exploited, alienated, and usually 
spatially transported labor… Moving material semiotic generativity 
around the world for capital accumulation and profit – the rapid 
displacement and reformulation of germ plasm, genomes, cuttings, 
and all other names and forms of part organisms and of deracinated 
2. Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, ‘A Feminist Approach to the Anthropocene: Earth Stalked 
by Man’, Barnard Center for Research on Women Videos, vimeo.com/149475243.
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plants, animals, and people – is one defining operation of the 
Plantationocene, Capitalocene, and Anthropocene taken together.3
The Plantationocene suggests that the geological force of 
humans on the planet’s ecosystem had its roots in plantation 
slavery, its instrumentalization of the soil for a singular kind of 
production and its violent enslavement of bodies to be used as 
machines to cultivate and harvest the cane, and to ideally repro-
duce and sustain itself. As Anna Tsing says, the Plantationocene 
is formed of ‘machines of replication’ or ‘simplified ecologies, 
such as plantations, in which life worlds are remade as future 
assets’ – in other words it highlights the aftermath of a radical 
and violent incursion and its effects on lifeworlds that intertwine 
the human and the natural. 
It is an almost impossible endeavour to read a history of over 
three hundred years of plantations and their continually evolving 
social relations in the wake of the oldest instance of plantation 
slavery, and in the continued presence of descendants of slaves 
and plantation owners and overseers, against the slow temporal 
swings that mark climate change. Reading a still living and 
present history against a slowly unravelling future of increasing 
frequencies of natural disaster, the warming of the ocean, the 
jeopardization of sea life is incommensurable and probably 
pointless as they operate in such different registers, and the pos-
sibility of finding common ground at ground level is nearly nil. 
Atlantis
After day after day after day of sun in the morning, sun in the 
afternoon, rain sliced through the sky in a gash. The rainy 
season has just ended and at the margins there is still the threat 
of water. This has taken centre stage, today of all days. The 
3. Donna Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: 
Making Kin’, Environmental Humanities 6, 2015, p. 162; www.environmentalhumanities.org. 
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taxi drives up to the house. The rain is so fat and plummy that 
it is impossible to sprint up the steps to the car door without 
getting wet. 
The taxi approaches the outskirts of the city with the wipers 
barely clearing the view. Each stroke of the blades makes a 
grating sound. We drive past the terminal where all the ocean 
liners anchor, their bulky bodies indistinct in the distance 
with the thickness of the pelting water. And then we arrive 
at the Atlantis office. It is brightly coloured and full of tourist 
memorabilia: rum and beaches, coasters and keychains. There 
is some free fruit punch in the corner. On the wall is a mural, a 
window painted and encrusted to look like a coral wall. There 
is a television on each side of the room – one with a looping 
documentary promo on the submarine, the other tuned into 
CNN, an endless loop of Trump winning the Electoral College 
vote in late December. 
We wait. 
Two overwhelmed parents try to keep their identically dressed 
daughters calm on what appears to be their birthday. Busloads of 
tourists arrive and they watch these two children indulgently, or 
look at CNN. We all sit on purple leather benches. Outside the 
rain lashes at the windows. 
Finally the door opens and we are ushered out to walk the 
100 metres to the waiting boat. It is raining so hard that we are 
instructed to share the umbrellas they hand out to us. Still, I am 
drenched by the time I get to the boat. After a safety demonstra-
tion, and lots of loud music, we head off. The water is grey 
and the sky is also grey. The rain falls so thick on the window 
that the seascape falls into blurry pixels. Finally we arrive at a 
point in the middle of the water where a small metal structure 




In the early twentieth century John Ernest Williamson, son 
of an English sea captain, was fuelled by the stories about lost 
Atlantises and the sinking of pirate towns like Port Royal in 
Jamaica. With his brother George he designed and built a struc-
ture he called the photosphere, an underwater chamber with a 
glass panel, which was connected to a boat on the surface of the 
water by a tube made of concentric rings. 
Williamson moved to the Bahamas to build his photosphere 
as the surrounding waters are shallow, and the coral sand is 
sparkling and white. The sea is largely free of clouding phyto-
plankton, so the water is clear. The photosphere was used for a 
number of purposes, as a chamber to film the first underwater 
moving images, as a tourist novelty, where visitors could send 
postcards from the bottom of the sea through an underwater 
post office, and reportedly to salvage ships underwater. It is here 
that the 1916 film of 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea was filmed, the 
figures ghostly still. So was the film made in 1954.
Krista A. Thompson describes how these early immersions 
into the photosphere were dreamlike, but that the vista of 
the underwater was also perceived to be menacing. This was 
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reflected in Williamson’s own thinking as he travelled to present 
his work on the sea in a lecture titled ‘Beauty and Tragedy’. 
Bahamian land was not remarkably fertile but its marine life was 
blooming and rich and multiplying. 
In the late nineteenth century underwater life as a kind of 
spectacle flourished as an elite pastime. Young black men would 
dive to the bottom of the sea to grab mementos for genteel 
women waiting on boats, who peered into the sea through ‘tropi-
cal lorgnons’. The submarine world was seen as an underwater 
garden, a landscape or a forest.
Hutchinson … re-envisioned coral sponges as ‘welcoming palms,’ fish 
as ‘hummingbirds,’ and coral as ‘great trees’ and ‘stately forests’… 
Charles Ives also contended that the seascape bore similarity to 
‘the vast and magnificent tropical forests, clothed in perennial 
green, adorned with graceful vines, teeming with flowers of every 
hue, and vocal with countless birds of the most varied and of the 
richest plumage, bear to a lady’s little but luxurious boudoir, with its 
evergreen branches, climbing vines and captive birds in their small 
but gilded cages.’4
*
Jessica Lehman describes the sinking of the Dutch slave ship 
Leusden in Atlantic waters off the coast of Suriname in 1738. The 
captain nailed shut the hatches to the hold of the ship which 
held 680 women, men and children. Although well documented, 
the wreck has not been found. In thinking of the ocean depths 
as archive, she writes:
If the ocean has concealed some of slavery’s ruins, it has not so readily 
hidden all of the more recent traces of capitalist imperialism. In July 
1964, during one episode in a long history of marine toxic dumping, 
the British merchant vessel Halcience began to discard packages of 
radioactive waste from several state-operated sites into the Bay of 
Biscay.5
4. Krista J. Thompson, An Eye for the Tropics: Tourism, Photography, and Framing the 
Caribbean Picturesque. Durham NC: Duke University Press, 2006, pp. 170–71.
5. Jessica Lehman, ‘Blue History’, The New Inquiry, 6 February 2017, thenewinquiry.
com/essays/blue-history.
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The items of radioactive waste, gloves and bottles left more 
of a trace, and yet even in 1964 were preceded by a substantial 
history of toxic dumping. This she sees as connected to the slaves 
buried in the Leusden hull, the ocean a repository and archive 
defined by ruin. The radioactive bottles float on the surface, and, 
following Edouard Glissant’s telling, their counterparts are the 
Atlantic’s under-sea currents, ‘signposted by “scarcely corroded” 
balls and chains’.6
And then there are the corroded currents themselves, waves 
laced with oil after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 
where 210 gallons of oil and natural gas slicked down the conti-
nental slope into deep water. This Atlantis is not an archive of 
the dead, the radioactive, the oil slicked and the corroded. It is all 
these things. This is its tragedy and maybe its beauty. 
<––––––>
Coasts
I meet Aaron after twelve years when he picks me up for a drive 
around the island. We decide to go to the Atlantic coast, the 
first of two trips. It seems like a set of journeys of attrition as 
during the first trip we drive to a village called Bathsheba, and 
the second time to another part of the coast called Bath. I’m 
convinced that had we made a third trip it would have conjured a 
third stretch called Ba. But this kind of bad humour can’t hold.
The Atlantic coast is the wild coast of the island. The water 
here is choppy, the settlements more sporadic and the roads 
more intermittent and winding. As we drive through a sunny 
road we see a woman waiting patiently at the side. Aaron stops 
and offers her a lift to where she works, which turns out to be a 
restaurant called the Roundhouse on the water, which apparently 
serves great cocktails. How were you planning to get there? he 
6. Ibid.
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asks her, and she points to a tiny path that disappears in the long 
grass. Not a great idea, he says, as we drive to the restaurant and 
she agrees. The next cocktail is on me, she calls, as she climbs 
out of the car and waves. 
The first time I jump in the Atlantic I feel the water pull and 
push against my skin. It is warm and swirling. The sand below 
my feet is rocky and rough. The beach is empty. Behind me in 
the sand are stumps of wood periodically placed, remnants of a 
railway track used to transport sugar along the coast. The coast 
has receded since then and the stumps which once circled dry 
land are now half underwater.
I look to the east, across the water and see that there is no 
land in sight. Following my gaze, Aaron tells me that the next 
land mass is the Senegalese coast. I keep staring east. 
*
On 29 April 2006 a twenty-foot boat was spotted off Ragged 
Point on the south-eastern coast of Barbados. On board eleven 
bodies were found by the coastguards, preserved and desiccated 
by the sun and salt water. This was a ghost ship adrift for four 
months on the Atlantic Ocean. It set sail on Christmas Day in 
Praia in the Cape Verde Islands full of migrants from Senegal, 
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Guinea Bissau and Gambia en route to the Canary Islands. Each 
of these people paid £890 for their place on the boat. 
The boat ran into trouble at Nouadhibou, a Mauritian 
port, and was towed for a time by another ship. An article in 
the Guardian conjectures that the line was possibly severed by 
being hacked by a machete. Once adrift the boat began its slow 
movement across the Atlantic, buffeted by the winds and rain, 
and pulled westward by the ocean’s currents. By January all the 
passengers had died; many of their bodies were jettisoned into 
the sea or washed overboard. This ghost ship then travelled the 
2,800 miles to Barbados.
A note written by one of the men who died on board and a 
ticket for a Senagalese Airlines flight found on the boat provided 
the first pieces of the puzzle. According to the Guardian, these 
two notes were also found on board: 
‘I would like to send to my family in Bassada [a town in the interior 
of Senegal] a sum of money. Please excuse me and goodbye. This is 
the end of my life in this big Moroccan sea,’ the note said, according 
to a Barbados paper, the Daily Nation.
‘I am from Senegal but have been living in Cape Verde for a year. 
Things are bad. I don’t think I will come out of this alive. I need 
whoever finds me to send this money to my family. Please telephone 
my friend Ibrahima Drame.
 Signed Diaw Sounkar Diemi.’
El Pais’s account of note found on boat7
*
In the morning hours, radiation from the sun warms the land 
faster than it warms the sea. The hotter, lighter air of the land 
pulls the wind from sea to land. So, as the sun rises, the island is 
surrounded on all sides by winds that blow inland from the sea. 
7. Giles Tremlett, ‘After four months at sea, ghost ship with 11 petrified corpses washes 
up in Barbados’, Guardian, 29 May 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/may/29/
gilestremlett.mainsection.
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Barbados has only two species of plants that are unique to the 
island, ‘a common gully shrub Phyllanthus andersonii sometimes 
called broom, and a rare slender climber, Metastelma barbadense, 
which has no common name’.8 The rest of the nearly three 
thousand varieties of plants came from across the water – some 
borne on ships from across the ocean and violently cultivated, 
and others carried by forces of nature – by birds flying across the 
water and by the wind. 
[In Barbados] flora reach the shores on winds and ocean currents 
and with the help of birds. In addition many of our wild plants are 
deliberate introductions which have since become self-seeding and 
naturalised. It is often said that many of the wild plants of Barbados 
are exotic weeds.9
Plants grown from seeds blown across the Antilles were 
replaced by annihilating fields of sugar cane. These decimated 
plants, blown by wind and carried by ocean currents and birds, 
now grow thickly across dirt-hewn paths, on fields grown for 
grazing, and in gullies carved through coral caves.
A stronger system of winds travels from farther away. Trade 
winds blow across the Atlantic Ocean to the Caribbean Sea, car-
rying the weather, and for centuries the sails of ships from East 
to West. Dust from the Sahara Desert blows across the Atlantic, 
moving grain by grain the matter of one continent onto a line of 
islands on the other side of the ocean. Barbados is the first coast 
that these particles of dust touch, and for spring, summer and 
autumn the air is full of matter of the Sahel, and the earth is 
carpeted with its phosphorescence.
8. Sean Carrington, Wild Plants of Barbados, Oxford: Macmillan Caribbean, 2007, p. 1.
9. Ibid.
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Strangers at home:  
from referential to compositional  
artworking
CHRistiAn nYAMPetA 
At the beginning of December 2019 I was returning to New York, 
where I live. My flight from Casablanca landed on time at JFK 
Airport, but because I am in the process of changing my tem-
porary visa to a permanent one re-entry into the United States 
currently involves undergoing a secondary clearance process by 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Homeland Security of 
course scrutinize all visitors to the USA in a way, except that 
this secondary processing takes place in an office to which one 
is escorted by armed guard. Once in that brightly lit room, it 
becomes a matter of waiting for approval, alongside others who, 
like myself, rather comically do everything that they can to avoid 
eye contact and hide their mix of embarrassment, exhaustion 
and desperation.
I was used to this experience, having gone through it a 
number of times already, but this occasion was different in that I 
was called into a third office. ‘Mr Christian’, a commanding voice 
said, ‘please follow me this way.’ The person behind the voice 
was in civvies, but I assumed the bulge on his right hip was a 
concealed handgun. I followed him in complete silence deeper 
and deeper into the circuitous interiors of the airport, each step 
causing my anxiety to increase, until we reached our destination.
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The immigration officer firmly shook my tired hand. He con-
firmed my full name and date of birth, refrained from introducing 
himself, and instructed me to sit at his desk in a chair opposite his 
own. He took his own seat, placed my passport and immigration 
card down next to him, hit a few keys on his keyboard, but then 
immediately abandoned his computer, picked up a notebook, 
turned over the page to reveal a blank one and told me that I 
had been called in so that he could get to know me better. I had 
nothing to worry about; all I had to do was answer all his ques-
tions and I should be out of there in no time. I muttered something 
in acquiescence, shuffling awkwardly in my chair.
This anecdote was the beginning of a presentation that was 
initially announced as an audiovisual presentation commenc-
ing with a set of unadorned questions: How come my name 
is Christian? How to build a memory of present-day limits of 
living? How to layer the memories that are sometimes contra-
dictory, even though they are all true? How to reconcile the 
singular national and official memory with the multiple in-
dividual, collective memories, and perhaps even the geographical, 
geological and ecological ones?
The idea was to address these questions through sonic and 
visual fragments from a collaborative and open-ended film, 
People Who Think Together Dance Together. The film constructs 
social ecologies through ‘audiosocial’ structures in the form of a 
playlist that draws from artistic assemblies, philosophical con-
ferences, social gatherings, pedagogical convenings and spiritual 
conversations, within and beyond spaces and knowledges that 
come out of historical ruptures, discontinuities, disjointed 
continuities and other such modes of thinking. Indeed, People 
Who Think Together Dance Together is the name of collective 
parties and sonic gatherings initiated by the artist and librarian 
Rangoato Hlasane as an integral component of the symposiums 
of Another Roadmap for Arts Education Africa Cluster, a 
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research project on the history of arts education undertaken 
within a network of educators, artists and researchers working 
in four continents, initiated at the Institute for Art Education at 
Zurich University of the Arts (ZHdK).
From ‘what is art?’ to ‘when is it art?’
But, as it is almost obsolete to mention, the moment of January 
2020 in which the above announcement was made looks and 
feels very different from the month of May 2020 in which I 
write.1 As has been the case in most parts of the world, in New 
York museums are closed and so are all spaces of display. Instead, 
some of the exhibitions, talks, screenings and performances 
have migrated online. Previously, before the onset of the current 
convergence of crises, the question of what contemporary art is 
could have been addressed by looking at when contemporary art 
is accessible: contemporary art had been artworks that wider 
publics and audiences scarcely encounter before noon and rarely 
past 6 pm (9 pm on select days of the week). In other words, 
the contemporary art preserved, mandated and conserved by 
the gallery and the museum is barely lived with. I was already 
fascinated by something akin to the sociology of the quotid-
ian of such artwork that is not lived with. And now, with the 
nationwide mandatory sheltering directives that are currently 
in effect in order to minimize the spread of the virus, this new 
restriction of mobility reminds me of my personal encounter 
with the immigration officer. The following is a reflection on 
how this paradox of ‘artworks that are not lived with’ gives shape 
to artworkers as strangers in their own home. In order to do this, 
I return to my encounter with the HSI immigration officer.
1. I had prepared this presentation as an address to the CRMEP–ICA Thinking Art 
conference in London at the end of February 2020. However, I had to cancel my travel in 
anticipation of the global lockdowns now in effect in response to the ongoing Covid-19 
pandemic, and did not attend the conference.
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‘Basically’, the officer explained to me as I sat in what felt 
like a detentio in his office, ‘you were flagged up in our system 
because you are travelling from Mali.’ He paused and looked 
directly at me. ‘What do you do for work? What were you doing 
in Mali? How long were you there for? Where did you stay? Who 
were you in contact with? What places did you visit?’ I was taken 
a little aback by the rapid questioning and mumbled that I had 
attended the Bamako Biennale held across a number of cultural 
institutions in Bamako, the capital of Mali. I had stayed at Hôtel 
l’Amitié and my entire journey had been organized by the Office 
of the Malian Minister of Culture on whose invitation I was, in 
fact, travelling. I showed the officer a press release, my invitation 
letter, and the badge and tote bag I had received at the Biennale. 
I even produced a picture of Salif Keita, which I had taken at one 
of the opening ceremonies at the National Museum of Mali. I 
had also taken a photograph of the president himself, but, I said, 
I was more pleased with my picture of N’Diaye Ramatoulaye 
Diallo, the minister of culture, because I had found her opening 
speech nothing short of electrifying. 
‘What is a biennale?’, the officer asked. He was hard to read. I 
was not sure if this was a genuine question. He also asked who 
Salif Keita was and repeated his earlier question: ‘What do you 
do for work?’ ‘I am an artist’, I finally responded, hesitantly. ‘A 
visual artist’, I quickly clarified. I was myself starting to question 
what that actually meant and whether that was actually what I 
was. The officer unhurriedly took some notes. He must have felt 
my piercing eyes on his hand because he stopped to tell me that 
the object of the interview, as he called it, was for him to build 
a comprehensive profile of me, so that, assuming the interview 
was successful, next time my name was inadvertently flagged, 
the ‘system’ would automatically dismiss my case. I would then 
be admitted into the USA without the need for this HSI third-
degree processing.
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I momentarily relaxed until the officer asked again: ‘What is 
art?’ I took another close look at his face but could not determine 
a single emotion. I concluded he was deadly serious. Startled, the 
officer’s question – ‘what is art?’ – became ‘what does art do?’ I 
remembered that it was in my greatest interest to speak at the 
readiness of my listener, as artist Lawrence Abu Hamdan would 
say. My listener could very well be unsympathetic to my enthu-
siasm and I had to be very mindful of what I said. However, 
despite my best intentions, the question distilled itself into ‘what 
does artworking not do?’, and from there my mind tricked me 
into moving to ‘what does artworking undo?’
What does artworking not do?
As I sat opposite the immigration officer trying my best to 
answer his questions to his satisfaction, my mind was computing 
a hypothesis that an artwork is an index of the artist’s actions, 
whereby artists are social figures with free agency, capable of 
interpreting and transforming their senses, actions, movements 
and other matter – as well as those of whom they represent – 
into works of cultural value. As I was in self-preservation mode, 
my thinking engines inverted this axiom and an artwork started 
to reveal what the artworker does not do.
Here, an artwork seemed to appear as a depository of what I 
saw as the ‘non-actions’ of the artworker. Non-actions are not 
inactions. Artworking is rarely doing nothing; there is always 
an expenditure of energy and labour involved in its production. 
It is always a material reality, though sometimes formless. Thus 
this non-activity is indeed an expenditure of energy and this 
energy is undoing something. This is because an artwork sets 
itself against the background from which it emerges, this emer-
gence being a process of social, cultural and sometimes, when 
‘successful’, economic detachment. In turn, this detachment is 
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what distinguishes an artwork from other artworks, but also 
from ‘work’ in general. This emergence from the background is 
essentially a reference.
I am not sure if the officer understood what I was saying, or, 
if he did, I am not sure he agreed with me. He might be right to 
question my hypothesis because, paradoxically, it follows from 
refusing the foreground to the reference from which the artwork 
emerges. In fact, an artwork claims the foreground; it sets a new 
front and it detaches the artwork from its background. In other 
words, an artwork undoes the foreground of its reference, its 
‘previousness’.
By this time, the officer was asking me where I was born. I 
do not always welcome this question, precisely because, as an 
artworker, where I was born is sometimes part of my previous-
ness that I may strive to undo, for surely one cannot be an artist 
and still have a nationality… Effectively, I thought, the attraction 
to an artwork, its success and its acceptance reside in the resolu-
tion of this tension: despite the artist’s non-action, the artwork 
emerges and distinguishes itself from the background, and 
materializes itself as work of cultural value. I pointed out, gently, 
that my place of birth was stated on my passport.
Artworking and the ‘generative’ erasure of reality
I continued to diligently answer the immigration officer’s ques-
tions, but my mind was on its own runaway train of thought. A 
work becomes an artwork through ‘sculpting’. The emergence of 
an artwork is both a removal and a shaping of matter, effected 
in order to transform the perception of ‘reality’. This is an 
equally paradoxical phenomenon of ‘generative’ erasure. Even 
when performing, dancing or painting, artworking removes 
reality, shaping one form of reality into another, by landscaping 
perception.
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By now the officer was examining the stamps in my (Dutch) 
passport. This made me think of ‘landscape’ or landschap in 
Dutch, which originates from shaping the land. I thought about 
how this ‘scaping’ could be observed in most artistic fields whereby 
reality is sourced as raw material to be shaped. One can think 
of history as the source of reality, society as the source of reality, 
technology as the source of reality, discipline as the source of 
reality, popular culture as the source of reality, genealogy as the 
source of reality, language as the source of reality, and so on.
Sources of reality and their manifestation in artworking
Reflecting on these sources of reality pointed me to the artistic 
forms that result from the ‘scaping’ of these sources. For 
example, I thought how certain artworks take technology as 
their historical referent and suggest what the future might look 
like if this technology became the societal norm. Similarly, ar-
chives and their contents emerge as artworks that source history. 
The artworker’s role therein tends to include interventional acts, 
editorial reordering, museological presentations and polemical or 
corrective propositions for or against a historical account con-
tained in the source material. Alongside other obvious benefits, 
the agency of such archival interactions serves to validate the 
commissioning institution, even where the work is critical of it.
Next I thought about how artworking institutions are 
modelled after the preservative imperative of the museum. This is, 
of course, also the case for institutions that do not sell or collect 
artworks. I remembered an expression I had read somewhere: in 
terms of ‘differential inclusion’, an artworking institution will 
always benefit from the benevolence – and the antagonism – of an 
artwork. I then landed on socially engaged artwork, which is the 
way my own practice is regularly categorized. I heard whispers in 
my inner ear. Socially engaged artwork tends to be undertaken 
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through sourcing reality from the community, drawing from the 
human, social, historical and cultural resources of community 
groups in the expanded neighbourhood, network or cluster of the 
commissioning institution. The outcomes of these interactions 
are preceded by workshops where an expert is invited to lead a 
programme of learning that benefits the artist and the partici-
pants or contributors and sometimes also the institution. From 
these workshops, artworks may emerge. They might be recordings 
of the workshops, new events hosted by or including members of 
the community, as well as craft-based objects produced through 
some kind of transferable skills workshop. The collectively pro-
duced objects could be redistributed as exhibitions, or distributed 
across the community to the stakeholders involved. At times, the 
artworks are ‘useful’, as in the case of public artworks, for in-
stance: beyond their symbolic aspect, these also have a functional 
purpose inside or outside the commissioning institution. 
I continued to indulge in thinking about how artworks that 
emerge from the background of genealogy are developed through 
the archetypes of education. Many of them are described as 
research-based projects, curatorial research or artistic research, 
and their substance and their outcome are material, even when 
the focus is a theme, a theorem, a thesis or a theory that may be 
rewarded in the form of an academic degree, a fellowship or an 
associate position at an artworking institution. These activities 
may be presented as survey exhibitions that overview regional, 
national or transnational thematics; as biennales and their 
satellite appendixes; or as stagings within research exhibitions 
and vice versa. The exhibited works may include archives, films, 
partial or complete libraries and settings or scenes that function 
as pedagogical hubs or working stations. Accompanying volumes 
or catalogues are published. What is crucial here is not the 
singularity of the work but the argumentative ability of each 
work towards one thematic, curatorial subject or position.
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The same genealogical background can be sourced from the 
categories of the ‘body’, whereby the anatomical body, the social 
body, the cultural body, the public body, the historical body or 
the political body all serve as a source of reality to be reshaped. A 
reshaping of the perception of reality is at play and the artwork 
that sources the manifestations of the body partakes in this 
reshaping. The processes through which these artworks are 
produced tend to involve ‘performance’, which is a category as 
narrow and as broad as the concept of art itself.
The objective of a performance is to do something or to 
achieve something. In financial and managerial idioms, per-
formance is an indicator of the properties and the attributes of 
an actor; for example, an asset, a resource or a product. A sales 
agent, for instance, performs well if they meet or exceed their 
sales target. A website or an app performs well if it attracts 
readership, downloads or airtime. In other words, performance 
is linked to labour and, because wherever there is labour there is 
exploitation, performance indicates how such exploitation can 
be minimized – or maximized. The yield of this exploitation is 
sometimes expressed through a salary, a bonus, a profit or a loss, 
but its measure, albeit arbitrary, is how well or how badly the 
actor or agency in question has performed.
But how was I performing? Was I going to be allowed back 
into the country? Maybe I did not really care at this point, 
continuing to explain what art ‘undoes’ to the officer. Perfor-
mance is a compelling category for examining an artwork as 
a depository of non-actions, being unlike other categories of 
artworking that are rooted in the tradition of an artist studio 
and/or its contemporary equivalent working spaces that are 
usually inaccessible to the viewing public. A performance may 
of course require the use of a studio to research, rehearse and 
develop the performance, but the delivery and the experience rely 
on the presence of an audience while the artworkers (re)produce 
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the work – while labouring. The double presence of the artwork-
ers and the public is thus the actual product of a performance; it 
is a prerequisite, and sometimes even the object and motivation 
behind the production of the work. A performance seems to say: 
I exist. This body exists. This somebody exists. There is virtue, 
value, validity or urgency to my experience and to the existence 
that produces it.
Even when an artist appears either pre-recorded or live on a 
screen via a remote appearance infrastructure, or when the artist 
enlists deputies, participants or collaborators that carry out the 
performance on the artist’s behalf, what matters is the presence, 
the biography, the existence, the problem, the body of the artist 
or what/who they represent. Performance is the production of 
body matters, and the social and cultural conditions in which 
such a body can exist. It is a process of affirmation of the matters 
of the body and its lives. The cultural valuation, circulation and 
distribution of performance in spaces of display depend on the 
public attendance of commissioned or self-initiated events. For 
this, performance seems to necessitate a public and a stage on 
which a performance takes place, and unfolds, corrects, redresses 
or addresses a given history, problem, memory or future. 
Furthermore, it is the object of a performance to ‘produce’ a 
public and a stage. It can be an institutional aim to stage events, 
workshops and performances in order to produce new policies 
and new publics. As such, even when the performance is trans-
gressive, this serves to accumulate further social standing for the 
performing artist and the commissioning cause or institution.
In this sense, performance seems to fuel every form of 
artworking. But what is artworking performing and why – to 
achieve what? What is the finality of the performance and what 
does it not do? In other words, in what way does an artworker’s 
performance shape and reshape reality? How can the presence 
of the artist reveal what they have undone? In what ways can 
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an artist’s performance reveal their non-actions? The presence 
of the artist in any given space of display, be it domestic, public 
or privately owned, is framed as a ‘belonging’ in the centre or 
in the margin. In effect, belonging is the object of performance. 
Performance and artworking in general are a process of affirming 
belonging, and the contention resides in the recognition of what 
the centres are and what the margins are.
Fine artworking and the gold standard of all artworking
I went on to think about how fine art, at least in English, is art 
for art’s sake, in the sense that the finality of artworking is art 
itself, but I also thought that the denomination of fine art might 
be a specific financial categorization of artworking. Fine art 
might even be the symbolic immortalization of the class that 
such art represents. In other words, fine art’s claim to be un-
bothered by the political is a veiled claim to conserve the social 
reference from which it emerges.
Indeed, sometimes artworking supposes detachment from 
reality, but (fine) art, in fact, draws from (art) history as the 
primary source of reality from which it shapes itself, but this 
time without unshaping or undoing such background. An 
artwork may also offer a commentary on another artwork. It 
can, of course, also offer a commentary on a work from popular 
culture or a non-fine artwork. There is great merit to these 
mutual commentaries. For instance, a fine artwork can speak 
against the absence of fine artworks in previous histories: an 
artwork can be produced by a member of an under-represented 
community.
This under-representation means under-collected and this 
generally culminates in finally fitting into a world that has thus 
far rejected some of its members. To fit in may impute adjust-
ing to or accepting injustice, and this could mean that those 
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injustices will continue. However ambiguous this gesture of 
differential inclusion may appear, speaking against deliberate 
absences can be crucial and urgent, because a fine artwork, 
virtually or actually collected by a museum, is the gold standard 
of all artistic productions.
The comments artist and researcher Emma Wolukau-
Wanambwa came to mind here: the museum should not only be 
understood as a building ‘in the sense of a place to go and look at 
art’; a museum should also be understood in ‘its function within 
the context of fine art’s discursive field’. This is because, at least 
‘within Western fine art discourses, the “museum” essentially 
functions as a gold standard – a guarantor of value. Even though 
you may never go to a museum, let alone have your work col-
lected by one, belief in the merits of its existence and a relative 
consensus regarding its position and function means that pretty 
much everything that exists and occurs within art’s discursive 
field somehow happens in relation to it – even when that relation 
is antagonistic.’2 
In that sense ‘fine’ art or the art inside the actual or virtual 
museums is the art that evaluates and therefore immortalizes all 
other artistic expressions.
Online and offline centres and margins
The reader might be pleased to learn that I was admitted 
back into the country without further complications. In fact, 
I am writing this at my desk in New York, surrounded by all 
the comforts that a cherished home can bring. However, once 
again, as any reader will be aware, the world of early December 
2019 differs greatly from the present moment of May 2020: 
2. Emma Wolukau-Wanambwa, in conversation with Aïcha Diallo, Contemporary And, 
1 October 2014, www.contemporaryand.com/magazines/a-lot-has-changed-in-the-four-
years-since-i-started-visiting-kampala (accessed 20 November 2015).
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the outbreak of Covid-19 has forced all public life to grind to 
an abrupt halt and to proceed mostly from private homes, for 
those who can afford them. I still think about the encounter 
with the immigration officer, who asked me how I earn a living. 
Good question. I avoided the question by explaining vaguely 
how the finality of an artwork indeed resides in its ability to be 
transacted. This transaction is of course financial, but it defines 
the transcultural transactions across the orbital system of the 
museum and funding institutions alike, and the infrastructures 
in between, including the commercial gallery, and its network of 
philanthropists, dealers, art fairs, not-for-profit institutions and 
art schools. ‘Why would The Mondriaan Fund want to support 
projects outside the Netherlands?’, the officer asked me. 
In a way, the answer to this question is a reflection on the 
double and simultaneous movements of belonging that an 
artwork makes, from margins to the centres, and vice versa. The 
Mondriaan Fund is a virtual type of museum, and any museum 
is the imagined finality of artworking, the conscious or inadvert-
ent guarantor of keeping the body that matters culturally, of 
staging justice in the form of recognition and (re)distribution. 
But in this financialized, transactional ecosystem, the body that 
really matters is that of Homo economicus of some sort, a trader.3 
In this way, the museum is a living sarcophagus, a public sep-
ulchre of Homo economicus. It is nearly obsolete to repeat them 
here, but at that moment the words of André Bazin came rushing 
through my brain:
at the origin of painting and sculpture there lies a mummy complex. 
The religion of ancient Egypt, aimed against death, saw survival as 
depending on the continued existence of the corporeal body. Thus, 
by providing a defence against the passage of time it satisfied a basic 
psychological need in man, for death is but the victory of time. To 
3. Sylvia Wynter, ‘Africa, the West and the Analogy of Culture: The Cinematic Text 
after Man’, in Jane Givanni, ed., Symbolic Narratives/African Cinema: Audiences, Theory and 
the Moving Image, London: British Film Institute, 2000. 
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preserve, artificially, his bodily appearance is to snatch it from the 
flow of time, to stow it away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life. 
It was natural, therefore, to keep up appearances in the face of the 
reality of death by preserving flesh and bone.4
Universal variability of artworking
In fact, in order to convince the immigration officer that I was 
not ‘a bad guy’, I told him that I had received the European Union 
Art Prize at the Bamako Biennale. This made me think of the 
announcements of artist prizes in general, which tend to be 
accompanied by brief quotations from the awarding jury panel 
members, who preoccupy themselves with this question: in what 
way has the artist ‘preserved’ and at the same time ‘advanced’ 
their field of knowledge? The assumption here is that the winning 
artwork is shaped from a reality sourced from a given, verifiable 
and quantifiable phenomenon, but in a novel and distinct way 
that reflects the time, space, culture, society and historical 
moment in which the artwork is produced. In other words, 
the artwork has to be similar in many respects to the existing 
artworks from art history, but the new artwork also has to be 
distinguishable in one or more significant ways. If this is the case, 
then the shaping of reality proceeds by way of sampling reality.
During my encounter with the immigration officer, my mind 
really was unsparing, and paradoxes piled up, born of art-
working’s imperative to not only preserve culture or reality, but 
also transform this mortal and transitory reality into something 
immortal and intransigent. Artworking is not only the per-
formance of ‘I exist’, but especially of ‘I shall exist’. Paradoxically, 
fine artworking also proclaims ‘I have always existed’. This im-
agined pre-existence of artworking transforms the individual ‘I’ 
into a universal ‘I’, into a subjecthood that institutes a universal 
4. André Bazin, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’, in Andre Bazin, What Is 
Cinema?, vol. 1, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005 (1967), pp. 9–16, p. 9.
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variable. The institution of this universal variability of artwork-
ing aims at transforming and preserving subjects, cultures and 
realities beyond their physical existence and manifestations. 
Inevitably, this need to preserve culture by representing it in the 
future is bound to clash with opposing visions of what the past, 
the present and therefore the future of reality should be.
If the object of such sampling of reality is to produce a 
universal variable, this same sampling of reality can also produce 
cultural, social and political margins: it is the nature of artists 
to perceive their reality as marginal, even where they themselves 
are or represent the centre. A prize, an award or even a commis-
sion is an example of such contradiction, whereby the centre is 
perceived as the margin. I felt that this paradox only became 
heightened at this moment of the museum closures.
From referential to compositional artworking?
’Social Ecologies/Presenting Catastrophe’ is the title of the panel 
to which I would have contributed at the ‘Thinking Art’ confer-
ence at the ICA in London. I am not sure if I have addressed this 
theme here, but I have learnt that, although paradoxes are not 
problems as such, I am compelled to conclude that the current 
situation of physical distancing has forced the museum to 
rethink the obviousness of its own body. In effect, since bodily 
proximity to most of the material substances that constitute 
the memorial practice inherent to the museum is currently 
impossible, art institutions have rushed to render their content 
digitally, beyond their normal opening hours, in much the same 
way that artists work and operate. Computers and the Internet 
are obviously quite material, but differently so from the struc-
tures that give shape to painting and sculpture – the ancestral 
ghosts of artworking. But in this process, the more the museum 
has a collection, the more unconvincing their online presence 
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has become: the more institutional an institution, the more it 
suffers from a principled infirmity to respond meaningfully to 
the urgency. This awkward illiteracy might be explained by their 
mandate to ‘conserve’, as opposed to intervene. In a way, this 
objective could also help to explain why artworking produces 
strangers at home: it is, to paraphrase an email from artist and 
theorist Kodwo Eshun, because a catastrophe – a pandemic, 
in the current case – exaggerates all anti-conservative, hyper-
conservative and post-conservative tendencies at the same time.
In the guise of a conclusion, it makes sense to return to the 
‘reality’ about which I have deliberately spoken without question-
ing or problematizing it, because of the lack of space. In the 
words of philosopher and educator Emmanuel Banywesize, it 
is a condition whose present history has embarked on a future 
course driven by the control of knowledge and digital tech-
nologies, enforced and dominated by a totalitarian capitalism 
which accommodates political authoritarianisms. Far from 
being predictable, this future is unstable and uncertain. It 
harbours multiple crises and deadly threats, barbarities, enmi-
ties, as shown by the multiple decisions to close borders, by 
the withdrawal into nationalistic exceptionalisms, and by the 
persistence of discourses informed by the enduring temptation 
to inflict death on layers of fellow humans whose members are 
still perceived as inferior and transformable into guinea pigs for 
‘scientific’ progress and the affirmation of power. Beyond the 
celebration of the digital revolution, and in the face of planetary 
viral threats, the present manifests itself in ‘the crisis of human-
ity which cannot manage to constitute its own humanity, and 
therefore, the crisis of the globe still incapable of becoming a 
world, and the crisis of humans still unable to accomplish their 
humanity’.5 This crisis constitutes a challenge to bodies, feelings, 
5. Edgar Morin, Pour sortir du XXe siècle, Paris: Fernand Nathan, 1981, p. 345, my 
translation, cited in Emmanuel Banywesize Mukambilwa, ‘L’humanisme comme pilier de 
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emotions, intelligence and more. In particular, it challenges the 
educational, representational and conservational institution as 
a space for the production and transmission of knowledge and 
relations. The challenge consists in rebuilding new spaces for the 
imaginary, drawing from the knowledge practised by all forms of 
life, toward a new thought capable of apprehending, unambigu-
ously, the co-belonging of all humans – and in fact also all non-
humans, and the non-human humans – to a common life. In so 
doing, artworking could move from the estranging referential 
mode to a compositional praxis, as a movement that heightens 
the responsibility of all, in the face of a shared vulnerability.
la Politique pour la vie. Réflexion sur le Covid-19’, April 2020, published in Centre d’art 
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